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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The literature on empathy falls into two distinct 
groups: interpersonal. empathy--empathy in person to person 
relationships--and aesthetic empathy-empathy in person to 
art object relationships. In general, the earlier empathy 
theorists, who wrote around the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, concerned themselves 
mainly with aesthetic empathy, while contemporary empathy 
theorists are interested almost exclusively in interpers.onal 
empathy. 
It is the hypothesis of this dissertation that these 
two kinds of empathy-interpersonal empathy and aesthetic 
empathy--constitute one and the same factor or ability. On 
the basis of this hypothesis it is predicted that persons 
of high interpersonal empathic ability tend also to be high 
in aesthetic empathic ability. 
While the primary purpose of this dissertation is to 
verify this hypothesis, a second aim is exploratory. Since 
the year 1949, a great deal has been written about the 
measurement of empathic ability, and several tests have been 
constructed purporting to measure this ability. One of the 
purposes of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate 
1 
these and all other possible methods o£ measuring empathic 
ability. On the basis o£ this evaluation methodological 
suggestions regarding future e£forts to measure empathic 
ability will be made. 
One further prediction to be tested in this disserta-
2 
. tion is that ministers who are engaged in Clinical Pastoral 
Training are above average in empathic ability. 
2. Definitions 
"Empathy" is the English translation rendered by 
Titchener for the German word Ein£8.hlung, a noun which in 
turn derives from the reflexive verb sich einftthlen.l ~ 
ff!hlung is literally translated "in-feeling" and sich ein-
ftthlen is "to feel onesel£ into." Titchener expressed some 
hesitation about translating Einftlhl.ung as "empathy, n but 
concluded finally that "empathy" was probably the best, 
even though not perfect, translation. This has been the 
general consensus of writers ever since that time. Some 
have preferred the literal translation, "in-feeling," but 
most have used "empathy," though with varying degrees o£ 
reservation. 
The roots of the words "empathy" and Einfflhlung empha-
size that this is a process of feeling• But empathy is also 
a cognitive process--the process whereby feeling is recog-
1. Edward Bradford Titchener, Experimental Psychology o£ the 
Thought Processes (New York: MaCMillan, 1909), p. 21. 
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nized or perceived--in the cognitive sense--in another per-
son or object. It is a £eeling-process o£ perception in 
which the object o£ perception is £eeling. 
It is empathy as an ability to perceive £eeling rather 
than empathy as a process o£ feeling which is of primary 
concern in this dissertation. Consequently, it is suggested 
here that empathy be understood to mean pathic perception--
the perception of £eeling or emotion. Empathic ability then 
is the ability to recognize or perceive feeling. As such, 
it is an ability like any other perceptual ability, and can 
be measured and quantified. 
This definition of empathy as pathic perception makes 
no prejudgment about the manner in which this process o£ 
perception operates. Thus the question o£ the validity o£ 
various theories of empathy is left open to be considered 
in Chapter II and in the concluding chapter. 
A question may be raised with regard to the meaning of 
the perception of £eeling in inanimate objects. There can 
be no doubt that some persons do perceive feeling in inani-
mate objects. This is especially so with regard to works of 
art, and several of the tests to be used in this disserta-
tion show that feeling can be perceived even in abstract 
designs. The problem is to determine the meaning of "cor-
rect" or "accurate" perception of feeling with regard to 
inanimate objects. The solution adopted here, though not 
entirely satisfactory, is the most practical--i.e., the 
:reeling exhibited by an inanimate object is the :reeling 
perceived in it by the majority o:r people who look at it. 
An inanimate object is regarded here as having the :reeling 
tone that most people perceive it to have. 
4 
Given this operational definition o:r "accurate" per-
ception, "empathic ability" will be used to re£er to the 
ability to perceive :reelings and emotions accurately. Where 
the object o:r perception is another person the ability will 
be re£erred to as "interpersonal empathic ability." Where 
the object o:r perception is an art object the ability will 
be referred to as "aesthetic empathic ability. n 
3. Limitations 
The sensory mode of empathic perception to be consider-
ed here is primarily visual~ In regard to interpersonal em-
pathy, the perception of persons will be conceived o:f main-
ly in terms o£ persons as visual stimuli, e.g., as :racial 
expression, gesture, posture, etc. The non-verbal, expres-
sive behavior o£ persons which is vis:ually perceptible is 
the aspect o:f interpersonal empathy with which this disser-
tation is specifically concerned. 
Likewise, in regard to aesthetic empathy only the per-
ception of works o:r visual art will be considered, e.g., 
painting, sculpture, architecture, and graphics. Music and 
literature will not be dealt with at all. 
One aspect o:r visual perception--color--has also been 
eliminated £rom this study. The whole subject of the a:f£ec-
5 
tive tone of colors constitutes a field in itself, and will 
not be considered here. In fact, all of the stimuli used in 
the experimental part of this study are without color. 
Much recent literature from the clinical field refers 
to the empathic relationship between counselor and client.l 
The implication of this is that the empathic process in-
cludes not only the counselor's perceiving his client's 
feelings but also his communicating this understanding to 
the client. This conception of empathy includes not only 
perception but also a response, a communicating to the 
other that his feeling has been perceived. 
As the definition of empathy as pathic perception im-
plies, this dissertation will consider empathy as percep.. 
tion and not as communication of perception. Only the per-
ceptual half of the empathic relationship will be consider-
ed here--if indeed the term "empathic relationship" may 
validly be used in the manner described above. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
There has been no previous experimental research on the 
problem of this dissertation. There have been attempts to 
measure empathic ability, and these will be reviewed in 
Chapter III; but there have been no attempts to demonstrate 
experimentally the identity of interpersonal empathic abil-
1. Joseph F. Woodson, "The Meaning and Development of Empa-
thy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 
1954). 
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ity and aesthetic empathic ability. 
There have been theoretical works which have held that 
empathy in relation to persons and empathy in relation to 
art objects is one and the same process. These works are 
reviewed in Chapter II. None of them has been devoted sole-
ly to this issue, however. In fact, the hypothesis has no-
where been defended at great length or by disciplined argu-
ment. The writings of Theodor Lipps constitute the only 
considerable exception to this last statement. 
5. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
A good theory may be of value without any experimental 
evidence to support it; an experiment, on the other hand, 
is of little value without a sound theory as a base. But, 
though theory and experiment are equally valid sources of 
knowledge, better still is their proper combination. 
In the field of empathy study, however, it may at the 
present time be necessary to lean rather more heavily upon 
theory than upon experiment, since the available instru-
ments for measuring empathic ability are still rather crude. 
A statement such as the following by SUllivan is not encour-
aging to the psychometrist: 
So although empathy may sound mysterious, re-
member that there is much that sounds mysterious 
in the universe, only you have got used to it; 
and perhaps you will get used to empathy.l 
1.- Harry Stack Sullivan; The Interpersonal Theory of Pn-
chiatry (New York: w.w. Norton, 1953), pp. 41-42. 
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As theory precedes experiment, this dissertation will 
begin in Chapter II with a review of the theoretical writ-
ings on empathy, especially those which bear upon the pro-
blem of the dissertation. The early issues in empathy the-
ory as well as certain modern problems will also be dis-
cussed in order to provide a background and frame of refer-
ence in which to view those theoretical statements which 
are directly pertinent to the problem of the dissertation. 
Following the theoretical discussion, Chapter III will 
review all of the methods that have been used to measure 
empathic ability. Included in this review will be tests 
that have sought specifically to measure empathic ability 
and also tests which though conducted with some other pur-
pose in mind none the less show some possibility of being 
used in the measurement of empathic ability. Evidence will 
be presented indicating why this latter group of tests 
might be used in the measurement of empathy. 
In Chapter IV it will be shown how these past efforts 
at measuring empathic ability were utilized in the construc-
tion of a battery of seven tests of empathic ability--Test 
Battery: Form I. The manner in which this battery was used 
to test the hypothesis o:f this dissertation will be explain-
ed. The seven tests in the battery will be described and 
their rationale for inclusion in the battery shown. The 
mode o:f scoring o:f the tests, their administration, and the 
nature of the test sample will also be discussed. 
The results of the experiment using Test Battery: Fo:nn 
! will then be presented in Chapter V. The statistical anal-
ysis applied to the test data will be explained and results 
of this analysis presented and interpreted. The implications 
for the hypothesis of the dissertation of the analysis of 
the data will be discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter VI conclusions will be drawn on the 
basis of both the theoretical discussion and the experiment-
al study. The conclusions will deal with the hypotheses that 
persons of high interpersonal empathic ability tend also to 
be high in aesthetic empathic ability, and that interperson-
al empathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability consti-
tute one and the same ability, and al.so the secondary hy-
pothesis that certain kinds of persons tend to be higher in 
empathic ability than the general population. Some implica-
tions of this study for a general theory of empathy will al-
so be sketched out. 
Recommendations for future research in the general area 
of the problem of this dissertation, and more specifically 
for future efforts to measure empathic ability, will also be 
found in Chapter VI. Included wil.1 be an evaluation of the 
tests used in Test Batten: Form I and also of all other 
known methods of testing empathic ability. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF EMPATHY 
Owing to the difficulty o:f measuring empathic ability 
and the necessity of relying heavily upon theory at the 
present time, it is the purpose o:f this chapter to indicate 
what a great mass o:f theoretical evidence exists in support 
of the hypothesis of the identity of interpersonal and aes-
thetic empathic ability. Theorists have differed greatly 
over the question o:f how empathy operates, yet almost with-
out exception they have agreed that it operates in the same 
way whether the object o:f empathic perception be another 
person or an art object. 
This chapter will al.so provide some background and 
orientation in the :field o:f empathy theory, though this is 
not its primary aim. 
The chapter is organized on the basis of the three is-
sues that concerned empathy theorists as the theory :first 
developed around the turn of the century despite the :fact 
that contemporary empathy theorists no longer treat these 
same issues. The three questions which remained live is-
sues through the 1920's were: (1) lhes empathy operate di-
rectly and immediately or does some other process inter-
vene? (2) Does empathy involve some kind of projection o:f 
the self; and if so, what does this mean? ( 3) Does empathy 
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involve or require motor behavior or kinesthetic sensations? 
The first section below will deal with those theorists 
who postulate a conscious, active self, which many o:f them 
think o:f as being projected into the object of empathic per-
ception. The second section will deal with those theorists 
whose greatest concern is with the question o:f whether empa-
thy operates directly and immediately or by association. The 
Gestalt psychologists are the great defenders of the hypoth-
esis of immediacy. The third section will deal with those 
theorists who insist upon the importance of motor activity 
in empathic perception. 
These three classes o:f theories are not mutually exclu-
sive; there is considerable overlapping. For example, a the-
orist who used the concept o:f the self might or might not 
believe that empathy operates by association or includes mo-
tor activity. Also, the vast majority o:f motor theorists 
hold that empathy operates by association. However, what the 
placing of a theorist in any of these three categories is 
intended to indicate is that this is the issue to which that 
theorist devoted most o:f his energies, and that it is thus 
the typical part o:f his theory of empathy. 
Early empathy theory was developed largely in the con-
text of aesthetics. Recent empathy theory has been developed 
primarily in the context o:f clinical or counseling psycholo-
gy. Neither has been particularly concerned with the ques-
tion o:f whether aesthetic and interpersonal empathy are one 
11 
and the same. In general the early theorists seem to have 
taken this for granted. The more recent theorists, on the 
other hand, have had little or no interest in aesthetics. 
It is only the Gestalt psychologists who, being interested 
in a holistic approach, have tried to relate aesthetic per-
ception and interpersonal perception. 
The theorists to be discussed in this chapter will be 
considered in terms of their definition of empathy and their 
conception of its operation. More pointedly it will be asked 
whether they consider aesthetic and interpersonal empathy to 
be the same, whether they make some distinction between 
them, and if so, what it is. 
1. Theories Using the Concept of Self 
i. The Theory of Theodor Lipps 
Though not the ultimate originator of the theory of em-
pathy, Theodor Lipps may nevertheless be called the father 
of empathy theory. The first extensive treatment of the sub-
ject is from his pen. 
Lipps's choice of the reflexive verb sich einftthlen to 
refer to the process of empathy was not original. Robert 
Vischer had used the term earlier in his writings,l but 
for Lipps it was in perfect accord with his orientation as 
an act psychologist. 
1. Robert Vischer, Ueber das optische Formgeftthl (Leipzig: 
Hermann Credner, 1~73). 
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In the opening pages of his Raum!sthetik Lipps de-
scribes what he means by Einf11hlung (empathy) by means of 
the example of his perception of a doric column. The shape 
of the column is to the observer an event; he is in a sense 
making the column. He is feeling in himself the movements, 
stresses, and strains which he would experience in becoming 
or being the column. These movements and forces, however, 
he experiences not as being in himself but in the column. 
All of this is given immediately in the act of perception. 
He neither intends it nor stops to recollect past knowledge. 
The column seems to him to be thrusting itself upward and 
bracing itself' under the load of the architrave. All the en-
ergy which it thus exerts is in fact the energy of the ob-
server projected into the inert column. But, it is precise-
ly this exercise of his own will, this feeling of his own 
strength, or this feeling of efficient functioning which 
gives to the observer the pleasure he finds in this experi-
ence.l 
Lipps is at pains to make the point that when one per-
ceives feelings in another, the feelings are not those of 
the other but one's own. Nevertheless, they are experienced 
as belonging to the other. The feelings aroused in oneself 
upon perceiving another are projected back upon the other. 
1. Theodor Lipps1 Raumaesthetik und geometrischoptische Tlluschungen (Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius· Barth, 1897), 
pp. 5-6. 
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"Der Gegenstand desselben ist unser 'objectiviertes,' in 
Andere hineinverlegtes [projected] und demgemlss in Anderen 
vorgef'undenes Selbst.; nl Thus one .feels onesel.f ~ the 
other. One perceives his self-.feeling as the .feeling of the 
other. He .feels at one with the other, at least in the 
realm o.f .feelings. I.f the other is animate, the .feeling pro-
jected upon it may or may not correspond to the .feeling it 
is actually experiencing. If the other is inanimate, the 
.feeling projected upon it by the observer is certainly not 
being experienced by it. In either case, the .feeling avail-
able to the observer is simply the .feeling of himsel.f--him-
sel.f .feeling himsel.f. As Lipps says regarding the "I" who 
.feels himself into another: 
Und was ist dies nich"?--Es ist dasjenige 
Ich das ich immer erlebe, wenn ich fUhle. • • 
n!mlich dasjenige, das wir--nicht denken oder 
erschliessen, sondern in jedem Augenblick 
unseres bewussten Lebens unmittelbar erleben 
oder haben, ist gegeben in den Geffthlen.2 
As he has expressed in this passage the emphasis that the 
feeling tone o.f the object of empathic perception is given 
directly and immediately to consciousness, similarly in 
Komik und Humor Lipps stresses that this is so because the 
perceived .feeling is none other than sel.f-feeling: 
1. Theodor Lipps, Komik und Humor (Hamburg: Leopold Voss, 
lg9g), p. 223. 
2. Theodor Lipps, nAesthetische Einff!blung," z. Psvchol., 
22(1900), 415-50. 
Dies Sympathiegeffthl ist Selbstgefnhl, aber 
doch wiederum vom unmittelbaren SelbstgefUhl 
verschieden. Der gegenstand desselben ist unser 
nObjectiviertes", in Andere hineinverlegtes, 
und demgemlss in Andere vorgefUndenes Selbst. 
So mitssen wir auch das Sympathiegefflhl als 
objectiviertes SelbstgefUhl bezeichnen. Wir 
ffthlen uns in Anderen, oder f6hlen Andere 
unmittelbar in uns. Wir ftlhlen uns in oder 
14 
durch den Anderen beglftckt, befreit, ausgeweitet, 
gehoben, oder das Gegenteil.l 
Despite its character as objectified self-feeling, em-
pathy is not simply subjective, as though a given stimulus 
might give rise to any feeling whatsoever. Lipps gives the 
example of seeing an angry man. He sees the man, a man who 
has the appearance of being angry. He understands the con-
cept of anger. He has experienced anger and can see it in 
others. Seeing the angry man, he reproduces from memory 
this feeling of anger in himself. The feeling of anger is 
his feeling, but it also corresponds to that of the other 
man. 2 Lipps is referring here to the operation of empathy 
by association, a position he generally eschews. 
Lipps's more characteristic position is that emp3.thy 
is direct, immediate, and unique, operating neither by anal-
ogy nor association.J He observes, for example, how the 
child responds to its mother's smile immediately, before it 
1. Theodor Lipps, Komik und Humor, pp. 223-24. 
2. Lipps, nAesthetische Ein.tnhl.ung," p. 417. 
3. Earl of Listowel, A Critical Histo~ of Modern Aesthetics 
{London: George Allen and Unwin, 1~3), p. 69. 
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has had any opportunity to associate it with gratification.l 
In £act, Lipps's insistence on the uniqueness o£ empathy as 
being rooted in the innate structure of the human organism 
has opened him to accusations of mysticism and metaphys.ical-
ism. On the other hand, Arnheim sees in Lipps the anticipa-
tion of the Gestalt principle of isomorphism--i.e., because 
of his emphasis on immediacy. 2 
So intensely does Lipps express the conviction of the 
observer that he is feeling into the other that he may well 
appear to be describing a mystical or ecstatic experience. 
He says, for example, that in the empathic experience "the 
object is myself and by the very same token this self o£ 
mine is the object. • • the antithesis between myself and 
the object disappears, or rather does not yet exist.n3 But, 
this may be taken as an accurate phenomenological descriP-
tion of empathic experirence and need not be taken to imply 
any mystical theory of how empathy operates. Similarly, 
Lipps speaks of "participation in the li£e of" another 
(Lebensbetltigung)4 yet those who have undergone the expe-
rience he describes recognize this as an appropriate de-
1. Theodor Lipps, lsthetik, P§Icholo~ie des Sch6nen und dqr 
Kunst (Hamburg: teoPi)ld Voss, 190 ) , I, p. ll4. 
2. Rudolf Arnheim1 "The Gestalt Theory o£ Expression," Psy-
cho!. Rev., 56\1949), 156-71. 
3. Theodor Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feel-
ings," trans. Rader ( ed.) , A Modern Book of Esthetics, 
1935, p. 294. 
4. Lipps, lsthetik, I, p. 97. 
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scription of it. 
In such passages as the above, Lipps moves from the 
more cautious position that the feelings of the self are 
projected upon the object of ~thic perception to the 
position that the entire self is projected upon or identi-
fied with the object. According to this view all states of 
the self--striving, knowing, etc., as well as feeling--are 
projected upon the object and perceived as belonging to it. 
"Identification" or "projection of the self" then re-
fers to this attribution of all of the qualities of the 
self to the object and the phenomenal experience of them as 
qualities belonging to the object. "Projection of feelings" 
is a less inclusive term. Both, however, are regarded as 
empathic processes. 
Lipps recognizes the operation of empathy in all realms 
of life.l Die praktische Einfflhlung, which includes inter-
personal empathy, is distinguished from llsthetische Einfflhl-
ung in that it carries with it the practical concern with 
whether or not the feeling perceived is actually the feeling 
being experienced by the other. In aesthetic empathic per-
ception the observer is not concerned with the objective 
correctness of his perceptions.2 The aesthetic empathic 
perception is a Selbstwertgef8hl--an act of value as an end 
1. Theodor Lipps, nlsthetik," Die Kultur der Gegenwart, Tl. 
I, Abt. VI, 1907, p. 362. 
2. Ibid. 
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in itself.l It is not a means to some other practical end. 
Empathy is the basis of the pleasure of aesthetic ex-
perience. 
Das !sthetische Sympathiegeffthl 1st aber 
nicht nur eine Weise des lsthetischen Genusses, 
sondern es 1st der lsthetische Genuss. Aller 
lsthetischer Genuss liegt schliesslich einzig 
und allein in der Sympathie begr0ndet.2 
This pleasure is "the enjoyment of the ego, which however, 
so far as it is esthetically enjoyed, is not myself but ob-
jective.") The self has an instinctive urge for activity 
which when gratified gives pleasure.4 Forms, colors, and 
sounds, says Lipps, are events in which I participate with 
resulting pleasure. My act of participation is an end in it-
self and the basis of the feeling of pleasure. It is, of 
course, an objectified pleasure feeling, by Which I rejoice 
in the quality of my strength, ability, or openness.5 
Lipps finds it entirely unnecessary to posit any kines-
thetic element in the operation of empatby.6 
Interpersonal empathy and aesthetic empathy are not 
1. Lipps, lsthetik, I, p. 97. 
2. Lipps, Komik und Humor, pp. 223-24. 
3. Lipps, "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feelings," 
p. 294. 
4. Ibid., p. 300. 
5. Lipps, Xsthetik, I, p. 97. 
6. Lipps1 "Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feelings," p. 300. 
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different processes in Lipps's opinion. That is, the mecha-
nism by which they operate is the same. What is required in 
aesthetic empathy beyond interpersonal empathy is the abili-
ty to disengage oneself from practical considerations. But, 
this disengagement is an aspect of aesthetic contemplation 
and not necessarily of empathy. 
ii. The Theory of Helge Lundholm 
Lundholm describes empathy in terms reminiscent of 
Lipps. 
Fundamental in all aesthetic enjoyment is 
that act of expanding the ego into the art-ob-ject which constitutes "Einf1lhlung. "• •• I 
prefer to tenn it the projection into the art-
object of our subjective striving self.l 
Without the observer's animating the art object in this man-
ner it would never stir affect in him. 
Empathy does occur in interpersonal as well as aesthet-
ic relationships, 
but the peculiar manner and measure of aesthetic 
animation distinguishes it from the cases of non-
aesthetic animation. The understanding of our 
fellow-men involves a measure of animation in 
the sense of attributing to them something of 
our own nature. 
In the case of aesthetic animation, it is an 
expansion through which the original self is 
lost.2 
1. Helge Lundholm, The Aefthetic Sentiment: 
an Original Excursion Cambridge, Mass.: 
Pub1., 1941}, p. 115. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
A Criticism and 
Science Art 
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For Lundholm then, the difference between interpersonal and 
aesthetic empathy is one of the degree of loss of self. 
This loss of self is, of course, facilitated in aesthetic 
experience because it is divorced from practical considera-
tions. 
iii. The Theory of Dewitt Parker 
Parker is eclectic regarding empathy, not an original 
theorist, and yet not without some interesting observations 
to contribute. He experiences empathy, often motor empathy, 
but he is cautious about generalizing from his own experi-
ence. Empathy may operate by association or immediately and 
directly as, for example, is the case with rhythm. Further-
more, the motor element may or may not be present. 
Parker does not talk about the projection of the self, 
but rather, the "projection of the idea of the self. nl The 
reason why one's feelings are projected into the object, or 
are felt to belong to the object and not to oneself, is 
quite simply because it is the object, the external environ-
ment, and not the self which is perceived to have changed. 
The feelings then that one has upon perceiving a change in 
the external environment seem to be external. The same phe-
nomenon is observed whether the environment has actually 
changed or the viewer has just shifted his attention.2 
1. Dewitt Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics (Boston: 
Silver, Burdett, 1920), pp. 60-69. 
2. ~., pp. 62-63. 
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For Parker, then, aesthetic empathy and interpersonal 
empathy operate in the same manner, the difference being 
that in aesthetic empathy the feelings are not so strong as 
in interpersonal empathy.l By this, he means to refer to 
the psychical distance involved in aesthetic experience. 
iv. The Theory of Johannes Volkelt 
Volkelt presents a fairly eclectic understanding of em-
pathy. Though he feels that it operates too directly and im-
mediately to rest upon association, he nevertheless admits 
that association may accompany it and even enrich it. Simi-
larly, he holds that motor mimicry is not imperative in em-
pathy although it may be present and facilitate the process 
greatly. Where this is so, the process is one of associating 
certain feelings and emotions with kinesthetic sensations, 
not a process such as is postulated on the basis of the 
James-Lange theory of the emotions.2 
Volkelt stands in the broad tradition of Lipps (in re-
gard to empathy) despite the deviations from Lipps's theory 
noted above. Empathy is the feeling of oneself into another--
Einf11hl ung. 
The object of this empathic process may be either an-
other person or an inanimate object. However, in the case of 
interpersonal empathy means-to-an-end considerations and 
1. ~., p. 6$. 
2. Johannes Volkelt, 3ystem der lsthetik (Mftnchen: Oskar 
Beck, 1905), I, pp. 186rf. 
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previous knowledge about the other person serve to obstruct 
empathic percept,ion. In aesthetic experience, on the other 
hand, empathy can operate more freely and consequently re-
sult in a more intense experience of feeling onesel.f into 
the other•l 
v. The Theory of' the Earl o:r Listowel 
For Listowel the main difference between aesthetic em-
pathy and interpersonal empathy lies in the element of' de-
tachment or psychical distance. 
At the same time, the sympathetic emotion 
that we f'eel at the moment of aesthetic con-
templation should be carefully separated from 
the whole gamut o:r ordinary emotions that we 
experience in daily lif'e. The main difference 
is, that being sympathetic onJ.y and not per-
sonal, it is less intense, vivid, and over• 
whelming than the joys and sorrows that are 
the very fabric of our nature. Consequently, 
it endures in our minds for a shorter period 
and is more easUy controlled by the, will; 
this enables us to liberate ourselves from 
the emotions stirred in us by the spectacle 
of art or nature as soon as we desire, and to 
experience a very large number of such emo-
tions, sometimes of the most opposing and an-
tagomstic order, in an extremely brief space 
of time.2 
vi. The Theory of Theodore Sarbin 
Sarbin makes use of' the concepts of both self and role 
in his theory. In terms of role, empathy involves taking the 
1. ~., pp. 155-56. 
2. Listowel, op. cit., p. 177. 
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role of the other. But, taking the role of the other depends 
on a more general ability, viz., the "as if" skill. Taking 
the role of the other means behaving as if the self were 
some other self. The "as if" ability is necessary in drama, 
fantasy, play, hypnosis, and in all imaginative behavior.l 
Sarbin does not apply this concept to counseling or 
visual art; yet, the empathic counselor certainly considers 
how he would feel as if he were in the client's situation, 
and one who would appreciate a painting must behave as if 
it were something other than a mass of pigments smeared on 
a canvas. 
According to Sarbin's theory the "as if" skill is an 
ability which varies from person to person, and depends, 
among other things, upon the ability to bind time and ten-
sion which in turn is a function of the development of the 
self~ This ability can be measured by the method of predict-
ing others' responses, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.2 
It is interesting to observe that behaving as if the 
self were another self implies the getting out of oneself 
which many theorists have considered such an important dis-
tinguishing characteristic of empathy. 
1. Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory," Lindzey (ed.), Hand-
book of Social Psrchology, 1954, I, pp. 236-38. 
2. Ibid., pp. 237-38. 
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vii. The Theory of Rollo May 
May appears to draw no distinctions between aesthetic 
empathy and interpersonal empathy. For him, both include a 
feeling into the other and a projection of the self into the 
other. He says, "empathy means a much deeper state of ident-
ification of personalities in which one person so feels him-
self into the other as temporarily to lose his own identity.nl 
"In artistic experience empathy is also basic, for the 
individual must in some way identify himself with the object 
if he is to experience it aesthetically.n2 In empathizing a 
person goes out of himself, gets rid of himself, and partici-
pates in the object. Herein lies art's cathartic power. Yet 
this is also true of counseling. Its cathartic power lies in 
the fact that the counselor has to go out of himself.3 
To what extent May goes out of himself in his counsel-
ing is indicated by the following example: 
As counselor I had become so absorbed in his 
story that his emotions had become my emotions. 
His feeling of desperation as he struggled 
through high school, his realization of the 
loneliness or existence and harshness of des-
tiny, became my own experiences, felt on my 
pulse as they had originally been on his. And 
when he concluded by stating his determination 
to stick it out at college if" it killed him, I 
felt a certain exhilaration as though this re-
solution had been made by my own will. This 
1. Rollo May, The Art o:r Counseling: How to Gain and Give 
Mental Health (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1939), p. 75. 
2. Ibid., p. 78. 
3. Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
partial identification was so real that if I 
had spoken aloud my voice would no doubt have 
partaken of the hesitant quavering quality of 
his.l 
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This li.IB.y concludes is empathy, the process by which people 
come really to understand one another, and without which in 
fact no such understanding is possible. 
V.ore than any other contemporary clinician May has re-
mained close to the original meaning of empathy as it was 
developed by Lipps. 
viii. The Theory of Carl Jung 
Jung's understanding of empathy emphasizes the identi-
fication of the self with the object, its function being 
the defense of the ego. 
But since the feeling-into subject feels his 
activity, his lifel ~the object, he there-
with also yields h1mself to the object, in so 
far as the felt-into content represents an es-
sential part of the subject. He becomes the ob-ject; he identifies himself with it, and in 
this way gets rid of himself.2 
It is this self-divestiture, or ability to get rid of one-
self, which serves to protect man. 
Though empathy is projection, i.e., the "transveying 
of a subjective content into the object," it nevertheless, 
"brings about a good understanding between subject and ob-
1. Ibid., p. 77. 
2. Carl G. Jung~ Psvchological i;pes, trans. H~ Goodwin-
Baynes {New Iorki Harcourt, race, 1923), p. 36g. 
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ject, or at least simulates it."l 
Jung makes no distinctions between the operation of 
aesthetic versus interpersonal empathy. The above state-
ments apply to both. 
ix. The Theories of the Predicting Others' Responses School 
Dymond's concern has been with interpersonal empathy 
which she defines as "the imaginative transposing of one-
self into the thinking, feeling and acting of another and 
so structuring the world as he does. n2 The functional out-
come of one's transposing himself into another is that he 
can then predict the behavior of the other. 
Herein is the crux of the understanding of empathy as 
the ability to predict others' behavior. The importance of 
this understanding of empathy is that empathy can thus be 
operationally defined and measured--e.g., as the ability to 
predict the responses of some given other in some struc-
tured situation. How this is practically done will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. An examination of the assumP-
tions so blithely accepted here must wait until the con-
cluding chapter. 
Others who have employed the concept of empathy as the 
ability to predict others' responses have been concerned to 
1. Ibid., P• 361. 
2. Rosalind F. Dymond, "A Scale for the Measurement of Empa-
thic Ability," J. Consult. Psychol., 13(1949), 127-33. 
26 
distinguish it from projection in the clinical sense. Cer-
tainly the writings of many of the earlier empathy theorists 
make empathy sound very similar to projection--i.e., the at-
tribution to another of the qualities of one's own ego. In 
fact, most of the earlier theorists speak of empathic pro-
jection. 
Hastorf and Sender have been most insistent in holding 
that empathy and projection need to be differentiated.l The 
underlying concern here is that empathy be "realistic" per-
ception. Norman and Ainsworth, on the other hand, indicate 
that empathy is projection--realistic projection.2 Their 
criterion of realism was whether one's predictions agreed 
with those of the majority of other people. If they did, 
then they were by definition empathic. Jackson and Carr made 
a distinction between empathy--accuracy of prediction--and 
assumed similarity--"the tendency to assume a similarity be-
tween oneself and another person."3 The results of their 
study indicate that assumed similarity is not necessarily 
projection "and might better be interpreted as a measure of 
1. Albert H. Hastorf and I. E. Bender, "A Caution Respecting 
the Measurement of Empathic Ability," J. Abnorm. Soc. 
Psychol., 47(1952), 574-76. 
2. R. D. Norman and Patricia Ainsworth, "The Relationships 
among Projection, Empathy, Reality, and Adjustment Opera-
tionally Defined," J. Consult. Psyehol;, 18(1954), 53-58. 
3. William Jackson and Arthur c. Carr, "Empathic Ability in 
Normals and Schizophrenics," J. Abno;rm. Soc. Psycho1.i 
51(1955}, 79-82. 
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the feeling of warmth and closeness."! 
This issue has arisen onl.y with recent attempts to 
measure empathy, because measurement requires "realistic" 
criteria. The problem seems never to have troubled the ear-
ly empathy theorists greatly. By and large, they seem to 
have accepted it as evident that empathy is accurate, real-
istic perception--in fact, the mode of accurate, realistic 
perception par excel1ence. Lipps, for example, makes it 
quite clear that one's empathic perception o:f an art object 
involves objective qualities of the object and is by no 
means arbitrarily subjective.2 
Kerr finds the early definitions of empathy inadequate 
because "they stress mere identity of feeling and omit the 
practical element of prediction of the other's behavior.") 
For Kerr, empathy is an ability which is common to leaders, 
good counselors, and successful salesmen. It is "the ability 
to put yourself in the other person's position, establish 
rapport, and anticipate his reactions, feelings, and behav-
iors."4 This definition is not applicable to aesthetic em-
pathy, and Kerr apparently has no interest in aesthetic em-
1. !J21S. 
2. Lipps, lsthetik, I, p. 368. 
3. Willard A. Kerr and Boris J. Spero££, The Empathy Test: 
Manual o:r Instructions (Chicago: Psychometric Affiliates, 
1947). 
4. Ibid. 
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pat by. He is, in fact, most interested in measurement , and 
in the predictive element be has found something that he 
can measure. How Kerr measures empathic ability will be dis-
cussed in the next chapter. 
Empathy is one of three primary dimensions of personal-
ity, Kerr theorizes. There are only three such dimensions, 
all others being secondary dimensions or mere variables. 
"The primary dimensions are only three in number: intelli-
gence; empathy; conscientious love of mankind."l These are 
pure factors--independent abilities which can be measured. 
Whence these factors are derived is not stated by Kerr. 
Empathy, Kerr believes, is essential for "all under-
standing of human feelings.n2 
x. The Theories of Various Other Clinicians 
Further anxiety about the accuracy of empathic perceP-
tion is apparent in slightly different terms in a definition 
of empathy by English and English. They fear that too much 
emotion may distort perception. Empathy, they define as "aP-
prehension of the state of mind of another person without 
feeling what the other feels.n3 Empathy is primarily intel-
1. Willard A. Kerr, Prima Instructions (Chi~c~a-go~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
2 • .illS· 
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lectual though not entirely without emotion. 
Hiltner believes that empathy is dangerous in counsel-
ing if the counselor "becomes emotionally entangled with 
his patient or client [and] loses the perspective which is 
necessary if he is going to be helpful."l Aestheticians 
have long known, of course, that empathy in aesthetic ex-
perience must be combined with a certain detachment or psy-
chical distance. 
Carl Rogers too is so insistent upon detachment as to 
almost remove the feeling element from empathy. He says that 
empathy 
is not in terms of emotional identification on 
theeounselor's part, but rather an empathic 
identification, where the counselor is perceiv-
ing the hates and hopes and fears of the client 
through immersion in an empathic process, but 
without himself, as counselor, e¥eriencing 
those hates and hopes and fears. (Italics mine.) 
All of the above views seem to identify empathy with in-
sight. They furthermore seem to deny, or at least overlook, 
that insight can come about through feeling. And moreover, 
they drive a wedge between emotion and intellect which does 
not exist in htUDan experience. 
Among counseling psychologists there are those who OP-
pose the views cited above. The position of Rollo May, dis-
1. Seward Hiltner, The Counselor in Counseling (New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1950), p. 162. 
2. Current 
ought on 
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cussed earlier, is diametrically opposed to that o£ English 
and English, Hiltner, and Rogers on this point. That Paul 
Johnson also thinks o£ empathy as other than intellectual 
insight is apparent £rom such statements as the £allowing: 
It [empathy] is understanding with the heart in 
the biblical sense o£ deeper and truer knowledge 
than the natural knowledge o£ the mind. As aP-
preciation is more than description, so empathy 
is more than matter-o£-£act information.! 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the importance 
of the concept o£ the sel£ and its projection in empathy 
theory is due primarily to the prodigious ef£orts of Lipps. 
His influence on the field is in proportion to his immense 
output of books and artic1es. As is apparent in previous 
pages, his is the basic and inclusive theory to which other 
writings come as supplements. 
2. Theories Concerned Primarily with the Question 
of whether Empathy Is by Association or Immediate 
i. Theories Based upon Associationism 
Associationist theories of empathy, or at least theor-
ies of empathy including associationism, are the most wide-
spread of all types of theories of empathy. Yet there is no 
single theorist of the stature o£ Lipps to stand up and 
champion this point of view. 
1. Paul E. Johnson, Psychology of Pastoral Care (New York: 
Abingdon, 1953), p. 92. 
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(1) The Theory of Hermann Lotze 
Lotze began developing a psychological theory of empa-
thy thirty years before Lipps published his Raumaesthetik. 
We share, Lotze says, in the life of or enter the vital 
modes of all kinds of creatures and even inanimate things. 
We can participate in, t·or example, the humble life of a 
mollusc. Or we can project ourselves into the forms of a 
tree identifying our life with its. We even perceive a 
building as experiencing inner stresses and exerting 
forces.l 
Lotze is an associationist in regard to the mode of OP-
eration of empathy. In fact, the aesthetic effect of an ob-
ject depends upon the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the 
memories it revives. The shapes and forms of objects remind 
us of certain states of our own body in times past, includ-
ing the feelings which accompanied those states. This whole 
recollected complex is transferred to the object perceived; 
or more accurately, is perceived as belonging to the nature 
of the object.2 
( 2) The Theory of Antonin Prandtl 
Prandtl, as most of the early German empathy theorists, 
1. R. Hermann Lotze, Microcosmus, trans. E. Hamilton and E. 
E. c. Jones (New York: Scribner and Welford, !885), I, 
pp. 585-86. 
2. R. Hermann Lotze, Geschichte dfr Aesthetik in Deutschland (Mttnchen: J. Cotta'schen, 1868 , pp. 70-86. 
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understands the process ot· empathy to oe generally the same 
regardless of whether the object is another person or an in-
animate object, e.g., an art object.l 
Association is the process whereby the apparent feeling 
in the object is reproduced in the viewer's consciousness. 
Kinesthetic sensations may be included in the experience, 
though they mere.ly accompany it and are not directly the 
cause of it.2 
(3) The Theoretical Comments of Several Social Scientists 
The position of the sociologist, Cooley, is tnat empa-
thy is learned yet finds its basis in common universal com-
plexes or feelings and emotions. 
The basis of common social perceptions, and 
hence, of cumulation, is in the general simi-
larity of mental-social complexes throughout 
the human race, and the much closer similarity 
among those for.med by a common language and 
culture. We become aware of this similarity by 
watching the behavior of other men, including 
their language, and finding that this behavior 
can be interpreted successfully by ascribing 
to them thoughts and sentiments similar to our 
own. The idea that they are like us is prac-
tically true; it works. It was generated in 
the experience of our earliest childhood, and 
we have gone upon it all our lives.3 
The process, according to Cooley, is one or learning 
1. Antonin Prandtl, Die Einf'tthlung (Leipzig: Johann 
Ambrosius Barth, 1910), pp. 1-3. 
2. !£!g., pp. 118-21. 
3. Charles Horton Cool~, "Roots of Social Knowledge," Amer. 
J. Sociol., 32(1926), 71. 
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to associate certain thoughts and feelings with certain 
cues and then attributing these thoughts and feelings to 
others when they exhibit these cues. 
As we perceive and remember sensuous images 
of gesture, voice, and facial expression, so, 
at the same time, we record the movements o£ 
thought and £eel~ng in our consciousness, as-
cribe similar movements to others, and so gain 
an insight into their minds.-1 
Much the same emphasis is made by the psychoanalyst, 
Franz Alexander: 
One understands another person's mental state 
on the basis of sel£-knowledge, which one ex-
trapolates to another person. This is the es-
sence o£ empathy. This common sense under-
standing o£ others is a natural £aculty which 
everyone possesses to some degree~ otherwise 
one could not survive in society.~ 
Floyd Allport, a psychologist, presents a theory which 
includes both motor mimicry and association. He has the £ol-
lowing to say in regard to empathy in judging £acial expres-
sion: 
An auxiliary method £requently used was the 
attempt to imitate the expression with the sub-ject's own £eatures. The purpose o£ this pro-
cedure seemed to be to receive all possible 
stimulations ( £acial in this case) which might 
bring up by association (conditioning) situa-
tions in which such expressions were prev~ous­
lE experienced, thereby receiving a clue for 
t e identi£ication.3 
1. I£!g., pp. 68-69. 
2. Franz Alexander, "Discussion o£: 'Aims and Limitations o£ 
Psychotherapy,' by Paul H. Hoch," Fromm-Reichmann ( ed.), 
Progress in Psychotherapy, p. 83. 
3. Floyd H. All~rt, · Social Psychology (Boston: Houghton 
Mi£flin, 1924), p. 225. 
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The theory implied here is that an individual associates his 
feelings and his muscular expression of them. By imitating 
the muscular configuration which he perceives in another, 
then, he will bring into conscious recollection the feeling 
which is associated by previous conditioning with those kin-
esthetic sensations he experiences upon assuming that given 
muscular configuration. This is to be distinguished from the 
James-Lange theory which holds that upon an individual's as-
suming the given muscular configuration certain autonomic 
systems are triggered which then give rise in consciousness 
to a corresponding feeling. 
Harsh and Schrickel are still more specific about how 
empathy is learned: 
From dependence upon adults a child learns the 
significance of facial expressions and behavior 
that vitally affect him. • • • Adults can aid 
his discrimination by calling attention to ex-
pressions and by using appropriate words. From 
his own experience the words gain visceral and 
fostural associations which may also be aroused faintly) when the word applies to another in-
dividual. His feelings are aroused even more 
effectively by such cues as blood dripping from 
a wound, the sight and smell of iodine on an in-jury, bandages, a broken toy, or children tug-
ging for possession of some object. The basis 
of empathy (imagining oneself in the place of 
another person) must stem from such sensory cues, 
present both when the event happens to oneself 
and when it happens to another person.l 
This quotation indicates how the theory of association can 
be combined with motor theory without assuming the James-
1. Charles M. Harsh and H. G. Schrickel, Personality Devel-
opment and Assessment (New York: Ronald, 1950), p. 93. 
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Lange hypothesis that the motor behavior precedes the con-
scious experience of emotion. Harsh and Schrickel under-
stand the motor aspects of empathy merely to accompany the 
experience and to be aroused by association. 
For years the controversy raged over the question of 
whether knowledge of the feelings of another was given di-
rectly and immediately or by association. Many theorists 
held that the expression of another is given to the viewer 
too quickly for there to be time for association of ideas 
to take place. Yet, as long ago as the end of the last cen-
tury Stern demonstrated what every psychologist knows today 
--that association may well be immediate and unconscious.! 
However, for some theorists who take the position that 
expression is given directly and immediately rather than by 
association, the terms "directly" and "immediately" have 
more than temporal connotations. 
ii. Theories Emphasizing Directness and Immediacy: The Ge-
stalt Psychologists 
The Gestalt theorists eschew the term empathy altogeth-
er, on the one hand because it often implies associationism, 
and on the other because it smacks of mysticism. Neverthe-
less, they have a great deal that is very pertinent to say 
about the perception of feelings and emotions in others and 
1. Paul stern,nEinffthlung und Association in der neunen 
Ksthetik," T. Lipps and R. M. Werner (eds.), Beitr!ge 
zur Asthetik, Bd. v, 1898, pp. 38££. 
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in art objects. They exhibit a remarkable unanimity in their 
writings exceeding even that of orthodox Freudians. The per-
tinence of their theory to this discussion lies in the the-
ory of isomorphism, a theory which they all accept despite 
the fact that its acceptance is not logically demanded by 
the basic assumptions of Gestalt psychology. 
Hence, the following generalizations can be made, at 
least about the Gestalt theorists to be discussed here. They 
all understand empathy (if that term may be used despite 
their objections) to operate by an isomorphic relationship 
between the perceiver and the object of his perception. This 
kind of perception operates in the same manner whether the 
object perceived be another human being, an art object, or 
whatever. 
Isomorphic patterns correspond topologically, but not 
topographically. They do not correspond in shape but rather 
in order. A point between two points in one pattern will, 
for example, lie between those same two points in the corre-
sponding pattern. Shape may, though not necessarily, be dis-
torted, but in relation to order the excitatory brain field 
corresponds to the perceptual field. This is the primary 
isomorphic assumption of the Gestalt psychologists. For ex-
ample, 
if a person is timid, diffident or energetic, 
cheerful or sad it can be proved--and such 
studies have been made--that the nature of 
the physical occurrence, which can be described 
concretely, and the psychological process, are 
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identical or akin in their gestalt structure.l 
Allport and Vernon in their study of expressive move-
ment come to the same conclusion, viz., that "motor acts 
are not so specific as to be meaningless, and being organ-
ized they must reflect to a large degree the organization 
of the total brain field."2 
Some theorists in the Gestalt tradition postulate iso-
morphic relationships to include the entire organism and 
not simply the brain field. Conclusive evidence does not 
exist to support even the hypothesis of isomorphism between 
the perceptual field and the brain field; on the other hand, 
there is no evidence which refutes the hypothesis.3 
A simple illustration may serve to indicate more clear-
ly what is meant by identity or similarity of gestalt struc-
ture. Look at the two line drawings in Figure 1. Which draw-
ing is most properly named "quidikaka" and which "waleula"? 
Fig. 1.--Quidikaka and Waleula 
B 
1. Max Wertheimer, "Gestalt Theory," Social Research, 11 
(1944), 96. 
2. Gordon w. All~rt and Philip E. Vernon, Studies in Expres-
sive Movement (New York: MacMillan, 1933), p. 181. 
3. Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psycholo~ ( 2d 
ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), pp. -so-83. 
As Allport observes: 
The drawings are essentially meaningless, 
but they leave you with a distinct "feel." 
You ~ which one should be called quidikaka 
and WEICh waleula. If asked for your reasons 
you may say that there is something rounded 
and sof't about the word waleula and also 
about A, something sg_uare and sharp about 
quidikaka and about B. Yet the visual round-
ness of A is not the same as the auditory 
roundness of waleula.l 
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Waleula and A are similar in their gestalt structure. 
There is an isomorphic correspondence between them, just as 
there is between quidikaka and B. 
Or take the example of a dancer. Insofar as he dances 
well, there is an identity or similarity of gestalt struc-
ture between the motions of a dancer and sound of the music 
to which he dances. 
In the same way, the human organism when it organizes 
itself to perceive organizes itself innately to correspond 
in its total gestalt structure with the gestalt structure 
of the object perceived. Hence, the feeling tone of the ob-
ject is given directly to the observer in the very act of 
perception--i.e., of organizing his perceptual field. But, 
every gestalt structure of the organism is in itself a feel-
ing or emotional state. In perception the organism changes 
its gestalt structure. Hence, every act of perception, ac-
cording to this theory, carries with it an expressive con-
tent. 
1. Gordon W. Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 491-92. 
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(1) The Theory of Rudolf Arnheim 
Arnheim is convinced by the immediacy with which the 
expressive feeling tone or an object or perception is given 
to the observer that the process involved cannot be one of 
association. 
The impact of the forces transmitted by a 
visual pattern is an intrinsic part of the 
percept, just as shape or color. In fact, ex-
pression can be described as the primary con-
tent of vision.l 
This fact is lost sight of, according to Arnheim, because 
we are trained by a scientifically oriented society to ig-
nore the expressive aspect of perception; nevertheless, it 
can be readily observed in children and primitives. And 
this priority of the expressive element of perception is 
after all logical genetically. The organism bas developed 
its senses to aid in its survival, and in this context the 
feeling intent of the environment is the most important 
thing to be perceived. Are the forces which face one strong 
or weak, friendly or hostile--these are the things one 
needs to know most urgently.2 That expressive qualities 
precede analytic description is apparent from the fact that 
the face or a person is much more easily and 
frequently remembered as being alert, clever, 
1. Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology 
of the Creative Eye (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 
1960), p. 365. 
2. ~., p. 365. 
energetic, than as being triangularly shaped, 
having slanted eyebrows, straight lips, etc~ 
The many studies of Gestalt psychologists on optical 
illusions, figure-ground reversal, apparent movement, etc. 
are very pertinent here, for all of these visual dynamics 
contribute to the expressiveness of any given object. Ob-
viously these dynamics are not in the object but in the ob-
server. However, they do not appear to the observer to be 
in it for the reason that he projects previously acquired 
knowledge upon it, but because these dynamic sensations 
are the conscious counterpart of the physio-
logical processes which organize the percept 
in the neural field of the optical sector, 
that is, the cerebral cortex, the optic nerve, 
and possibly the retinae of the eyes.2 
Analogous processes, of course, occur in all other 
sense modalities~ 
Expression is conveyed not so much by the "geo-
metrical-technical" properties of the percept 
as such, but by the forces they can be assumed 
to arouse in the nervous system of the observer. 
Regardless of whether the object moves (dancer, 
actor) or is immobile (painting, sculpture), it 
is the kind of directed tension or "movement"--
its strength, place, and distribution--trans-
mitted by the visible patterns that is perceived 
as expression.3 
The forces which are organized in the nervous system 
1. Rudol.f Arnheim, "The Priority of Expression," J. Aesth. 
and Art Critic., 8(1949), lOo. 
2. Rudolf Arnheim, "Gestalt Psychology and Artistic Form," 
Whyte (ed.), Aspects of Form, 1951, p. 199 
3. Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception, pp. 363-64. 
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of an individual perceiving a given form are structurally 
similar in their organization to those in the object--iso-
morphic. 
Applied to body and mind, this means that if 
the forces which determine bodily behavior are 
structurally similar to those which character-
ize the corresponding mental states, it may 
become understandable why psychical meaning 
can be read off directly from a person's appear-
ance and conduct.l 
For instance, a person's mood may be structural-
ly identical with the bodily behavior which ac-
companies that mood. This isomorphic correspond-
ence has been used to explain the fact that the 
"expression" of physical behavior seems to be 
directly comprehensible to the onlooker. The 
gesture of a dancer, but al.so the motions of a 
towel on the clothesline or the shape of a cloud, 
contain structural features whose kinship with 
similarly structured mental features is irmnedi-
ately felt.2 
The expressive feeling tone of an art object or the 
mood of another person is thus immediately given to the ob-
server in his perception by virtue of the structure of the 
human organism and its innate manner of organizing its per-
ceptual .field. However, Arnheim is careful to point out that 
this does not necessarily imply that the observer thereby 
understands the "state of mind" o.f another individual or is 
conscious o.f the content of the "psychica.J. experiences" of 
the other.3 This belongs rather to what Arnheim calls the 
1. Arnheim, "The Gestalt Theory o.f Expression," p. 160. 
2. Arnheim, "Gestalt Psychology and Artistic Form," pp. 207-
208. 
3. Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception, p. 367. 
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secondary effects of perception of expression, which include 
the following: 
( 2) The observed expression may bring about the 
corresponding state of mind in B ••• (3) The 
observed expression may provoke the correspond-
ing kinesthetic experience1 • • • The effects described under (2) and {3J may be instances of 
a kind of "resonance" based on isomorphism.! 
(2) The Theory of Wolfgang K8hler 
K6hler sees the Cartesian dualism of physical events 
and psychical events as having so adversely effected modern 
thought that the isomorphic basis of perception has been to-
tally disregarded until recent time. And this despite the 
obvious fact that the behavior of others is available only 
through perception, i.e., by a physical medium. Consequent-
ly, any study of how individuals understand each other must 
first of all be a study of perception.2 
"Behavior in the most practical sense of the word tends 
to be seen as organized in forms which copy the organization 
of corresponding inner developments."3 Thus K6hler states 
his allegiance to the isomorphic theory. He goes on to illus-
trate his point: 
Psychology postulates that • • • the physiologi-
cal organization is the same as the mental or-
ganization. This view is also held with regard 
1. Arnheim, "The Gestalt Theory of Expression," p. 166. 
2. Wolfgang K6hler, Gestalt Psychologr (New York: Liveright, 
1947), pp. 221-22. 
3. Ibid., pp. 231-32. 
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to all other phases of organization. Hence, in-
nervation projects upon the pianist's muscles 
an organization which his mental processes and 
their brain correlates have in common. In this 
fashion the formal relations among the result-
ing sound waves are determined. But auditory 
organization in the people who listen depends 
upon such relations. Consequently, their experi-
ences tend to be organized in a way which agrees 
with the organization of mental processes in the 
pianist.l 
This is a somewhat unfortunate illustration since it 
seems to suggest that the organization or the piano key-
board, which is determined largely by mechanical considera-
tions, is isomorphic with the form of the music. Whether or 
not K8hler intends to say this is not clear. In any case, 
the example of the dancer and his music given earlier seems 
better. 
The above statement that "this view is also held with 
regard to all other phases of organization,n2 is important 
and requires further comment. What KlShler means to say here 
is that not only the neural organization, but the organiza-
tion of all systems, or better still of the whole organism, 
is isomorphic with that of the object perceived. That is to 
say, they are identical in their structural pattern. Gestalt 
theory is a theory of the whole organism, not of any of its 
isolated systems, e.g., the nervous system. 
Both persons and objects, e.g., art objects, are per-
1. ~., p. 238. 
2. ~., p. 238. 
ceived in the manner described above. 
If the organism of a human being can emit 
stimuli which give rise to perceptual £acts 
"with psychological ingredients," then there 
is no reason why stimuli which come £rom 
other sources should never be able to cause 
similar ef:f'ects.l 
(3) The Theory o£ Solomon Asch 
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Asch has applied the theories o£ Gestalt psychology to 
social psychology. His understanding of isomorphism includes 
relationships o£ similar structure not only between brain 
processes and their conscious experience, but also between 
these and the actions or outward behavior o£ the individual. 
Employing this theory, Asch describes the operation o£ the 
interpersonal perception o£ expression as £ollows: 
For A we may distinguish the following succession 
o£ happenings: (1) The stimulations in the sur-
roundings that excite the sense organs of A and 
initiate neural impulses in him arrive in the 
:f'orm o£ a mosaic o£ energy waves. (2) The excita-
tions reaching the sense organs o£ A produce 
neural impulses which become cortically organized 
in a definite manner. (3) These neural events are 
the physical basis o£ A's experiences, the condi-
tion o£ his emotions, intentions, and thoughts. ( 4) The neural processes and the psychological 
experiences issue in actions of a speci:f'ic kind--
in movements of the body, in sounds, and so on. 
As :f'ar as B is concerned, (5) his sense organs 
also are excited by the situation and by the 
movements of A, again in a mosaic of energy waves 
as described in (1) above. (6} The excitations 
reaching the sense organs of B produce their neu-
ral organization (corresponding to step 2). (7) 
The latter are the physical basis of B' s pheno-
menal experience of A's actions (corresponding to 
1. !e!S·, pp. 243-44. 
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step 3). (8) Their tinal effect is to produce ac-
tion in response to A (corresponding to step 4) .1 
To summarize, by virtue or its economy of concepts, 
the theory of the Gestalt theorists is the neatest explana-
tion of the phenomenon of empathy. The one concept of iso-
morphism--the correspondence of gestalt structure between 
observer and object--explains how feeling is perceived and 
why it is perceived similarly by most people. In perceiving, 
the organism organizes in certain ways determined by its 
nature. In perceiving a given feeling it organizes itself 
in a manner which corresponds in gestalt structure with the 
way in which it organizes itself to express that same feel-
ing. In fact, that given organization of the organism~ 
that given feeling state. This is why one person can recog-
nize immediately the feeling expressed by another. And, be-
cause these same gestalt structures may appear in inanimate 
objects, these too may express feeling. 
The Gestalt theorists do not deny the operation of as-
sociation in this process. That would be foolhardy in the 
face or modern studies or learning and conditioning. What 
they do is to relegate association to the position of an 
epiphenomenon. Neither do they deny a place to motor or 
kinesthetic activity, though it too is understood to be 
epiphenomenal. 
1. Solomon Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice-Hall, 
1952), pp. 159-60. 
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The idea of the projection of the self into the object, 
however, finds no place in Gestalt theory. It is for this 
reason that only with some reservations can the Gestalt the-
ory be referred to as a theory of empathy. The Gestalt the-
ory is not necessarily by its nature inimical to the con-
cept of an active self. Rather, the cause for its exclusion 
seems to lie in the personal interests of the various Ge-
stalt theorists themselves. In the first place, they have 
been more interested in the process of perception than in 
the agent who perceives. And in the second place, they have 
attempted to maintain a tough-minded, experimental attitude. 
The solution o£ the controversy over whether empathy is 
by association or direct and immediate lies beyond the scope 
of this study, and must wait, in any event, for further ex-
perimental research. The Gestalt theorists hold that the 
perception of expression is precisely the same whether the 
object be a person or an art object. The associationists 
agree that the process is basically the same in interperson-
al and aesthetic empathy, although the ideas involved in the 
process or association may differ 'from object to object. 
3. Theories Emphasizing the Role o£ Motor Activity 
Two theorists or major importance have arisen to argue 
for the importance or motor activity in empathy, one in Ger-
many and one in England. Karl Groos and Vernon Lee, together 
with Theodor Lipps, constitute the three most influential 
writers ever to write about the subject of empathy. That two 
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of these three belong to the motor theory school indicates 
the importance of that point of view. So influential, in 
fact, is this point of view that many people think of empa-
thy as nothing more than motor imitation. 
i. The Theory of Karl Groos 
Groos observes empathic perception to operate with re-
gard to all that man perceives--both other persons and 
things. 
In this very complicated process we can dis-
tinguish these leading characteristics: la. 
The mind conceives of the experience of the 
other individual as if it were its own. lb. 
We live through the psychic states which a 
lifeless object would experience if it pos-
sessed a mental life like our own. 2a. We 
inwardl.y participate in the movements of an 
external object. 2b. We also conceive of the 
motions which a body at rest might make if 
the p<;>wers which we attribute to it were ac-
tual ( fiuidity of form). 3. We transfer the 
temper, which is the result of our own inward 
sympathy, to the object and speak of the so-
lemnity of the sublime, the gaiety of beauty, 
etc-.... 1 
Groos's most characteristic term for this empathic pro-
cess is "inner imitation" (innere Nachahmung). Like Lipps, 
Groos is impressed with the directness and immediacy of in-
ner imitation and concludes thereby that it does not operate 
simply by association, because in it "the after-effect of 
past experience and present perception blends to an insepar-
1. Karl Groos, The Play of Man, trans. Baldwin (New York: 
D. Appleton, 1901), p. 323. 
able synthesis.nl 
Included in this synthesis are perceptions of motor im-
itation--kinesthetic sensations--in the observer.2 This, 
for Groos, is a very important factor in the experience. 
The motor activity need not be overt in order to be effec-
tive, and may even be only incipient. Or, motor imitation 
may be symbolic, i.e., it may not imitate the observed move-
ment literally but only symbo1ically.3 The ability of peo-
ple in regard to motor imitation varies, that is, the abil-
ity to participate in motor imitation, not the consciousness 
or that motor imitation, which is irrelevant to its effec-
tive operation.4 
Groos's interest in aesthetics led him into an exten-
sive study of play in which he discovered many similarities 
between aesthetic experience and play. Inner imitation, for 
exaaple, is common to both aesthetic enjoyment and play. A 
child playing with a doll projects himself into the doll; 
he "lends the doll his own soul whenever he answers a ques-
tion for it; he lends to it his feelings, conceptions, and 
aspirations."5 Play and aesthetic enjoyment are basically 
1. ~., p. 323. 
2. Ibid., p. 328. 
3. Ibid., p. 329. 
4. Ibid., P• 333. 
5. Ibid., p. 327. 
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the same except that aesthetic enjoyment transcends mere 
play when profound moral and insightful qualities are in-
troduced. 
Aesthetic empathy differs from all other forms only in 
regard to the practical consideration--it is an end in it-
self. Aesthetic empathy is active and voluntary while the 
rest of empathy is passive and involuntary.! A perception 
is aesthetic for one only 
when he has an independent, self-centered pleas-
ure in this result--that is to say, when he 
plays • • • in aesthetic perception the impres-
sion is intentionally lingered over only for the 
sake of its pleasure-giving qualities, i.e., 
play .fully. 2 
Inner imitation is a pleasure-giving experience and 
constitutes one or the main factors in aesthetic enjoyment. 
This pleasure results in part simply because inner imitation 
satisfies the general need of the organism for activity. The 
imitation of an intense, unpleasant feeling may thus still 
be a pleasant experience. We enjoy imitating intense feel-
ings. Furthermore, Groos goes on, in the case of aesthetic 
pleasure there is the joy or being set free from practical 
considerations~~ 
ii. The Theory of Vernon Lee 
Lee observes empathy to operate in all realms o£ man's 
1. Karl Groos 1 Einleit'&: in die Jlsthetik ( Giessen: J. Ricker, 18~2), pp~ 9 97. 
2. Groos, The Play of Man, p. 326. 
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perception and not with regard to art alone. "Empathy is an 
elemental mental phenomenon accompanying all spatial contem-
plation."! 
This phenomenon of aesthetic Einftthlung • • • 
is therefore analogous to that of moral sym-
pathy. Just as when we "put ourselves in the 
place" or more vulgarly, "in the skin" of a 
fellow-creature ••• 2 
The early theoretical writing of Lee is based on the 
introspective researches of her associate, Miss c. Anstruth-
er-Thomson. What seems to have impressed Lee at the time she 
wrote "Beauty and Ugliness" was the report by Anstruther-
Thomson of the many kinesthetic sensations and occasional 
overt motor behavior which she experienced while viewing ob-
jects of art. A great deal was made of the fact, for exam-
ple, that in order to appreciate fully a certain statue 
Miss Anstruther-Thomson felt it necessary to imitate with 
her body, at least partially, the contraposto of the stone 
:figure.3 Lee concluded, on the basis of the James-Lange 
theory of the emotions, that the feelings which we have 
about a work of art derive from the sensations sent back to 
the brain by our kinesthetic receptors. However, these sen-
sations are not perceived by the viewer at a conscious 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Vernon Lee and c. 
and Other Studies 
John Lane, 1912), 
Ibid., p. 20. 
~., p. 119. 
Anstruther-Thomson, Beauty and Ueliness 
in Psychological Aesthetics (New York: 
p. 22. 
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level, nor are the feelings to which they give rise experi-
enced as originating in his own body. Rather, the feelings 
are projected into the art object and perceived as belong-
ing to it. 
This use of the James-Lange theory to explain how mo-
tor mimicry gives rise to conscious feeling tone is what 
distinguishes Lee's early theory i'rom that of' Groos. 
Lee later modified her theory in the direction ot· 
Lipps. She renounced the James-Lange theory and even the 
necessity of motor activity in empathy.l She could never, 
however, tolerate Lipps's postulating an active ego, and 
remained herself an associationist. 
The roots of empathy lie in man's natural "tendency to 
merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the 
qualities of' the perceived object."2 Hence, Lee refers to 
her theory as "anthropomorphic aesthetics." She observes 
how hil~s are said to roLL, mountains to rise, and lines to 
twist. 
They do • • • what we should t·eel ourselves do-
ing if we were inside them. For we ~ inside 
them; we have "felt ourselves," projected our 
own experience, into them, or more correctly 
into the pattern which they constitute.3 
This is as close as Lee comes to Lipps. Notice the retreat 
1. IQ!g., p. 91. 
2. Vernon Lee, The BeautifUl (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1913), p. 63. 
3. Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, op. cit., p. 19. 
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to associationism from "we have 1 felt ourselves' n to "pro-
jected our own experience." Usually Lee is even more care-
ful than this to note that empathy operates by association. 
Or in the case of the mountain which rises: 
All these risings! done by ourselves or watched 
in others, actual y experienced or merely imag-
ined, have long since united together in our 
mind, constituting a sort of composite photo-
graph. • • • It is this universally applicable 
notion of rising, which is started in our mind 
by the awareness of the particular present acts 
of raising or rising involved in our looking at 
that mountain, and it is this general idea of 
rising, i.e., of upward movement, which gets 
transferred to the mountain along with our own 
particular present activity of raising some part 
of us, and which thickens and enriches and marks 
that poor little thought of a definite raising 
with the interest, the emotional fullness gath-
ered and stored up in its long manifold exist-
ence.2 
The associational complex that is projected into the 
object of empathic perception, according to Lee's final the-
ory, is a complex of past experience, especially its affec-
tive tone, and present mtor activity or ideas o£ motor ac-
tivity. For though Lee goes so far as to say that empathy 
may be due "not to actually present movements and muscular-
organic sensations, but to the extremely abstract ideas of 
1. Ibid., P• 47. 
2. Lee, op. cit., p. 65. 
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movement and its modes residual £rom countless individual 
and possibly racial experiences,"! she nevertheless feels 
that the study of motor activity in empathy is a fruitfUl 
field of investigation. 
iii. The Theory of Herbert Langfeld 
Langeld is a modern exponent of the motor theory of 
empathy, not unlike the early Vernon Lee. He describes the 
operation of empathy as follows: 
Clues from the physical object arouse movement, 
either overt or covert, in the observer, and 
• • • these movements are projected into the 
object in the sense that they form the basis 
£or the characteristics of movement and force 
which are perceived in the phenomenal object. 
'1'wo points cannot be too strongly ~phasized. (1} There is no perception (subjective) of bodi-
ly movements, and ( 2) there is a projection in 
that all the observer is aware of are certain 
features of the object like grace and strength. 
It is when the observer starts to introspect 
that. he becomes aware of his own movements; 
then the projection ceases, and with it empa-
thy.2 
The perception, for example, of a line or shape stimu-
lates in the viewer memories of the movement of the hand in 
drawing such forms, or i£ it is an unfamiliar form, he 
traces it in his imagination. These memories or ideas of 
movement are expressed either as actual motor behavior or 
as tendencies to movement. "A tendency toward movement may 
1. Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, op. cit., p. 353. 
2. Herbert s. Langfeld, "Concerning Empathy," Miscellanea 
Psychologica Albert Michotte, 1947, pp. lOg-109. 
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be described as a motor set or pattern which must precede 
any overt action."! Langfeld produces evidence from physi-
ological studies to indicate the possibility of the shift-
ing of tensions in the muscles without overt movement.2 
These movements "fuse with the object as visual, audi-
tory, or other form of perception, giving character and 
meaning to the object ••• nJ Herein also is the cause of 
the affective tone or feeling of pleasure which accompanies 
the perception. 
Langfeld doubts that empathy is possible between a psy-
chotherapist and his patient because the therapist is, in 
most cases at least, aware of his "imitative behavior."4 
Albert Chandler accepts the motor theory of empathy 
with regard to both aesthetic and interpersonal empathy. 
"Inner imitation," he says, "evokes appropriate moods with-
in us • • • because the muscular response in us is of a 
type that would express such a mood."5 
Ruckmick, famous for his work on facial expression, 
1. Herbert s. Langfeld1 The Aesthetic Attitude {New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1920), p. 122. 
2. !Q!g., p. 124. 
3. lQ!g., p. 122. 
4. Langfeld, "Concerning Empathy," p. 109. 
5. Albert Chandler, Beaut} and Human Nature (New York: D. 
Appleton-Century, 1934 , p. 49. 
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also subscribes to the motor theory of empathy. What he 
says lacks specificity, but it does serve to indicate the 
strength of his conviction. 
A nbody-less" empathy and enjoyment is incon-
ceivable. • • • If the self is identified at 
all with the enjoyment of an artistic situa-
tion it is not a cold type of identification 
of the personality that takes place; it is 
not a bare reference to past experience by 
way of memory; it is not the mere recognition 
of formal beauty in the abstract. It is rath-
er an intimate mind-body response Which reso-
nates with the environmental presentation.! 
iv. The Theory of Geoffrey Scott 
Scott's is not an original theory of empathy but his 
application of empathy theory to architecture is of inter-
est, and belongs, because of his emphasis on bodily sensa-
tions, to the motor theory school. His example of an appar-
ently toP-heavy building illustrates his understanding of 
empathy. Such a building causes a feeling of discomfort and 
apprehension in the observer. He has this feeling despite 
the knowledge that the building is nevertheless structural-
ly stable, and despite the fact that the abstract concept 
of toP-heaviness does not by itself produce such a feeling. 
There is discomfort, but it is in ourselves. 
What then has occurred? The conclusion seems 
evident. The concrete spectacle has done what 
the mere idea could not: it has stirred our 
physical memory. It has awakened in us, not 
indeed an actual state of instability or of 
being overloaded, but that condition of spirit 
1. Christian A. Ruckmick, The Psychology of Feeling and Emo-
tion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 505. 
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which in the past has belonged to our actual 
experience of weakness, of thwarted effort or 
incipient collapse. We have looked at the build-
ing and identified ourselves with its apparent 
state. We have transcribed ourselves into terms 
of architecture.! 
Scott holds that this is "the natural way of perceiving 
and interpreting what we see," and that the scientific mode 
of perceiving is forced upon us against our natures.2 Much 
evidence can be assembled to show that the great architects 
of the past o:rten based the proportions of their buildings 
upon those of the human body. They did this, consciously or 
unconsciously, because we perceive architectural forms in 
terms of our own bodies.3 
Scott does not insist upon the necessity of motor acti-
vity in empathy, yet neither does he exclude it. His sugges-
tions in regard to space are of especial interest. Many em-
pathy theorists have remarked upon the importance of respir-
atory motor activity accompanying aesthetic experience. How-
ever, it is in regard to the perception of space that this 
seems most appropriate, for space certainly does possess ex-
pansiveness. The feeling of expansiveness in the body is 
pleasant, and hence, expansive spaces are aesthetically sat-
isfy'ing.4 
1. Geoffrey Scott, The Architecture of Humanism (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), pp. 15S-59. 
2. Ibid., p. 162. 
3. Ibid., p. 164. 
4. Ibid., pp. 168-71. 
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Finally, Scott seems to refer to certain Gestalt in-
sights with the remark that "a series of suggested move-
ments, in themselves indifferent, may awaken in us an ex-
pectancy and consequent desire of some further movement."! 
Scott, then, understands empathy to operate by associa-
tion with motor activity oi~en playing an important, though 
not absolutely necessary part. 
v. Experimental Studies Related to Motor Theor.r 
Evidence from a recent study lends some support to the 
motor theory by demonstrating that autonomic responses to 
visual stimuli may occur below the threshold of conscious 
discrimination. All of the motor theorists have held that 
this is possible and indeed have pointed to experimental 
evidence to support their claim. The point in question has 
nothing to do with the James-Lange controversy, but simply 
with whether or not it is possible for one to have kines-
thetic sensations which might effect conscious experience 
without his being aware or the source of the sensations as 
his own. 
McCleary and Lazarus conditioned a group of subjects 
by showing them ten nonsense syllables flashed on a screen, 
five of which were accompanied for each subject by an elec-
tric shock. When the subjects were sufficiently well condi-
tioned so that they expected to be shocked whenever any of 
1. Ibid., p. 167. 
the five "shock" syllables was flashed on the screen, the 
ten syllables were flashed in random order at exposure times 
too short t·or them to be consciously discriminated, i.e., 
according to verbal report. Nevertheless, the subjects' gal-
vanic skin responses continued to indicate a "shock" reac-
tion every time a "shock" syllable was shown despite the 
t•act that it was shown at a subliminal. speed. Subjects show-
ed an autonomic response to a stimttius of the nature of' 
which they were not consciously aware.l 
The subject ot· eye movements is important in a consid-
eration of empathy since many theorists, especially motor 
theorists, have regarded the movement of the eyes as the 
source of affective tone in relation to the formal aspects 
o:f an art object. It has been supposed, :for example, that 
the eye delights in :following a sensual curve whereas its 
:free movement is obstructed by a series of angles. Some 
lines, it was thought, were more pleasant for the eye to 
follow than were others, 
Many psychologists have investigated this problem; how-
ever, it will be sufficient here to refer to one competent 
study--that of Buswell, 2 Buswell recorded photographically 
1. Robert A, McCleary and Richard S, Lazarus, "Autonomic 
Discrimination without Awareness," J, Pers., 18(1949), 
171-79. 
2. Guy T. Buswell, How People Look at Pictures (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1935). 
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the eye movements of subjects as they looked at a series of 
photographs. Included among the stimuli were photographs of 
paintings, drawings, buildings, and abstract designs. Bus-
well's data reveal that the eye does not glide smoothly over 
the lines ot· a picture but that it fixes one ai'ter the other 
on a series oi' points between which it jumps almost instan-
taneously. The duration of fixations varies with the point 
attended to and the individual observing the picture. Never-
theless, all subjects looked at the pictures in this manner. 
There was also variation in the points fixed upon and the 
order o1· points fixed upon. No evidence was found to sub-
stantiate the theory that the eye follows curves; in fact, 
it does not even seem to follow lines. 
From this experiment by Buswell it is apparent that em-
pathy cannot find its basis in eye movements. 
vi. The Theory ot· Curt Ducasse 
Ducasse is included among the motor theorists because 
he would restrict the meaning of empathy to dramatic empa-
thy--empathy with objects in motion. Empathy, he says, is 
"simply the process by which doing and undergoing are per-
ceived as such in others •••• the process by which dramat-
ic agents or patients are perceived as such. ttl Empathy and 
aesthetic contemplation are not the same thing and should 
1. Curt John Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (New York: Dail, 
1929)' p. 149. 
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not be confused. Neither is empathy necessary for aesthetic 
contemplation. Colors, £or example, may be contemplated aes-
thetically but are little susceptible to being empathized. 
On the other hand, empathy occurs most .frequently without 
any aesthetic contempl.ation. In .fact, this dramatic manner 
of interpreting is the most natural. manner of' perceiving. 
To speak o£ "feeling ourselves into" another is to 
Ducasse nonsense. What we do, he says, is "to suppose our-
sel.ves into it, or identify ourselves with it.nl 
Thus, the phenomenon ca.Lled empathy is not one of 1"eeling 
but of knowing. Yet, this phenomenon is "not an intell.ectual 
and discursive process, but a more or less automatic and in-
tuitive process like any other case or perception.n3 The 
mechanism by which empathy operates "consists in inner ( i•·e.·, 
imagined or minimal or incipient) and more or less symbolic 
imitation of the action or experience which we regard the 
thing as performing or undergoing.n4 This all occurs spon-
1. !.£!S.' p. 152. 
2. !Q.ig•', p. 153. 
3. !!ll:.s!·' p. 16o. 
4. !!E:,g.' P• 161. 
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taneously and unconsciously in most cases, though it is pos-
sible to attempt it deliberately. 
Since it is a form of perception, empathy is subject to 
error. The object may not actually be undergoing what through 
the empathic process it is intuited as undergoing. If the 
thing perceived empathically is inanjmate, then the case is 
not one of correct or incorrect perception but rather of il-
lusion or hallucination. This is not to devalue empathy in 
regard to inanimate objects, nor even to imply that it is 
more difficult or less frequent. 
Despite its being a process of knowing, 
through the intuitive apprehension, by empathy, 
of what a conscious being is doing or experienc-
ing, one indeed automatically obtains the sort 
of feeling which goes with that sort of doing 
or experiencing•~ 
Since "empathy is the process through which alone modes of 
conscious doing and undergoing are p$rceived or imagined,n2 
the logical conclusion would seem to be that empathy is the 
process through which one feels what another is feeling as 
he undergoes a given experience. In like manner, the percep-
tion of art objects gives rise to feeling tone. 
Summary 
This chapter has introduced a great many empathy theo-
rists. Almost without exception they agree that empathy 
1. !2!.sl•, p. 164. 
2. Ibid•, p. 164. 
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operates in the same manner whether the object of perception 
be another person or an art object. They affirm that the 
same kind of process is involved in perceiving feeling in 
other persons that is involved in perceiving feeling in art 
objects. In short, they affi:nn the identity of interpersonal 
empathy and aesthetic empathy. 
Those theorists who emphasize the projection of the 
self or qualities of the self into the object agree that 
this is a process which operates with regard to both other 
persons and inanimate objects. Those theorists who emphasize 
the importance of the association of ideas in empathy agree 
that feelings are associated with human facial expression, 
for example, in the same manner that they are associated 
with certain shapes of lines, for instance. The Gestalt the-
orists maintain that the same gestalt structures are per-
ceived in the formal patterns of nature and art that exist 
in the human organism, and that the human observer may know 
their expressive content by coming into an isomorphic rela-
tionship with them--by assuming a similar gestalt structure. 
Those theorists who emphasize the importance of motor imita-
tion in empathy agree, except for Langfeld, that this is the 
process whereby persons perceive the feelings of both other 
persons and inanimate objects. Though there are four basic 
theories regarding how empathy operates' there is almost 
unanimous agreement that interpersonal empathy and aesthetic 
empathy are identical. 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to establish 
by which of these four processes empathy operates, though 
some suggestions in this regard will be made in Chapter VI. 
In fact, the primary concern here is not with the empathic 
process, i.e., the operations involved in the perception of 
feeling. The primary concern in this dissertation is with 
an ability or capacity to perfor-m that operation. 
This chapter has shown that regardless of what opera-
tions a theorist believes to be involved in the empathic 
process, he asserts that these very same operations are in-
volved whether the object o:f empathy be personal or aesthet-
ic. 
If the process o:f interpersonal empathy is identical 
with the process of aesthetic empathy, it follows then that 
interpersonal. empathic ability and aesthetic empathic abili-
ty are identical--i.e., are perfectly correlated. To illus-
trate, if the operations involved in skiing on water are the 
same as those involved in skiing on snow, it follows that 
everyone who has the ability to ski on water will also be 
able to ski on snow and vice versa. 
The import of the theories presented in this chapter is 
to support the hypothesis of the identity or correlation of 
interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic abili-
ty. The processes are identical, and the ability to perform 
identical processes is one unitary ability or factor. 
CHAPTER III 
THE MEASUREMENT OF EMPATHIC ABn.ITY 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the various 
methods which have been used to measure empathic ability. 
Not all or the studies to be cited have been viewed by their 
writers as attempts to measure empathic ability. Neverthe-
less, at least one and usually several writers have agreed 
in regard to any of the types of tests to be discussed that 
empathic ability plays a significant part in performing that 
type of test. The order in which these studies will be dis-
cussed is dictated by the order o£ similar tests in ~ 
Battery: Form I. Unfortunately, this order is almost the di-
rect opposite of the chronological order of these studies. 
The studies to be discussed are: (1) stick figures; (2) the 
method of predicting others' responses; (3) the Empathy 
~; (4) studies of the expressiveness of lines; (5) stud-
ies of facial expression; and (6) the Thematic Apperception 
Test. 
1. Stick Figures 
Sarbin has prepared a filmstrip of forty-two stick fig-
ures (line drawings of human figures) in various postures,! 
In the test situation these figures are shown at the rate of 
1. Sarbin, op, cit,, p. 231, 
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three per minute. Each figure is accompanied by a list of 
five words one of which the subject of the test is to choose 
as the most apt description of that figure. 
Results from this test indicate that those subjects who 
check the greatest number of modal responses arrive at their 
answers by "the empathic method in a signi:ficantly greater 
proportion, the biserial r being .41, P=.Ol. nl "The empathic 
method" means "they had imagined themselves in the particu-
lar postures for each figure."2 The modal response means 
the response given most frequently by a given sample, and is 
here regarded as the correct response. Elsewhere Sarbin re-
ports that scores on the stick figure test "and an indirect 
measure o:f kinesthetic in:ference (empathy) are correlated to 
the extent o£ .48."3 
Sarbin does not say that the stick figure test measures 
empathic ability, but he does indicate that empathy is an 
important :factor in per:forming the test well. 
2. The Method o:f Predicting Others' Responses 
Since the year 1949, when Cottrell and Dymond called 
attention to the subject of empathy and its measurement, a 
great many articles have appeared reporting the measurement 
1. Ibid., p. 232. 
2. ~., p. 231~ 
3. Theodore R. Sarbin and Curtis D. Hardyck, "Con:formance in 
Role Perception as a Personality Variable," J. Consult;. 
Psycbol•, 19{1955}, 109-ll; 
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or empathy by the method o:f predicting others' responses as 
suggested by Cottrell and Dymond.l. This method defines em-
pathy operationally as the ability to predict the responses 
of a given individual or group ot individuals, with whom the 
subject has a specified degree ot acquaintance, to a given 
psychol.ogieal test. 
Actually, this method of measuring empathy was suggest-
ed as earl.y as 1945 by Steinmetz. He ·suggested the measure-
ment or "psychological perception or empathetic insight" 
through the unorthodox use of tests already available. 2 To 
measure subjects' empathic understanding of a certain type 
of abnormal person, :for example, they might be required to 
take a Tburstone Personality Schedule or a !!f! responding 
as they think such an individual would respond. Another sug-
gestion made was that a person appear briefiy before a group 
of subjects and give a short talk, after which subjects 
would be required to respond to some test as they thought be 
would respond. 
Dymond first utilized this method of measuring empathy 
in the following manner. Subjects were tested in groups of' 
sixteen. The sixteen subjects were divided into groups o:f 
1. Leonard s. Cottrell, Jr. and Rosalind F. Dymond, "The &n-
pathic Resp<?nses: A Negl.ected Fiel.d for Research, n ~­
chiatry, 12(1949), 355-59. 
2. H. C. Steinmetz, "Directive Psychotherapy: Measuring Psy-
chological Understanding," J. Cline Psychol., 19(1945), 
331-35. 
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four persons each and allowed ten minutes to get acquainted 
with each other. At the end of that period the subjects were 
given trait rating scales, one each to be filled out by each 
subject as follows: (1) rate himself'; (2) rate each of the 
other persons in his group; (3) predict how each of the 
other persons in the group rates himself; and ( 4) predict 
how each of the other persons in his group rates him. After 
this was done the subjects were shUffled so that everyone 
was in a new group which contained none of the members of 
the previous group, and the above procedure was repeated. 
The groups were finally re-shuff1ed a third time and the 
test procedure repeated, so that each subject rated a total 
of nine other persons in the course of the test.l 
The rating scale used involved six traits each arranged 
along a five point scale. The test is completely objective 
in that the subjects themselves provide the correct answers. 
Subjects are required to predict something objective, i.e., 
responses of given other subjects--responses which the ex-
perimenter will have in his hands at the end of the test 
period. The test can then be scored by comparing a subject's 
predictions with the actual responses of those others whose 
responses he was attempting to predict. 
A given subject's score is the total number of units on 
the rating scales that his predictions deviate from the ac-
tual responses he was to predict. If his prediction .for a 
1. Dymond, op. cit. 
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given other on a given trait is correct, he receives a score 
or zero for that item. If he missed it by only one point on 
the rating scale, his score for that item is one, etc. His 
total deviations on all items for all others predicted for 
is his test score. A low score then indicates high empathic 
ability. 
Dymond found that the predictions made in this test 
were significantly more accurate than would occur by chance 
at the .01 level.l Hence, it is apparent that some kind of 
ability is measured here. This ability Dymond claims is em-
pathy, however, she presents no adequate evidence for the 
validity of her test·. 
Bender and Hast orr, who at first considered the method 
of predicting others' responses a promising technique for 
the measurement of empathy,2 have since become critical of 
this method. Their first criticism of Dymond's method was 
that she did not control the factor of projection on the 
part or subj ects.3 Consequently, they suggest a refined 
empathy score to be derived in the following manner.4 The 
1. Ibid. 
2. I~ E. Bender and Albert H. Hastorf, "The Perception of 
Persons: Forecasting Another Person's Responses on Three 
Personality Scales," J. Abnof14 Soc. P!fchol., 45(1950), 
556-61. 
3. Hastorf and Bender, op. cit'~ 
4. I. E. Bender and Albert H. Hastorf, "On Measuring General-
ized Elllpathic AbUity (Social Sensitivity)," J. Abnom. 
Soc. Psychol., 48(1953), 503-06. 
69 
type or test to be used is similar to Dymond's and is to be 
scored as Dymond scored her test. However, the score thus 
derived is only a raw empathy score~ It still includes the 
factor of projection and is found to be correlated with the 
degree of similarity between subjects. But, a projection 
score can be gotten by comparing a given subject's predic-
tions of others with his own self-ratings on the given scale. 
In other words, it can be seen whether his predictions are 
closer to the self-ratings of the people predicted for, or 
to his own self-ratings--whether he is empathizing or pro-
jecting. The refined empathy score then is the mathematical 
dif.ference between the raw empathy score (the difference be-
tween A's predictions of B's self-ratings and B's sel.f-
. . 
ratings) and the projection score (the difference between 
A's predictions of B·t s self-ratings and A's self-ratings). 
Further research using the refined empathy score re-
vealed additional problems. It was discovered that some sub-
jects who scored high on refined empathy did so for no other 
reason than that they made mid-range predictions on the 
rating scale for associates who made mid-range sel.f-ratings 
while they themselves made end scale self-ratings. One might 
predict cautiously, but rate himself in extreme categories. 
And lie might do this consistently regardless of the person 
whose responses he was trying to predict. This tendency, 
Bender and Hastorf hold, has nothing to do with a subject's 
empathic ability but still contaminates the refined empathy 
score. Their conclusion is 
that the use of predictions on attitude or 
questionnaire items creates so many scoring 
problems that other experimental procedures 
should be investigated in the search for some 
feasible measure of empathic ability.l 
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Jackson and Carr accept what Bender and Hastorf call 
the "raw empathy" score as an adequate measure of empathy, 
i.e., in agreement with Dymond.2 Moveover, they do not ac-
cept Bender and Hastorf's projection score as a measure of 
projection. Jackson and Carr's subjects were a group of 
schizophrenics and a control group of nonaal individuals. 
Subjects filled out the trait rating scales in terms of 
themselves and then rated three others as they thought they 
had rated themselves. The others were an associate, a normal 
person, and a psychotic person. The latter two persons were 
observed in a structured interview. The control group of 
normal individuals showed both greater empathic ability and 
greater assumed similarity than the schizophrenic group. 
Assumed similarity scores are what Jackson and Carr call 
what Bender and Hastorf call projection scores. They con-
clude in opposition to Bender and Hastorf that 
results support the impression that the dis-
crepancy between one's predictions of the 
responses o1· another -and one's self-descriP-
tion is not a measure of projection and might 
1. Albert H. Hastorr, I. E. Bender, and D. J, Weintraub, 
"The Influence o£ Response Patterns on the Re£ined Empa-
thy Score," J. Abnorm. Soc. Psychol•, 51(1955), 34J.-43. 
2. Jackson and Carr, op. cit. 
better be interpreted as a measure of the 
feeling of warmth and closeness,! 
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The operational definition or empathic ability as the 
ability to predict the responses of others has been used in 
a variety of interesting ways. Davidoff used it to measure 
the degree of empathic understanding between white high-
school students and their Negro neighbors,2 Subjects were 
required to estimate the responses of Negro students to a 
questionnaire including questions about the place of Negroes 
in our society and their relations with the white community. 
Notcutt and Sylva measured the mutual understanding of 
husbands and wives by having them predict each other's re-
sponses on scales of eighteen traits. 3 
In a clinically oriented study by Giedt subjects were 
required to predict the unfinished part or the response or a 
client to his therapist in an interview, Four twe1 ve minute 
interviews were presented in tour different ways f'or compar-
ison: (1) by silent motion picture; {2) by written transcrip-
tion; ( 3) by sound transcription; and ( 4) by sound motion 
picture, Regardless of' how the interviews were presented, 
certain portions of the client's responses were blanked out 
1, Ibid. 
-
2, Melvin D. Davidoff', "A Study o:f &npathy and Correlations 
of Prejudice toward a Minority Group," Purdue Univ, Stud. 
Higher Educ,, 67(1949), 
3. B, Notcutt and A, L, M, Sylva! "Knowledge of Other People," 
J. Abnora, Soc, Psycho!,, 46( 951), 30-37. 
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and lett to be predicted by the test subject.! 
Peebles required subjects to perform a Q sort as they 
thought two given other persons would sort it. Subjects were 
first required to perform this task only on the basis of' the 
knowledge that these two other persons were female college 
students. A second set of predictions was required after the 
subjects heard a tape recording of the responses of the two 
other persons to a picture story test. Peeb~es presents this 
as a test or empathic abUity.2 
Norman and Ainsworth administered the Guilford-Martin 
Inventoey of' Factors twice to a group or subjects. First they 
were to answer in terms of themselves. The second time they 
were to answer in terms of how "aost peopl.e or your own age 
and sex feel."3 Subjects received one point for each item 
on this second test on which their response corresponded to 
the responses of the majority of persons of their own age and 
sex. The score thus determined was interpreted as a measure 
of empathic ability (realistic projection). 
Tagiuri has used the predicting technique in connection 
with sociometric methods. In an effort to measure social per-
1. Harold F. Giedtf "Coaparison of Visual, Content, and Au-
ditorr Cues in nterviewing," J. ConsuJ.t. Psychol., 19 
(1955)' 407-~6. 
2. Richard Rogers Peebles, "Empathic Ability and Perceptual 
Disposition" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston Uni-
versity, 1956). 
3. lorman and Ainsworth, op. cit•; 
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ception he asked subjects to predict how the others in a 
group will respond to them in a sociometric test. Tagiuri 
does not refer to this as a test or empathic ability,! 
Dymond and Hughes, however, used this same technique of 
having subjects predict the socio.aetric choices of others in 
a group in an attempt to measure empathic abUity among 
children,2 
Allport contends that Dymond and those who use her 
method of predicting others' responses are not measuring em-
pathy, which is strictly speaking a process and not an abil-
ity, but are simply measuring the ability to judge others or 
to judge others' self-ratings. 3 Bruner and Tagiuri likewise 
include most of the studies which use the method of predict-
' 
ing others' responses under the category of studies of the 
ability to judge personality from expressive behavior,4 
There are a nlllllber of other studies, which are not cited 
here, which use this method but do not work within a conceP-
1. Renato Tagiuri, "Relational Analysis: An Extention of 
Sociometric Method with Emphasis upon Social Perception," 
Sociometrr, 15(1952), 91-104. 
2. Rosalind F. Dymond, Anne s. Hughes, and Virginia L, Raabe, 
"Mea~uriJ!S Ch~es in &apathy with Age," J, Consu].t. P§X-
sl!Q!,. , 16{ 1952) , 202-06. 
3. Gordon Allport, op, cit:, P• 537. 
4. Jerome s. Bruner and Renato Tagiuri, "The Perception of 
People," Lindzey (ed.), Handbook ot Social Psychology, 
II, 634-5t..;' 
74 
tual framework which uses the term empathy,! 
Remmers used a method very similar to Dymond's and de-
fined empathy operationally as "the ability to predict or 
project oneself into, the responses of others, whether indi-
viduals or groups, particul.arly responses of a social-emo-
tional, attitudinal sort,n2 This definition mentions the 
distinction between predicting individual responses and pre-
dicting group responses, but Remmers does not make provision 
for this distinction in his test. Bronfenbrenner et. al, 
have indicated that this distinction needs to be made opera-
tionally. Their measurements or ability to judge the "gener-
alized other" and ability to judge the individual other (in-
terpersonal sensitivity} show these to be independent fac-
tors, i.e.,, they are uncorrelated,'3 Consequently, they have 
sought to develop pure tests of these abilities, using the 
method or predicting others' responses but eschewing the 
term empathy, 
Both Bronfenbrenner et, al. and Lindgren and Robinson 
feel that Dymond's test tails to separate these two abil-
ities, since subjects tend to judge each other not as indi-
1. Urie Bronrenbrenner, J. Harding~ and M, 0, Gallwey, "'l'he 
Measurement of Skill in Social Yerception," Baldwin ~· 
.!!• ( eds,), Talent and SocietY, pp, 29-lll. 
2, H, H, Remmers, "A Qualitative Index or Social P~chologi­
cal &npathy," ADler, J, Orthopsychiata, 20(1950), 161-65, 
3, Bronfenbrenner et. al,, ope cit. 
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viduals but as generalized other college students,l 
This issue is raised at this point since the two tests 
to be discussed in the following section are put forward as 
tests of empathic ability despite the .fact that they measure 
only the ability to predict the responses of the generalized 
other, i.e., some portion ot the public. 
3. The Empathy Test 
Kerr and Spero.ff have published a test for the measure-
ment of empathic ability--the "ability to put yourself in 
the other person's position, establish rapport, and antici-
pate his reactions, feelings, and behaviors. n2 
The Empathy Test of Kerr and Speroff requires the sub-
ject to rank the order of preference of a given subgroup of 
the general public in regard to: (1) types of music; (2) 
magazines; and ( 3) annoying experiences. Fourteen types of' 
music, fii'teen 111agazines, and ten types of annoying experi-
ences are to be ranked. The scoring key is objective, the 
correct rank order having been obtained from sales and sub-
scription statistics and .from public opinion polls. 
The Empathy Test is scored in a manner similar to all 
other tests of predicting others' ratings. A subject's score 
is simply the total of the rank differences between his 
1. H. c. Lindgren and Jacqueline Robinson, "An Evaluation of 
Dymond's Test of Insi~ and :&npathy," J. Consu].t, Psy-
cho!., ·17(1953), 172-76. 
2. Kerr and Spero.ff', op. cit,' 
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rankings and the objective rankings, subtracted from 200 to 
give a positive score. 
Scoring and administration are easy and quick. The test 
can be done in from five to fifteen minutes. Furthermore, its 
reliability is high, and it is available in two forms. All of 
this serves to make the Empathx Test a handy and attractive 
test instrument. 
Two studies have questionned the validity of the Empathy 
Test. Siegel administered the lbpathy Test: Fona A to thirty-
three experiaental psychologists and twenty-five clinical 
psychologists predicting that clinical psychologists would 
score higher. No significant differences were found between 
the scores of these two groups.-1 
Bell and Hall administered both Dymond's test and the 
Empathy Test to a group of eighty-three subjects. They found 
the correlation between scores on the two tests to be nearly 
zero;2 This finding is in accord w1 th those of Bronfenbren-
ner et. al. that there is no correlation between ability to 
predict the responses of the generalized other and ability 
to predict the responses of the individual other. 
On the other hand, a nlDlber of studies have been pub-
1. A. I. Siegel, "An Experiaental Evaluation of the Sensitiv-
ity of the Empathy Test," J. Appi. Psychol., 38(1954), 
222-23. 
2. Graham B. Bell and Harry E. Hall, Jr. "The Relationship 
between Leadership and &apathy," J. A'l,norm. So e. Psychol;:, 
49(1954), 156-57. 
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lished in def"ense of the validity o:f the l!tpathr Test. 
Tobolski and Kerr administered the .!apathy Test to thirty-
two automobile salesmen in two of Chicago's biggest agencies. 
'l'hey found scores on the Empathy Test to be correlated • 44 
with actual sales records (sales divided by attempted sales) 
and .71 with sales managers' merit ratings•! 
Van Zelst tested sixty-f"our labor union local business 
agents with the &apathy Test and f"ound the following corre-
lations with their scores: (1) .. 167 with rankings by their 
superiors; (2) .38 with percent of vote received at union 
elections; (3) :55 with the File-Hemmers How Supervise; (4) 
.60 with ability to recruit new members; (5) ~64 with abili-
ty to settle grievances and disputes; ( 6) '-.;44 with ability 
to enforce union rules; and ( 7) yielding a multiple correla-
tion of .76.2 
In another study reported by Kerr, the- graduates o:r 
Illinois Institute of Technology were rated by a psycholo-
gist at the commencement exercises on their "breadth or 
smile and overt acknowledgement to the president's behavior" 
upon his handing them their diplomas.3 Subjects were rated 
one, two, three, or :four. Empathy Test scores were available 
1. Francis P. Tobolski and Willard A. Ke~, "Predictive 
Value or the Empathy Test in Automobile Salesmanship," 
J. Appl. Pqchol., 36(1952), 310-11~ 
2;- Raymond H. Van Zelst, "&llpathy Test Scores o:r Union Lead-
erst'" J! APPl.' Psvchol., 36(1952), 293-95. 
3. Kerr and Spero:r:r, op. cit. 
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for 136 of the graduates and the correlation between these 
and breadth of smile ratings was £ound to be • 64. 
Predicting that empithic ability is an important factor 
in leadership ability, Kerr administered the Finpathy Test 
and FUe-Renmers How Supervise to two groups o£ college stu-
dents. For ninety-five subjects who took Form M o£ How Super-
vise the correlation with the Empathy Test was .62. For 
eighty who took Form B o£ How Supervise the correlation with 
:&npathy Test scores was .32.1 
A new test, the Primary Empathic Abilities was publish-
ed by Kerr in 1957 "with the aim o£ sampling more diverse 
aspects of empathic ability. n2 This test contains 167 items 
o£ various kinds. lfJost of them involve judging the pre£er-
ences O·f the generalized other, i.e., of some subgroup of 
the general public; none involves judging an individual 
other. An item of this generalized sort is: 
( 11J) Which do workers think is the poorest rea-
son for ~motion! (a) Being very loyal to the 
company; (b) Having a good family reputation; 
(c) Studying for sel£-improvement.3 
Other items are of a more purel.y informational sort: 
(100) The most numerous groups of Foreign-born 
Americans: (a) Germans and Poles; (b) French 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. Kerr, op. cit. 
3. Willard A. Kerr, The Prima~ Empathic Abilities (Chicago: 
Psychometric Affiliates, 1 7) • 
and Poles; (e) Poles and Italians; (d) Germans 
and Italians.l 
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The items included have been selected because they clus-
ter about seven factors. Subjects receive scores on each o£ 
these seven factors as well as a total score. The factors 
are: (A) diplomacy; (B) industrial urbanity; (C) empathy 
with the insecure; (D) empathy with the conscientious middle 
class; (E) empathy with the lower middle cJ.ass; (F) empathy 
with stable young married people; (G) empathy with upper so-
cial levels.2 
The split-half reliability of the entire test with 
Spearman-Brown correction is .00,..3 The split-hal£ reliabil-
ity of the individual factors, however, is considerably low-
er. 
Attempts to validate the Primarr Empathic Abilities are 
inconclusive. The criteria against which the test has been 
correlated include years of selling experience, tendency to 
receive elective positions, and tendency to occupy human re-
lations jobs.4 These are rather crude criteria for a test 
of empathic ability, and the correlations obtained have not 
been either high or consistent. 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. Kerr, Primary Empathic Abilities: Manual. 
3. Ibid• 
4. Ibid., also: Kerr, The Primaff Em:2fthic Abilities: Sup-
p!e'iient to Manual· or Instruct ODS Chicago: Psychometric 
Affiliates, 1958). 
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4. Studies o:f the Expressiveness o:f Lines 
Lipps spoke or :feeling into lines,l and Chandler says 
that "lines owe their expressiveness to a type of' process 
called empathy•""2 Artists, of' course, have long been aware 
that by varying the qual.ity o:f their lines they are able to 
express and communicate dii'f'erent moods and emotions. Lund-
holm, however, was the first to study this phenomenon sys-
tematically.) 
Lundholm presented his subjects with a series or adjec-
tives descriptive o:f :feelings and asked them to draw lines 
expressing each of the given adjectives. Forty-eight adjec-
tives were supplied in thirteen groups, all those in a given 
group being roughly synonymous• Four men and :four women were 
used as subjects, and introspective accounts o:f the mental 
processes by which they arrived at their responses were col-
lected. The lines which the subjects drew in response were 
analyzed according to two criteria: type and direction. Pres-
sure was not measured. Three main categories of' line type 
were distinguished: (1} lines with only curves; (2) lines 
with only angles; and ( 3) lines with both angles and curves. 
Lines were fUrther classified on the basis of whether the 
amplitude and :frequency of the curves or angles was large 
1• Lipps, Komik und Humor, pp. 223-24. 
2. Chandler, op. cit., p. 48. 
3. Helge Lundholm, "The· Af'f'ecti ve Tone of' Lines: Experimental. 
Researches, "Psychol. Rev;·, 28(1921), 43-60. 
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and slow,, medium, or small and rapid• Direction was simply 
scored as up, down, or horizontal, vertical lines being con-
sidered as horizontal., Lundholm discovered a degree of una-
nimity in the responses of his subjects, in many instances 
far above chance, which led hia to conclude that 
this .feeling tone is probabl.y dependent upon 
the suggestion o.f mov•ent in the lines; that 
is, the lines appear to imitate in their move-
ment the motor expression or emotional states,! 
Poffenberger and Barrows followed up these experiments 
by Lundholm on the expressiveness o.f lines by presenting sub-
jects with a series o.f lines varying in shape and direction 
to Which they were required to respond with an appropriate 
adjective,,2 Eighteen .Lines "representing the simple classes 
discovered by Lundholm in his analysis of subjects' reac-
tions" were arranged on one sneet of paper which was given 
to each subject. Another sheet o.f paper containing forty-
seven adjectives arranged in the same thirteen classes used 
by Lundhol.m was given to each subject aiong with the sheet 
of lines. The 500 subjects who participated in this experi-
ment were asked to pick out a llne from among the eighteen 
expressive ot each of' the thirteen groups oi' adjectives. 
Again, substantia.L agreement was discovered among subjects' 
responses on many of the 1ines. 
1. Ibid•·, p. 60, 
2. A, T, Poffenberger and B, E.- Batrows "The Feeling Val.ue 
of Lines," J. Appl. PsychOl., 8( 1924f, 187-205,' 
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Not only did Lundholm and Poffenberger and Barrows find 
consistency and unanimity in the responses of their respec-
tive subjects, but there is also very good agreement when the 
results of both experiments are compared. Chandler presents 
a table of the results of both experiments and observes that 
they are "essentially similar.nl 
Guilford and Guilford have used a variation of Lund-
holm's method in constructing a test for measuring artistic 
aptitude.2 In this test the subjects were required to draw 
lines expressive of twenty-four given adjectives descriptive 
of' feelings. The resulting lines were scored on the basis of' 
form, direction, and pressure. Form f'ell into four categories: 
wave, curve, angle, and straight. Direction was subdivided in-
to up, down, and horizontal. Pressure was considered as ei-
ther heavy, medium, or light. It was found necessary not only 
to assign various weights to these three criteria but also to 
allow f'or a range of "correct answers" which varied in value. 
Nevertheless, the test proved to have high validity. 
Walton assumed that this ability to associate the cor-
rect adjective with a given line on this kind of test is a 
manif'estation of empathic ability; and consequently, he used 
this kind of test in the study of the development of empathic 
1. Chandler, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
2. Joy Paul Guilford and R. B'~- Guilford, "A Prognostic Test 
for Students in Design," J. Appl. PSIChol., 15(1931), 
335-45. 
ability in children.l Walton constructed a four part bat-
tery of tests which he administered to children from kinder-
garten to the t\felth grade. The battery included: (1) a 
multiple choice test which presented one line and several 
descriptive adjectives, the subjects being required to se-
lect the appropriate adjective; (2) a list of adjectives for 
each of which the subjects were required to draw appropriate 
lines; ( 3) a series of lines for each of which the subjects 
were required to respond with a descriptive adjective of 
their own; and (4) the Ruckmick pictures of faces having 
various expressions which the subjects were required to de-
scribe. On the basis of the data collected with this battery 
Walton concluded that empathic ability increases with age up 
to a certain point at which it reaches a plateau. It is cor-
related with artistic ability but does not seem to be re-
lated to intelligence. 
Hevner criticised the experiments of Lundholm, Poffen-
berger and Barrows, and Guilford and Guil.f'ord for using 
stimuli which were artificial and not o£ the same kind as 
the stimulus of the art object.2 Consequently, she conduct-
ed an experiment in which she presented subjects with ab-
stract designs framed within rectangles. Two versions of' 
1. w. E. Walton, "&npathic Responses in Children," Psychol. 
Monog., 48( 1936), I.IJ-67. 
2. Kate Hevner, "Experimental Studies of the Af£ective Value 
of Colors and Lines," J. Appl. Psychol., 19(1935), 385-98. 
four designs were used. Each of the four designs was com-
posed of only one kind of lines: circle, square, angle, or 
wave; The two versions were simply different in color, one 
being in red tones and the other in blue.- The designs were 
presented to the subjects one at a time along with a list 
o.f adjectives subdivided into eight groups. With each new 
design a new copy of the same list of adjectives was pre-
sented. The subjects were required to check those adjectives 
which were expressed by each design. The results showed good 
consistency and tmiformity among subjects' judgments, and 
led Hevner to conclude that the artist's choice of line "is 
of the greatest importance in establishing in his audience 
the feeling tone which is appropriate for his subject mat-
ter."l 
A recent experiment published on the expressiveness of 
lines is that of Scheerer and Lyons.2 They conducted two 
experiments similar to Lundholm's in which they presented 
words in response to which subjects were to draw lines. An 
elaborate scoring system was devised on the basis of: design 
complexity; closure (closed or open figure); shape; pres-
sure; pattern; and direction. As with previous studies, a 
degree of agreement far above chance was exhibited by sub-
1. Ibid.' 
2. Martin Scheerer and Joseph Lyons, "Line Drawings and 
Matching Responses to Words," J. Pers., 25(1957), 251-
73. 
jects in their responses. 
In two other experiments in the same study by Scheerer 
and Lyons, subjects matched ~ines with words. The agreement 
among subjects' responses on these tests was also far above 
chance-significantly above chance at the .01 level of prob-
ability in one case, and at the .001 level in the other. 
Scheerer and Lyons appear to favor an explanation of these 
results that is most like the Gestalt theory of' isomorphism. 
5. Studies o£ Facial Expression 
The scientific study of' facial express.ion goes back to 
the classic work of Darwin,! Mantegazza,2 and Rudolph.3 
Since these monumental works of the last century, a great 
deal more study has been devoted to the subject of .facia1 
expression. Some o.f tnat work and some o:f the issues about 
which it centered will be reviewed briefly here. Anyone in-
terested in an exhaustive treatment of the subject is refer-
red to Jenness for a 110 item bibliography and comprehensive 
review of the literature outlining all o.f the major issues 
up to 1932•4 For a more recent review o:f the literature see 
1. Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotion in Man and An-
imals (London: J. Murray, 1872) • 
2. Paolo Mantegazza, Physiognomy and Expression (London: 
Walter Scott, 1890}. 
3. Heinrich Rudolph, Der Ausdruck der Gemfttsbewegungen des 
Mensc.hen (Dresden: G. KUhtmann, 1903). 
4. Arthur Jenness, "The Recognition of Facial Expressions 
of Emotion," Psychol. Bull., 29(1932), 324-50. 
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Secord.l 
Almost without exception theoretical writers on empathy 
have held that the human face can be, or perhaps is even 
best, perceived through an empathic process. Many of the 
studies to be cited in this section mention empathy as the 
method used by subjects to perceive facial expression, 
though none of them except the study of' Walton cited earlier 
suggests that a test o:f ability to judge facial expression 
might be used as a test of empathic ability. 
One of the earliest problems in the study of facial ex-
pression, and one which is still a live issue, is that o:f 
finding a good series of pictures of facial expression. 
Langfeld did some work with the Rudolph pictures in 1918, 
but they were not very satisfactory. 2 Various artificial 
models, such as the Boring-Titchener model, were constructed 
and enjoyed some popu1arity for a time, but their artifici-
ality was a severe limitation. 
In 1921 Ruckmick published a series of thirty-four :fa-
cial expression photographs of a :female drama student who 
had posed for them before a mirror with the intention of ex-
1. Paul F. Secord, "Facial Features and Influence Processes 
in Interpersonal Perception," Tagiuri and Petrullo ( eds•') , 
Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior, pp. 300-15. 
2. Herbert s. Lang:feld, "Judgments of Facial Expression and 
Suggestion," Psychol. Rev. 25(1918), 488-94. 
Herbert s. Lang:feld "The Judgment of Emotions :from Fa-
cial Expressions,"~J. Abnorm. Psychol., 13(1918), 172-84. 
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pressing certain specific emotions.! This has been probably 
the most popular set of pictures of facial expression and 
was published for many years by c. He Stoelting, although it 
is now out of print. Ruckmick had the emotions expressed in 
these pictures named by a group of judges, and these judg-
ments are regarded as the correct answers in most studies 
which use the Ruckmick pictures. 
Feleky published in 1924 eighty-six photographs of her 
own facial expressions, each one posed with a specific emo-
tion intended.2 These photographs are rather poor differing 
as they do in clothing and hairdo from one to another and 
including hand gestures in some cases. These pictures were 
shown to 100 subjects who were to respond by telling what 
emotion was being expressed. A list of 109 adjectives. was 
supplied for prompting but other responses were also allow-
ed~ The correct answer was the emotion intended by Feleky 
when she posed for the picture or a synonym, rather freely 
interpreted. "A considerable degree oi' agreement" was found 
among the judgments of' the 100 subjects.J From introspec-
tive reports by her subjects Feleky concluded that most of 
1. Christian A. Ruckmick, "A Preliminary Study of· the Emo-
tions," Pgychol. Monog., 30(1921), 30-35. 
2. Antoinette Feleky, Feelings and l!motions (New York: 
Pioneer, 1924}. 
3. Ibid~, p. 199. 
them had used motor mimicry: 
Most of' the quotations [i.e., of" introspective 
reports] illustrate the !'ormation of judgment 
by imitating a bodily attitude similar to that 
ot· the poser, ana some show the arrival at a 
judgment by a mental process.J. 
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A study by Buzby, also conducted in .l924 using the Bor-
ing-Titchener model indicated that certain of its expressions 
were either poorly constructed or else poorly judged for some 
other reason.·2 Women were found to be slightly better judges 
on the average. The issue o:f' sex differences raised here has 
been a subject of controversy ever since and without definite 
conclusions. 
Floyd Allport used fourteen Rudolph pictures and forty-
eight subjects in a study which sought to investigate the 
effects of training upon the ability to judge facial expres-
sion.3 Subjects were required to select their responses 
from a list o:f' adjectives supplied, and the correct answer 
was determined from Rudolph. About :f'orty-five to fifty per-
cent of the judgments made were correct and no sex differ-
ence was fotmd. Introspective reports by the subjects re-
vealed that they had arrived at their responses by three 
methods: ( 1) by endeavoring to imagine a situation in which 
the given expression would seem appropriate; ( 2) by imitat-
1. Ibid., p. 202. 
2. Dallas E. Buzby, "The Interpretation of Facial Expres-
sion," Amer. J. Psycho!., 35(1924), 602-04. 
3. F. Allport, op. cit., pp. 225ff. 
ing the expression wi. th their own physiognomy; ( 3) by ana-
lyzing the various muscular and other components of the ex-
pression, Training in each of these methods had the effect 
of improving the ability o:f poor judges to judge facial ex-
pression, but tended to confuse good or intuitional judges. 
Jenness repeated this experiment of Allport's on the 
ef:fect o:f training and found that training did tend to raise 
scores on tests of judging :facial expression,! 
An article by Landis in 1929 raised two issues one o:f 
which was to be taken more seriously than the other,2 The 
more important issue was the question of the validity o:f 
posed photographs o:f facial expression. Landis used photo-
graphs taken in actual "emotional" situations, although he 
used some posed photographs also,' Subjects were to name the 
emotion portrayed using any word they chose. The results 
showed the subjects' judgments to be no more o.f'ten correct 
than would occur by chance. This led Landis to conclude that 
"it is practically impossible to name accurately the 'emo-
tion' being experienced by a subject when one has only a 
photograph o:f the face on which to base the judgment. n3 The 
issue of whether it is in fact possible to judge emotion 
1. Arthur Jenness, "The Ei'fects o:f Coaching Subjects in the 
Recognition of Facial Expressions, " J. Gen. Psycho!, , 
7{1932}, 163-78. 
2. Carney Landis, "The Inten>retation o:f Facial Expression, n 
J. Gen. Psychol., 2(1929), 59-72. 
3. Ibid. 
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from .facial expression alone has been raised by a small num-
ber of other investigators, but it has never been taken se-
riously by the vast majority of experimenters in the field 
who have amassed a great deal o.f evidence to the contrary, 
Crider, using pictures taken from advertisements which 
subjects were to match with an adjective taken from a list, 
also concluded on the basis of his results that emotion can-
not be successfully identified .from photographs o.f facial 
expression,! 
A study by Jenness in 1932, essentially replicating 
Langfeld's 1918 study, and using the same .fourteen Rudolph 
pictures, indicated that women did slightly better at the 
task of judging emotions from pictures o.f .facial expression, 
and also that certain emotions were judged better than 
others,2 
In an article published in 1930 Frois-Wittmann described 
a new set o.f pictures of .facial expression for Which he hi~ 
self posed: 
The .face is fairly neutral; there is no indica-
tion o.f clothes, the hair 1s without parting and 
unobtrusive; the face is clean-shaven and its 
muscles are thus plainly visible; the head has 
been kept in a uni.fo~ three-quarter position, 
1. B. Crider, "The Identification of Emotions in Advertising 
Illustrations," J, Appl. Psychol,, 20(1936), 748-50. 
2. Arthur Jenness "Dif.ferences in the Recognition o.f Facial 
Expression of Emotion," J, Gen. Psychol., 7(1932), 192-96. 
and only that amount o~ tilting necessary ~or 
certain expressions is present,l 
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This marked a major advance in the study of facial expression 
such as can be fully appreciated only by looking at the sets 
o~ pictures previously available, 
All seventy-two o~ the Frois-Wittmann pictures were pub-
lished in 1935 in an article by Hulin and Katz in which they 
raised another issue o~ significance,2 Subjects might, they 
suggested, be able to understand what emotion a given pic-
ture o~ ~acial expression was expressing yet not be able to 
put it into words correctly. In an effort to overcome this 
verbal problem they required their subjects to sort the 
seventy-two Frois-Wittmann pictures into separate piles, 
placing in the same pile all those which seemed to be ex-
pressing approximately the same emotion, The study is merely 
descriptive but does serve to raise an important issue, 
The problems involved in the use o~ verbal responses to 
pictures o~ facial expression are illustrated by a study by 
Kanner,J In scoring the ~reely chosen responses o~ 409 sub-
jects to eighteen o~ the Feleky pictures Kanner ~ound it nec-
essary to grade the responses on a scale ~rom one to ten de-
1, Jean Frois-Wittmann, "The Judgment of Facial Expression," 
J, Exp. Psychol,, 13(1930), 116-17. 
2. Wilbur S, Hulin and Daniel Katz, "The Frois-Wittmann Pic-
tures of Facial Expression," J, Exp, Psychol,, 18(1935), 
4S2-98. 
3, Leo Kanner, "Judging Emotions from Facial Expressions," 
Psycho!, MOnog,, 41{1931), 1-91, 
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pending on their degree of' similarity in meaning to the cor-
rect answer. 
A study by Foley is of' interest because it reports the 
use of' empathy in judging the expression of a non-human.l 
Foley's subjects were required to judge what emotion was ex-
pressed in six photographs of' the face of' a chimpanzee. 
Though the subjects' judgnients were very poor, many never-
theless reported that they had tried to imagine what they 
would £eel like with the given expression on their own 
£aces. 
Munn published an experiment in 1940 using pictures 
taken in real lif'e situations, the object of' which was to 
determine whether knowledge of' the situation would improve 
judgments of f'acial expression.2 Sixteen photographs were 
selected from ~ and &.2.2k magazines and enlargements made 
of the £ace alone. Af'ter subjects had made judgments of' the 
emotions expressed by the pictures of the face alone, they 
were shown the entire picture including the situational con-
text and required to judge again what emotion the person in 
the picture was expressing. The results indicated that the 
seeing of the whole photograph, i.e., knowledge of the situ-
1. John P. Foley, Jr., "Judgment of' Facial Expression of' 
Emotion in the Chimpanzee," J. Soc. Psycho!., 6(1935), 
31-67. 
2. Norman L. Munn, "The Ef'f'ect of' Knowledge of' the Situation 
upon Judgment of' Emotion from Facial Expressions," iL· 
Abnorm. Soc. Psychol., 35(1940), 324-38. 
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ational context, did not consistently lead to improved ac-
curacy in judging, 
A later experiment by Vinacke, however, indicated that 
knowledge of the situation did increase agreement among 
judges,l Vinacke used the same method used by Munn. 
Coleman varied the above technique to have subjects re-
spond with what situation elicited the facial expressions 
which were presented to them by motion picture, He reports 
that "the methods most o.rten reported by the judges in iden-
tifying the facial expressions of emotion fell within the 
general category of empathy,n2 
The research of Hanawalt has been concerned with the 
question of whether the upper or the lower half of the face 
is a better cue to judging facial expression, One of his 
studies used pictures of faces from sculpture and painting,3 
His conclusion is that neither the upper nor the lower half 
of the face is a better cue to expression generally,4 
1, w. E, Vinac~:i "The Judgment of Facial Expression by 
Three Natio -racial Groups in Hawaii: I, Caucasian 
Faces," J, Pers,, 17(1949}, 407-29, 
2. J. C, Coleman, "Facial Expressions of Emotion," Psycho!, 
Monog,, 63(1949), 1-36, 
3, Nelson G. Hanawalt, "The Role of the Upper and Lower 
Parts of the Face as a Basis for Judging Facial Expres-
sion: I, In Painting and Sculpture," J, Gen. Psychol,, 
27(1942}, 331-46. 
4. Nelson G, Hanawalt, "The Role of the Upper and Lower 
Parts of the Face as a Basis for Judging Facial Expres-
sion: II, In Posed Expressions and Candid Camera Pic-
tures," J. Gen. Psychol., 31(1944), 23-36. 
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Schlosberg has been concerned in his research on facial 
expression to develop a set of dimensions by which facial 
expression may be coded or described accurately and briefly. 
His earlier work deals with the placement of pictures of fa-
cial expression on the Woodworth scale of the emotions. Con-
sidering the range of human emotions as a linear continuum, 
Woodworth has marked out six equally spaced points on this 
continuum: (1) love, mirth, happiness; { 2) surprise; { 3) 
fear, suffering; ( 4) determination, anger; ( 5) disgust; and 
{ 6) contempt. .1 All other emotions could be placed somewhere 
between these points along the scale, but these points rep.. 
resent equal intervals. 
Schlosberg had forty-five subjects sort three sets of 
the Frois-Wittmann pictures into seven bins, six of which 
were labeled with the points of the Woodworth scale listed 
above and one labeled "mixing."2 The results of this exper-
iment indicate that the Woodworth scale is indeed a scale, 
but a circular rather than a linear scale. It is more like a 
color wheel than a yardstick. The modal position of each of 
the Frois-Wittmann pictures on this scale was calculated and 
the data published in the article. 
Two orthogonal axes or dimensions are shown by Schlos-
berg in a more recent article to be capable of replacing the 
1. Robert s. Woodworth, ~erimental Psychology (New York: 
Henry Holt, 1938), p. 1. 
2. Harold Schlosberg, "A Scale for the Judgment of Facial 
Expressions," J. Exp. Psychol., 29{1941), 497-510. 
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Woodworth scale,l Subjects were required to· rate the Frois-
Wittmann pictures on two nine point scales: Attention-Rejec-
tion; and Pleasantness-Unpleasantness. By superimposing 
these two scales on orthogonal axes and marking off the X 
andY values for each picture (i,e., the modal response in 
terms of each scale) Schlosberg was able to find a location 
on this two dimensional surface for each of the seventy-two 
pictures. Next he drew a circle having as its center the or-
igin of the axes. The circle was divided into six equal 
parts and the Woodworth scale categories assigned in order 
one each to each of the six sections of the circumference. 
The circle was so rotated that the Y axis bisected that six-
ty degrees of arc representing Woodworth category I (love, 
mirth, happiness) at the positive end (i.e., Pleasantness), 
Its negative end (Unpleasantness) then bisected category IV 
(determination, anger). The X axis extended from "Rejection" 
at its negative end, where it fell on the border bet"t"l'een 
category V (disgust) and category VI (contempt), to "Atten-
tion" at its positive end, where it fell on the border be-
tween category II (surprise) and category III (fear, suffer-
ing). Given this graphic surface, Schlosberg showed that if 
a vector were drawn from the origin through the point repre-
senting the location of a given picture on this surface, it 
1. Harold Schlosberg, "The Description of Facial Expressions 
in Terms of Two Dimensions," J, Exp. Psycho!,, U-(1952), 
229-37. 
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would intersect the circllDlf'erence at a point which coincided 
with the modal Woodworth scale value for that picture as de-
termined by earlier research. Thus the two-dimensional nota-
tion can be substituted for the Woodworth scale values. 
Schlosberg likens this surface to a color wheel, the Wood-
worth values around the circumference being the hues and the 
distance from the origin indicating the saturation or inten-
sity. 
In 1957 Schlosberg published a new set of pictures of 
facial expression--the Lightfoot pictures.l The model is fe-
male and there are forty-eight pictures in the set. Not only 
are these pictures superior photographically and technically 
to previous sets, but they also include a wider range of ex-
pression on a third dimension whiCh Schlosberg describes as 
SleeP-Tension.2 Now pictures of facial expressions, and in 
fact all of the emotions, can be described in terms of three 
dimensions.3 The theoretical model is no longer the color 
wheel but the three dimensional color solid. The color solid 
1. Trygg Engen, Nassim Levy~ and Harold Schlosberg, "A New 
Series of Facial ExpresS1ons," Amer. Psycholog!st, 
12(1957), 264-66. . 
Pictures also shown in: Clifford T. Morgan, Student's 
Workbook to Accom Introduction to Ps cholo (New 
ork: cGraw-Hill, 195 , pp. 30-35. 
2. Trygg Engen, Nassim Levy, and Harold Schlosberg, "The Di-
mensional Analysis of a New Series of Facial Expressions," 
J. Exp. Psychol., 55(1958), 454-58. 
3. Harold Schlosberg, "Three Dimensions of Emotion," Psycho!. 
Rev., 61(1954), 81-88'.· 
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is a cylinder with the color wheel as its circular section 
and the light-dark dimension as its axis. Schlosberg's 
SleeP-Tension dimension apparently corresponds to this 
light-dark axis. 
In 1953 Fields published an experiment in \>ilicb he of-
fered a workable solution to the problem of verbal response 
first pointed to by Hulin and Katz in 1935.1 Using pictures 
from the Frois-Wittmann and the Ruckmick sets, Fields found 
twenty pairs that were matched in terms of the emotion being 
expressed, i.e., Frois-Wittmann matched with Ruckmick. Half 
of the pictures were attached to stationary panels and the 
other half to cards. Subjects were required to match the 
pictures on the cards with those on the panels.2 
The study of facial expression is thus fraught with 
many problems. Some writers hold that the ability to judge 
facial expression rests largely upon empathic ability; 
others claim no relationship between the two. 
6. The Thematic Apperception Test 
Dymond has published two studies in which she attempted 
to measure empathic ability with the Thematic APPerception 
Test. In the earlier study subjects were rated on their empa-
1. Sidney J. Fields, "Discrimination of Facial Expression 
and Its Relation to Personal Adjustment," J. Soc. Psychol., 
38(1953), 63-71. 
2. See inf'ra, pp.117-18 for a more extensive description 
of Fields's test. 
thic ability in proportion to how richly they imputed feel-
ings and emotions to the characters in the test pictures,l 
The later study was concerned with measuring empathic abil-
ity in children,2 Here subjects were scored on the basis of 
the number of times they mentioned the thoughts and :feelings 
o:f their characters, or how many questions the test adminis-
trator needed to ask to elicit such responses. These children 
also predicted each other's responses to a sociometric test, 
and the empathy scores thus derived were :found to be corre-
lated • 46 with the empathy scores derived :from the use of 
the Thematic Apperception Test as an empathy test. This cor-
relation or .46 is ~ significant. 
High reliability is no doubt very difficult to attain 
with this kind of test. Furthermore, its validity is rather 
dubious, 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed a vast number of tests of em-
pathic ability and tests in which empathic ability appears 
to be a factor. The following chapter will indicate which 
of these methods or measuring empathic ability have been 
chosen for inclusion in Test Batterr: Form I and their ra-
tionale for inclusion therein. Further evaluation of the 
1. Rosalind F. Dymond, "A Preliminary Investigation or the 
Relation of Insight and Empathy," J. Consult. Psycho!., 
12(1948), 228-33. 
2. Dymond,· Hughes, and Raabe, op. cit. 
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various methods of' measuring empathic ability will be f'ound 
in Chapter VI. 
The interest of psychologists has shifted over the 
years from the ability to perceive feeling in aesthetic ob-
jects and facial expressions to the ability to predict the 
responses of· other persons. Sarbin' s work with stick figures 
constitutes the only considerable exception to this general 
trend. The trend seems to be away from studies of perceiving 
what feeling another is expressing toward studies of pre-
dicting what another will do. 
Several factors may account for this shift of interest. 
The tone of modern, and especially American, psychology has 
become increasingly practical and applied. At the same time 
large organizations in American society have become increas-
ingly concerned with public relations-i.e~, in the sense of 
the manipulation or people. In this context it is of more 
value to be able to predict what a person will do than to be 
able to perceive how he feels. Consequently, priority is 
given to the developnent of'" tests that will discriminate 
among persons on the basis of their ability to predict the 
responses of others. Kerr's use of the &qpathy Test for 
measuring sales ability illustrates this point well. 
Whether being able to predict what a patient will do 
is of more value to a psychotherapist than being able to 
perceive what he feels depends apparently upon one's theory 
of psychotherapy~ Much of the research on the ability to 
predict the responses of others has been done in the context 
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of psychotherapy, and presumably is of value to some psycho-
therapists. 
In all fairness to those who espouse the predicting 
others' responses point o:r view, it should be pointed out 
that they assume that the ability to predict the responses 
or another rests upon the ability to perceive how the other 
reels. Hence, they presume to measure what the old tests--
e. g. , of facial expression--measured plus something more. 
However, no experimental studies have shown any significant 
correlation between the ability to predict the responses of 
another and the ability to perceive how another feels. The 
above assumption is not supported by any experimental evi-
dence. 
Another reason for the shift of interest among empathy 
theorists away from studies or aesthetics and facial expres-
sion is that these studies repeatedly ran into the difficul-
ties or establishing objective criteria. In facial expres-
sion studies the correct answer was sometimes regarded as 
the emotion intended by the model who posed for the picture, 
sometimes the answer given most frequently by subjects who 
saw the picture, and sometimes the opinion of a board of 
judges. The same was true with regard to art objects except 
that the intention of the artist was substituted for the in-
tention of the model. In any event, none of these methods 
was entirely satis:factory, especially in the face of" the ob-
jective bias of much of American psychol.ogy. Given this di-
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lemma, the method of measuring empathy by measuring the 
ability to predict the responses of others appeared to be a 
great scientific advance. Here at last was a test of empa-
thic ability in which the experimenter could say unequi vo-
cally what were the correct answers. This method of measur-
ing empathic ability has come to the fore in recent years 
because it offers objective scoring. 
The issue underlying all of this discussion, however, 
is the question of the definition of empathy or empathic 
ability. The ability to predict the responses of another is 
not, strictly speaking, empathic ability. It is certainly 
not empathy as it is understood by the early empathy theo-
rists nor as it is used in this dissertation--i.e., as path-
ic perception. 
Despite this problem of definition, a test of the abil-
ity to predict the responses of others may still contain em-
pathic ability as a factor. In fact, probably none of the 
tests reviewed in this chapter is a factorially pure test 
of empathic ability. The psychometric problem is the pro-
blem of finding a criterion against which to validate the 
various tests which claim to measure empathic ability. Lack-
ing an adequate criterion, the best solution to the problem 
seems to be to construct a battery of tests all of which 
may be reasonably expected to contain empathic ability as a 
factor, and then to factor analyze the resulting correla-
tion matrix. The largest common factor extracted from such 
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a matrix presumably would represent empathic ability. Given 
this information, factorially purer tests could then be con-
structed. This, in fact, was the original rationale for the 
construction of Test Battery: Form I, and this is why this 
chapter has attempted to indicate why each of the tests re-
viewed here may be reasonably expected to contain empathic 
ability as at least one of its factors. 
CHAPTER IV 
MErHOOOLOGY 
Theoretical evidence to support the hypothesis that in-
terpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability 
constitute one unitary factor or ability was presented in 
Chapter II. Chapter ni reviewed all of the methods of meas-
uring empathic ability that have been devised. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to show how these methods of meas-
urement have been used to test experimentally the hypothesis 
defended theoretically in Chapter II. 
Using the insights, and in several instances the very 
tests, of past researchers in the measurement of empathic 
ability, a battery of seven tests of empathic ability was 
assembled--Test Battery: Form I. The stimuli for the seven 
tests vary from purely aesthetic in certain tests to person-
al in others, and some are of a mixed aesthetic and personal 
sort. 
The hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability and 
aesthetic empathic ability constitute one .factor leads to 
the prediction that the ranking o:t subjects according to 
their scores on any one test in the battery should be highly 
correlated with their ranks on each o.f the other tests. In 
other words, the subject who scores highest on one test o.f 
empathic ability should score highest on every other test of 
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empathic ability~· 
Test Batten: Form I was administered to 150 Stibjects; 
and the correlations were computed to test this prediction.~ 
This chapter will describe: the seven individual tests 
in the battery, their mode of construction; administration, 
scoring, and rational.e f'or incl.usion in the battery; the as-
sembl.ing and order o:t the tests in the battery; and the test 
sample. A copy o:t the test bookl.et, Test Batterr: Form I, is 
found in the Appendix. 
1:~; The Individual Tests 
i;' Test I: The Stick Figure Test 
The Stick Figure Test is the property of Theodore R~' 
Barbin and is used here with his permission~' Research in-
volving the use of this test by Sarbin is reported in two 
published articlew=U. The mat;eria1s :for this test include a 
35 mm~ :filmstrip containing :forty-three stick figures, and 
a list o:t five possible responses :for each or the figures. 
A duplicate was made or Sarbin 1 s filmstrip•, The instructions 
and the multiple Choice responses were reproduced in the 
Test Battez:y;: Fom I booklet just as they appear in Sarbin-
Hardx;ck Form 2, except that eleven of Sarbin' s items have 
been omitte<f~e2 Sarbin's numbering or the items, however, 
1. Sarbin, oa. citt-:,· PP• 230-32.' 
Sarbin an HardYck, ope cit~;· 
2. ~in-Hardyck Form 2 (mimeographed and received from 
eodore R. Sarbin,, University of Cali:fomia-.) 
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bas been retaine<L 
Items omitted were those indicated in Sarbin' s scoring 
key as yielding either no stable response, different modal 
responses from male and female subjects, or a modal re-
sponse which is clearly not expressive of feelings, e~g:, 
baseball lllllpire;.J. The scoring key is "based on college stu-
dent norms~"2 A subject's score on the Stick Figure Test is 
the total number of correct responses according to Sarbin' s 
key. 
The thirty-two stick figures used in this test were 
projected at the rate of three per minute on a screen thirty 
by f'orty inches in size. The room was darkened, but ample 
illumination was provided for subjects to read and write in 
the test booklet. 
The Stick Figure Test is included in this battery be-
cause Sarbin indicates that it measures empathy to some ex-
tent. He reports that 
for one sample the subjects were asked to state 
briefly the method they had used in forming their judgments, i;'e•', whether they had imagined them-
selves in the particular postures for each figure 
(empathized) , or whether they had formed their 
judgments solely on the basis or the checklist 
categories. 
An initial scoring using simpl.y the number of 
modal responses for each subject indicated a sig-
nificant relationship between modal response 
score and self-report on empathy-non-empathy.· 
~. ScoR Kg and Stick Figures (mimeographed and received 
from rb n.··) 
2. Letter from Theodore R•' Sarbin, March 22, 1961. 
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The subjects who had checked the greatest number 
of modal responses reported the use of the empa-
thic method in a significantly greater proportion, 
the biserial. r being ;•41, P••'Ol;l. 
ElseW-nere Sarbin reports that "conformance scores 
[ i: •'fi'~~, modal responses to the stick figures J and an indirect 
measure o:f kinesthetic inference (empathy) are correlated to 
the extent o:f ·;48~""2 
ii.' Test II: The Test o:f Predicting Others' Trait Ratings 
The materials for this test include a 16 mm. black and 
white motion picture approximately 300 feet (twelve minutes) 
long and the six trait rating scales which appear on pages 
five to ten in Test Batten: Form I. 
Six persons appear in the motion picture :for approxi-
mately two minutes each. They stand before a blank wall with 
a blackboard behind them and a small card table in :front o:r 
thellt. During his two minutes each person performs five spec-
ified tasks for approximately twenty seconds each. The five 
tasks, as the persons in the motion picture were instructed 
to perform them, are as follows: (1) Remove your outer coat 
and then your suit coat or sweater, laying each on the 
table; (2) Draw a person, a tree, and a house in that order 
on the blackboard; (3) Build as elaborate a house of playing 
cards as you can on the table; (4) Remove a match from the 
1. Sarbin, "Role Theory," pp. 231-32• 
2. Sarbin and Hardyck, "Conformance in Role Perception as a 
Personality Variable," p. lll. 
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book, light it, hold it downward at first so that it starts 
to burn rapidly, and then hold it keeping it burning as 
long as you can; ( 5) Play a game of slap hands with the ex-
perimenter. 
The persons who appear in the motion picture are in 
this order: (1) a nineteen year old, male college student 
majoring in engineering; ( 2) a nineteen year old, female 
secretary; (3) a thirty-t110 year old, JDal.e clergyman; ( 4) a 
forty-one year old, f'emale, part-time secretary and house-
wife; (5) a ti:rty-one year old, male engineer; and (6) a 
sixty-three year old housewife; These persons were selected 
with the intention of presenting not only a wide range or 
age and a balanced sex ratio, but also because among them 
they demonstrate variability in their responses to the 
trait rating scale. 
These persons were filmed with no prior knowledge or 
wbat was expected or them except that they were to be in a 
motion picture which would be used as the stimulus in a 
psychological test.· Each person was filmed individually 
with no audience except the . experimenter and his assistant. 
The persons in the film did not see each other filmed nor 
did they comanmicate with each other before they were film-
ed. The men all wore suits, white shirts, and ties, and the 
women all wore skirts and blouses. 
When a given person appeared to be filmed, he was in-
structed in the first task and was filmed performing it as 
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soon as he was ready. As soon as that task was completed, 
he was instructed in the next task and it was filmed, and 
so on until all five tasks had been completed. It was found 
that in some cases an additional explanation and even a few 
seconds of practice was necessary on task three (build a 
house of cards) and task five ( p1ay slap hands), since some 
persons had never participated in these activities nor even 
witnessed them. 
As soon as a given person had completed his five tasks, 
he was immediately handed a copy of the trait rating scale 
as it appears on pages five to ten in Test Battery: Form I 
except that it carried the following instructions: 
Please rate yourself on each or the six 
traits on the rating scale below. Rate your-
self' by drawing a circle around the number (from l to 5) on each scale which best de-
scribes how much or how little of that trait 
is present in you. Try to be as honest as 
possible. This information is completely 
private and will be divulged to no one. When 
you have finished you will have made six 
circles, one around one number on each of 
the six lines. 
The five tasks performed in the motion picture are se-
lected from two sources. Estes selected from some f'if'ty ex-
pressive situations the folLowing as being the most expres-
sive of personality: (1) remove coat and shirt; (2) play 
slap jack; (3) hold a lighted match as long as possible; (4) 
build as elaborate a house of' cards as possible; and ( 5} In-
dian wrestle.- Twenty seconds of each of these tasks on mo-
tion picture film was found adequate to enable judges to 
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judge the personality o:f the performer,! 
Gage, .following Estes, had three male and three :female 
subjects perform the following five tasks before a group of 
judges, who were then required to fill out a Kuder Prefer-
ence Record, Form BM as they thought each subject had :fill-
ed it out: (1) draw a house, a tree, and a person; (2) tear 
a match :from the book, light it, and hold it as long as pos-
sible; ( 3) with a deck o1· cards build the most elaborate 
house possible in two minutes; ( 4} play cross slap hands 
with an assistant; ( 5) describe the room he is in i'or two 
minutes,2 
The rating scale used in this test is taken from two 
similar scales used by Dymond, Both are i'ive point scales, 
The :first uses the :following six traits: (l) self'-conf'i-
dence; ( 2) superior-inferior; { 3) sel.fish-unselt"1.sh; ( 4) 
:friendly-unfriendly; ( 5} leader-follower; and ( o) sense o:f 
humor,) The second uses tile :following six traits: (1) su-
perior-ini"erior; ( 2) :friendly-unfriendly; ( 3) leader-fol-
lower; ( 4) shy-self-assured; ( 5) sympathetic-unsympathetic; 
and ( 6} seeure-insecure;4 Dymond .found subjects able to 
1•· Stanley G, Estes, "Judging Personality .from ~ressive 
Behavior, n J, Abnorml1 Soca Psxchol~;, 33(1938), 217-36. 
2. N. L, Gage, "Ju~g Interests from Expressive Behavior, n 
Psychol. MOpp,g•'• 66{1952), 1-20.; 
), Dymond, "A Scale .for the Measurenent o.f Empathic Ability," 
4. Rosalind F. Dymond, "Personality and !apathy, n J. Con-
svlt Psxchol., 14( 1950) ,- 343-50. 
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make significantly more accurate predictions on these scales 
than could occur by chance, ( P•.Ol),~l 
The administration of this test was accompanied by the 
reading of supplementary instructions after the subjects had 
read the instructions in Test Battery: Form I. 2 Following 
this the room was darkened and the motion picture showing 
person number one performing the fi. ve tasks was shown. The 
lights were then turned on and the subjects were given as 
much time as they desired to fill out the trait rating scale 
for person number one. The room was then darkened again and 
person number two was shown, and so on. No subjects were 
used who were previously acquainted with any o:f the persons 
shown in the motion picture. 
The test was scored by the method used by Dymond. A 
given subject's score is the total number of points that his 
responses deviate from the responses of the persons in the 
motion picture, minus 100 (to give a positive score). 
This test is included in Test :Battery: Fonn I because 
it is the closest approximation to Dymond's test that could 
be practically included in a lengthy battery. As remarked 
previously, this method of predicting others' responses has 
become the most widely accepted method of measuring empath-
ic ability in recent years. 
1. Ibid. 
2. See Appendix for Supplementary Instructions for Test II: 
The Test of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings. 
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iii,· Test III: The Empathy Test 
Form A o:f the Empathy Test is used as the third test in 
Test Battery: Form I,l It was administered in accordance 
with the instructions provided in the manual which accompa-
nies the test·,2 It was scored with the scoring key provided 
and a.tter the manner indicated thereon,3 Only raw scores 
and not percentiles based on Kerr's norms are used, 
The Empathy Test is included in this battery because it 
is the only published test which purports to test empathy, 
except for a more recent test by the same author which would 
require too much time to administer as part of an already 
lengthy battery. 
iv, Test IV: The Expressive Line Test 
The Expressive Line Test is a replication o:f an experi-
ment o:f Poffenberger and Barrows. 4 The materials for the 
test include a sheet o:f paper with eighteen variously shaped 
lines on it, and a list of thirteen groups or adjectives. 
The lines were photostatically copied :from the page where 
they appeared in Poffenberger and Barrows' article and then 
enlarged untU they fitted neatly on an eight and one half 
1, Willard A•' Kerr The Em~t~ Test: Form A (Chicago: Psy-
chometric A.f'ril!ates, 17~ 
2. Kerr and Spero!"£, op, cit• 
3. Willard A, Kerr and Boris J. Sperof£, The Empathy Test: · 
Scoring Key (Chicago: Psychometric Affiliates, 1957 re'V;'); 
4, Poffenberger and Barrows, op. cit. 
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by eleven inch sheet of paper.: The instructions and the list 
of adjectives were reproduced in Test Batterv: Form I exact-
ly as they appear in Poffenberger and Barrows' article ex-
cept that the chart of lines is designated as being on the 
next page and the last sentence of the instructions is un-
derlined .. 
The Express! ve Line Test was scored on the basis of 
Poffenberger and Barrows' data from 500 subjects, among 
groups of whom no significant differences in modal responses 
were found to exist.l A weighted system of scoring was de-
vised as follows: (1) three points were given for each re-
sponse which corresponded to the modal response obtained by 
Poffenberger and Barrows for a given item; ( 2) two points 
were given for each response which corresponded to the se-
cond most f'requent response obtained by Po:ff'enberger and 
Barrows for a given item provided that that response was 
given by at least 101t of their subjects; and (3) one point 
was given for each response which corresponded to the third 
most frequent response obtained by Poffenberger and Barrows 
for a given item provided that that response was given by 
at least 10% o:f their subjects~· 
Two items exhibited such a high degree of agreement 
among Poff'enberger and Barrows' subjects that no second or 
third highest frequencies reached lo%. On two other items no 
1 Ibid'"" 
·-· 
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third highest frequency reached 1~. However, on one item 
two responses gave such nearly equal second highest frequen-
cies that both had to be given a score of two points. On an-
other item three responses were so closely tied for third 
place that all three had to be accepted for one point. Con-
sequently, of the thirteen items in the test: seven have 
three correct answers weighted three, two, and one respec-
tively; two have only one correct answer weighted three; 
two have two correct answers weighted three and two; one 
has four correct answers, one weighted three, two weighted 
two, and one weighted one; and one has five correct answers, 
one each weighted three and two, and three weighted one,l 
Walton in devising a battery of tests to measure empa-
thy in children used three tests involving expressive lines, 
at least two of which were very similar to this test,2 
Chandler in reviewing the experiments on expressive lines 
remarks that "lines owe their expressiveness to a type of 
process called empathy,n3 Hence, it seemed expedient to in-
clude the Expressive Line Test in this battery. 
v• Test V: The Portrait Judging Test 
The materials for the Portrait Judging Test include 
twenty-five reproductions of portrait paintings and six cat-
1. See Appendix for key and weights. 
2. Walton, op. cit, 
3. Chandler, op. cit;~, p. 4$,; 
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egory cards. The reproductions are in black and white, aP-
proximately four by five inches in size, and are available 
from the University Prints in Cambridge, Massachusetts.! 
The six categories of emotion listed on the category cards 
are the six points on Woodworth's scale of the emotions. 2 
They are: (1) love, mirth, happiness; (2) surprise; (3) suf-
fering, fear; (4) determination, anger; (5) disgust; and (6) 
contempt•· Schlosberg has demonstrated that this is a circu-
lar rather than a linear scale as Woodworth seems to indi-
cate~J 
Subjects are instructed to sort the portraits into the 
six categories, placing each one in that category which most 
nearly describes the feeling or emotion which the person in 
the painting seems to be expressing• The portraits were pre-
sented to each subject in a different random order. Schlos-
berg has obtained good results t·rom experiments in which 
subjects were required to sort the Ruclonick pictures, the 
Frois-Wittmann pictures, and the Ligbtroot pictures of fa-
cial expression into these same six categories•4 
The pictures to be included in this test were selected 
by first examining all of the more than 5000 reproductions 
1. See Appendix f'or list of pictures used. 
2. Woodworth, ope· cit.', p. 251. 
3. Schlosberg, "A Scale for the Judgment of Facial Expres-
sions." 
4. Schlosberg, "The Description of Facial Expressions -~, • • n 
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o:f paintings in the University Prints catalogue. From these 
were selected all or the portraits which appeared at all ex-
pressive and which did not include background details or ob-
jects held or worn which might stimulate spurious ideational 
associations. This yielded fifty-seven pictures. A pilot 
group of seventeen subjects sorted these fifty-seven pic-
tures into the six categories~' Twenty-five pictures were se-
lected for inclusion in Test Battery: Form I on the basis o:f 
the :following considerations: (1) that the pictures be as 
evenly distributed among the six categories as possible, 
i.e., that four pictures which the modal response o:f the pi-
lot group placed in each of the six categories be included; 
( 2) that no picture be included which resulted in a bimodal 
or apparently random distribution from the pilot group; and 
(3) that no more than one picture in each category which re-
cei ved a modal :frequency of more than 8o% be included. 
This test is scored on the basis or the assumption that 
the modal response is the correct response. A subject re-
ceives one point for each o:f his responses which corresponds 
to the modal response or the sample. 
Of the seven tests in this battery, the Portrait Judg-
ing Test most thoroughly mixes interpersonal and aesthetic 
stimuli• I:f those aestheticians of the Formal School are 
correct in their theories, scores on this test should corre-
late most highly with those on the Expressive Line Test and 
the Expressive Design Test. This provides one rationale :for 
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including this test in Test Batte;ry: Fonn I. A more basic 
reason is that the theoretical. writings of many psycholo-
gists and aestheticians lead to the prediction that, whether 
they are perceived as facial expressions or abstract designs, 
the expressive content of these pictures will be most accur-
ately perceived when it is perceived through an empathic 
process. 
vi. Test VI: The Expressive Design Test 
The materials for the Expressive Design Test include 
twenty reproductions of modem, abstract paintings and a 
list of five adjectives expressive of feelings for each of 
the twenty pictures. The reproductions are black and white 
photographs approximately three by four inches in size and 
were obtained from Taurgo Company in New York City.l Each 
reproduction is numbered corresponding to a number attached 
to the appropriate adjective list in the test booklet. An 
arrow is also shown on each reproduction indicating its pro-
per orientation in space. 
The reproductions were selected by Taurgo Company from 
among the Museum of Modem Art coll.ection. The criterion o£ 
selection was simply that the pictures be totally abstract. 
Forty-one different reproductions were obtained from Taurgo." 
In a pilot study thirteen subjects looked at these forty-one 
reproductions and wrote down their perceptions of the feel-
1. See Appendix for list o£ paintings used. 
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ing or emotion expressed by eaCh. Those reproductions which 
elicited the greateSt unanimity of response were selected 
for use in Test Battery: Fona I• The adjective lists for 
each reproduction which are printed in Test Battery:: Form I 
also find their source in the responses of these thirteen 
subjects in the pilot group. 
In administering the test the subjects were provided 
with the pack of· twenty reproductions, advised o:f the number-
ing and orientation arrows, and instructed to check that ad-
jective in the corresponding list which best described the 
feeling or emotion expressed by each painting. If none of 
the adjectives in the list for a given picture adequately 
described the feeling or emotion expressed, they were to 
write in, in the space provided, their own response. The 
structure of this test is thus parallel to that of the Stick 
Figure Test.' 
The Expressive Design Test is scored on the basis of 
the assumption that the modal response is the correct re-
sponse. Hence, one point is given a subject for each re-
sponse checked which corresponds to the modal response of 
the sample• 
This test and the Expressive Line Test are conceived of 
as being the two tests in the battery which most clearly 
measure aesthetic empathy. 
vii. Test VII: The Test of Matching Facial Expressions 
The Test of Matching Facial Expressions is the property 
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of Sidney Fields,l The materials were supplied by Fields 
and the test is' used here with his permission, The materials 
include nine of the Ruckmick pictures and eleven of the 
Frois-Wittma.nn pictures motmted four each on 1'ive panels, 
and nine of' the Frois-Wittmann pictures and eleven of the 
Ruckmick pictures mounted individually on , cards. 2 
In administering this test the five panels were spread 
out on a table and the twenty cards presented in a pack. 
Subjects were instructed to match the cards from the pack 
with those on the panels (male to be matched with female 
and vice versa), Subjects were allowed to rearrange the 
cards until the best over-all matching of pictures was ob-
tained, Those faces which seemed to be expressing the same 
feeling or emotion were to be matched with each other, 
The Test of Matching Facial Expressions was scored on 
the basis of the key provided by Fields• This key corre-
sponds to the modal responses obtained by Fields from 200 
subjects,3 
The primary reason for including this test in Test Bat-
te;ry: Form I is that it avoids the problem of' verbal meaning 
which is a factor in all of the other tests in the battery 
and which bas been the locus of' much criticism directed to-
ward previous research on facial expression, 
1. Fields, op. cit, 
2, See Appendix for list of pictures used and key•, 
3. Fields, op. cit, 
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2. Test Batter;r: Form I as a Whole 
Practical considerations, .for the most part, dictated 
the order in which the tests are presented in the test book-
let. The two tests the stimuli .for which must be projected 
on a screen are put .first• Since in all the other tests the 
subjects work at their own speed, only at the beginning o.f 
the test period are they aJ.1 ready to look at the same pic-
tures on the screen at the same time. O.f these two tests in-
volving projected pictures, the Stick Figure Test is put 
first because it has simpler instructions and is probably 
the less threatening o.f the two. 
The fest o.f Matching Facial Expressions is put last be-
cause only one copy o.f it was available. This meant that 
subjects would have to wait their turn to do the test; and 
the least objectionable place to have such a wait is after 
the rest o.f the test is completed. Also, responses to this 
test have to be recorded by the experimenter be.fore another 
subject can be tested. 
Responses on the Portrait Judging Test have similarly 
to be recorded. Hence, the Expressive Design Test was 
placed between these two tests in order that the experiment-
er might not have too many scores to record at the same 
time~· It was also considered desirable to place the Expres-
sive Design Test near the end o.f the battery since some re-
sistance to it was anticipated~ 
The &npathy Test and the Expressive Line Test were 
120 
placed third and fourth respectively in order to allow the 
experimenter time to rewind the f'ilm lised in Test II and 
put away the projectors and screen before having to record 
responses on the Portrait Judging Test.- The Flnpathy Test 
was placed third because it has instructions which are to 
be read, and this is the last point in the battery at which 
subjects all begin a test at the same time.' After this 
point subjects go on to the next test as soon as they have 
completed the previous one. 
Subjects required from one to three hours to complete 
Test Batte;ry: Form I, with the average length of time being 
about one and one hal£ hours.~ Few subjects required more 
than two hours.' 
SUbjects were tested individually and in groups of 
from two to six persons. This limitation was imposed mainly 
because only one copy of' the Test of F.~atching Facial Expres-
sions was available;' Six copies o£ the picture sets for the 
Portrait Judging Test and the Expressive Design Test were 
used. 
3. The Sample 
The sample o:r 150 subjects ( 71 male and 79 female) 
ranges in age :from seventeen to approximately seventy-£1 ve 
years old. It can be divided into six groups as follows: 
(1) 26 ministers and theological. students enrolled in Clin-
ical Pastoral Training; (2) 23 students enrolled in Boston 
University School o:f Theology; (3) 24 student nurses ful-
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filling requirements .for psychiatric affiliation at Massa-
Chusetts Mental Health Center; (4) 30 college students from 
a cross section o.f the general college student population; 
( 5) 20 young adults; and ( 6) 27 older adults. 
All subjects participated voluntarily with the only re-
ward promised being a report of their scores. Subjects gen-
erally had no more specific knowledge of the purpose of the 
research than that it had as its aim a study of empathy. 
Foreign born persons were not accepted as subjects 
since several of the tests are rather strongly related to 
cul.tural experience. This is especially true of the &lpath:y: 
Test for which Kerr has published a separate Canadian edi-
tion. 
4. The Validity of Test Battezy: Form I 
In what sense is Test Battery: Fozm I a test of empath-
ic ability? It is immediately apparent that it measures at 
best only empathic perception. In the context of the empath-
ic relationship as it is presented in the psychiatric and 
counse1ing literature, perception is only a part of empathy. 
This battery certainly does not test the ability of subjects 
to communicate to another their understanding of his feel-
ings, which is such an important part of the empathic rela-
tionship. If empathy be understood in this context, Test 
Battex;r: Fonn I does not measure empathy, or measures only 
part of it. 
Yet, empathy basically means pathic perception-the 
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perception of feelings. It has taken on additional connota-
tions depending upon and expressive of the theories of vari-
ous thinkers as to how pathic perception operates. To the 
ego psychologists empathy means self-projection. To a cer-
tain school of stimulus-response psychologists it means kin-
esthetic sensation. In fact, as a result of this very defin-
ing of the word to suit the theories of various schools the 
Gestalt psychologists eschewed the word altogether. Defining 
empathy as pathic perception makes no such prejudgment about 
how this perception operates. 
All of the tests in Test Battery: Form I measure pathic 
perception, with the possible exception of Test lli: The ~ 
pathy Test. Only Test II: The Test of Predicting Others' 
Trait Ratings and Test III: The Empathy Test imply any ad-
ditional theoretical presuppositions beyond this simple def-
inition. Both Test II and Test III ask the subject to put 
himself in another person's place. Test II: The Test of Pre-
dicting Others' Trait Ratings requires an additional infer-
ence beyond mere patbic perception--how the stimulus person 
perceives himself. Whether one holds that an individual's 
perceptions of himself are generally similar to other per-
son's judgments of him or generally different again rests 
upon presuppositions and theoretical biases. 
Taken at face value, most of the tests in Test Battery: 
Form I appear to measure pathic perception-empathy. 
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Summary 
Seven tests have been selected to be included in a bat-
tery--Test Battery: Form I~· Each of these tests is either 
presented by its author as a test of empathic ability or may 
reasonably be expected to include empathic ability as one of 
its factors. 
The purpose of gathering these seven tests together in 
one battery is twofold. The primary purpose is to examine 
the hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability and aes-
thetic empathic ability constitute a single factor or abil-
ity. On the basis of this hypothesis it is predicted that 
subjects' scores on all seven of the tests in the battery 
will be positively correlated--i.e., that a subject who 
scores high on one test will score equally high on every 
other test. 
The second purpose for constructing Test Batteq: Form 
! is to evaluate the various approaches to measuring empath-
ic ability which are represented therein. An examination of 
the resulting correlation matrix will reveal, for example, 
which tests measure common factors or clusters of factors. 
If one test, for instance, should fail to correlate with 
any of the others the conclusion would be justified that it 
did not measure an ability measured by the other six tests 
which did show some intercorrelation. Though there does not 
exist any criterion test which can be included in the bat-
tery, still. by combining these seven tests into a battery 
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an opportunity is provided :for comparing them and evaluating 
them in terms of each other. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
1. Relationships among the Tests 
Seven tests were administered as a battery--Test Bat-
terr: Form I--to 150 subjects to verify the hypothesis that 
interpersona1 empathic ability and aesthetic empathic abil-
ity constitute a single factor or ability. On the basis of 
this hypothesis it was predicted that subjects' scores on 
all seven of the tests would be positively correlated--
i• e., that a subject who scored high on one test would 
score equally high on every other test in the battery. 
Given seven tests, there are twenty-one possible com-
binations of pairs of tests. Coefficients of correlation 
were calculated for subjects' scores for each of the twenty-
one pairs of tests. These are presented in Table 1 on the 
following page. 
The meaning in terms of Table 1 of the prediction made 
above is that all twenty-one of these coefficients of cor-
relation should be significant and positive. The results 
are that only four of the correlations are significant: 
rr;·2•~-22 and r4,5•.24 at the .'01 level of confidence; and 
r4, .,-.'20 and IJ..,6••18 at the •05 level of confidence. 
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TABLE 1 
PEARSON PRODUCT MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION 
AMONG SCORES ON SEVEN TESTS (N•150) 
Test Test Number 
Number I II III IV v VI VII 
I .22 .01 .10 .10 .18 .03 
II .22 .D1 .ll .D1 .12 .09 
III .01 .01 .oo .02 ~Q6 -.01 
IV .-10 •'11 -.-oo .24 .13 .20 
v .10 .01 .02 '~'24 .02 .06 
VI .18 .12 .06 -.-13 .-o2 -.05 
VII •03 .09 -.01 •20 .o6 -.05 
Note: required for significance at .05, r-.16; at .01, r-.21. 
Though only four significant coefficients of correla-
tion were found among the seven tests in Test Battery: Form 
!,, it is \rorth noting that these four significant correla-
tions involve all o:f the tests in the battery except Test 
III: The »npathy Test. While this correlation matrix does 
not warrant a .factor analysis, it appears that a common .fac-
tor exists among those six tests that do show intercorrela-
tion. That Test III: The Empathy Test is the least related 
to the other tests in the battery is not surpris.ing. In the 
first place, it is the only non-visual test in the battery. 
Secondly, tests of ability to predict the responses of the 
generalized other, of which the Empathy Test is an example, 
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have been shown to be uncorrelated with tests o~ ability to 
predict the responses o~ the individual other. Test II: 
The Test o~ Predicting Others' Trait Ratings is a test o~ 
this latter type, and is correlated with at least one other 
test in the battery though not with Test III: The Empathy 
Test. 
Test IV: The Expressive Line Test, a test o~ aesthetic 
nature, is significantly correlated with two tests o~ judg-
ing facial expression--Test V: The Portrait Judging Test 
which is of an aesthetic and interpersonal nature, and Test 
VII: The Test o~ Matching Facial Expressions which is of an 
interpersonal nature. Though the coefficients o~ correla-
tion are low, this· result may be interpreted as supporting 
the hypothesis o~ the identity o~ interpersonal empathic 
ability and aesthetic empathic ability. 
The coe~ficient of correlation o~ .18 between Test I: 
The Stick Figure Test, which is of an interpersonal nature, 
and Test VI: The Expressive Design Test, which is o~ an 
aesthetic nature, also supports the hypothesis o~ this dis-
sertation. 
The coe~ficient of correlation of .22 between Test I: 
The Stick Figure Test and Test II: The· Test of Predicting 
Others' Trait Ratings is a correlation between tliO tests of 
an interpersonal nature. As such it has no direct re~erence 
to the hypothesis of this dissertation. However, it may be 
interpreted as indicating that empathic ability is a ~actor 
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in a test of predicting others' responses. 
The correlation matrix as a whole, f'alling short as it 
does of the twenty-one significant correlations. predicted, 
does not provide a sound basis for more than tentative con-
clusions. However, several factors other than a false hy-
pothesis may at least have contributed to the low correla-
tion coefficients. The most important of these is the low 
reliability coefficients of the tests themselves. These are 
presented in Table 2. 
Test 
Test I 
Test II 
Test III 
Test IV 
Test v 
Test VI 
Test VII 
TABLE 2 
RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS OF THE 
TESTS IN TEST BATTERY: FORM I 
rtt Method of' calculation 
.27 Kuder-Richardson formula 20a 
.55 split-half with Pearson correction 
.89b split-half with Pearson correction 
.55 split-half with Pearson correction 
-.06 split-half uncorrected 
.28 Kuder-Richardson formula 20 
.70 Kuder-Richardson formula 20 
aK-R 20 coefficients may be slightly lower than split-
half', but they are generally comparable. 
bKerr, The Empathy Test: Manual of Instructions. 
The results of the Kuder-Richardson formula 20 and the 
split-half methods of measuring test reliability are both 
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effected largely by item consistency. That is, the test 
with items all of which are of most nearly equal difficulty 
is the test that shows the highest coefficient of reliabil-
ity. The Kuder-Richardson formula 20 coefficient of relia-
bility, in fact, is calculated on the basis of the percent 
of the total sample that answered each item correctly. Item 
difficulty does vary greatl.y in Test I: The Stick Figure 
Test, Test IV: The Expressive Line Test, Test V: The Por-
trait Judging Test, and Test VI: The Expressive Design Test. 
There is some reason to believe that a test-retest co-
efficient of reliability, which gives a truer measure of 
test reliability and which is not so much effected by item 
consistency, might be higher in the cases of Test IV and 
Test V than the reliability coefficients presented above. 
Regarding Test IV: The Expressive Line Test, the fact that 
the pattern of responses obtained here so closely approxi-
mates that obtained by Poffenberger and Barrows seems to 
indicate that these judgments are reliable.l Regarding 
Test V: The Portrait Judging Test, the fact that Schlosberg 
has found that subjects can reliably sort photographs of 
facial expression into the six Woodworth scale categories 
suggests that subjects should be able to sort painted por-
traits into these same six categories with at least some de-
gree of reliability. Unfortunately, test-retest coefficients 
1. See Table 4, Infra, p. 141. 
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of reliability are not available at present for any of the 
tests except Test In: The &npathy Test. 
Lack of controls in the testing situation may also 
have contributed to the unreliability of subjects' scores 
both within tests and among the various tests in the bat-
tery. All 150 subjects were not tested at the same time, 
nor were they all tested under the same conditions. Some 
subjects were tested individually while others were tested 
in groups. It was found impossible to conduct testing at 
all times under identical or even optimum conditions. 
Lighting conditions, o:r great importance in a test bat-
tery so largely visual, varied over a wide range. Occasion-
al~y it was impossible to make a room dark enough so that 
the motion picture used in Test II: The Test of Predicting 
Others' Trait Ratings could be seen optimally. Sometimes it 
was impossible to get sufficient illumination on a desk or 
table so that the pictures used in Tests V, VI, and VII 
couJ.d be seen optimally. 
Only one set or pictures was available for Test VII: 
The Test of Matching Facial Expressions. This meant that 
when subjects were tested in groups they usually had to 
wait their turn to take Test VII and comp.lete the battery. 
Some subjects were forced to wait up to one and one half 
hours a.fter completing the rest of' the test battery. Those 
who took Test VII while others were waiting were thus of'ten 
hurried, while those who had waited a long time no doubt 
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experienced some effect upon their motivation. 
2. Relationships among Sample Subgroups 
The test sample was divided into six groups for pur-
poses of testing the hypothesis that certain groups in the 
general population should be higher in empathic ability 
than others. O.f the six groups included in this sample it 
was predicted that ministers engaged in Clinical Pastoral 
Training would score highest.' The means and standard devia-
tions .for each of the six groups on each of the seven tests 
in Test Battery: Form I are shown in Table 3 on the follow-
ing page. 
~~nisters in Clinical Pastoral Training! scored sig-
nificantly higher ( P•.05) than the rest of the sample on 
Test III: The &npathy Test, Test IV: The Expressive Line 
Test, and Test VI: The Expressive Design Test. They scored 
significantly higher than all other groups except Boston 
University School of Theology students (P•.Ol) on Test V: 
The Portrait Judging Test; However,· they scored significant-
ly lower (P-'~'01) than the rest of the sample on Test II: 
The Test. of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings. 
Ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training scored signifi-
cantly higher ( P•.05} than Boston University School o.f The-
ology students, with whom they are better matched, on Test 
1. Enrolled in 1961 Summer Clinical Pastoral Training pro-
grams at Massachusetts Mental Health Center and Worcester 
State Hospital. 
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TABLE J 
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS1. AND F RATIOS FOR SIX GROUPS ON THE SEVEN TESTS IN TEST BATTERY: FORM I 
Test number 
Group I II III IV v VI VII 
I 17.15 61.54 82.46 22.'23 14.08 9.15 14.-31 
3~54 4";'96 16~91 4.49 1.88 2.32 3.18 
II 16.-91 65.35 70.74 19.00 13.13 7.43 13.74 
3.48 5.19 16.29 6~")0 2.25 2.43 3.97 
III 17.17 65.88 77.08 20.25 12.71 8.83 1).67 
3.58 6.52 17~'52 5.90 2.13 2.69 2. 78 
IV 17.'23 65.47 77.23 20.;93 12.43 8.43 15.53 
3.01 6.16 16.40 5.;32 2.46 2.16 3.03 
v 17.45 64.35 72.90 21.25 12.65 8.15 13.85 
1.91 5.40 11.45 4.88 2.15 2.69 3.40 
VI 17.70 62.37 72.22 17.74 12.04 7.56 12.19 
3.20 7.41 15.03 6.06 2.13 2.11 3.04 
Total 17.27 64.13 75.64 20.22 12.83 8.27 13.92 
sample 3.20 6.27 16.34 5.73 2.28 2.47 3.40 
F .18 2.20 1.80 2·.15 2.60 1•98 3.04 
Notes: 
Groups are: (I) ministers in Clinical Pastoral Train-
ingf (II) students at Boston University School of Theology; ( n ) student nurses; (IV) general college students; ( V) 
young adults; (VI) older adults. 
F•J~·14 
required :ror significance at .·05, F=2.'27; at .01, 
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III: The Empathy Test, Test IV: The Expressive Line Test, 
and Test VI: The Expressive Design Test, and significantly 
lower (P=·.05) on Test II: The Test of Predicting Others' 
Trait Ratings. 
On Test I: The Stick Figure Test there are almost no 
di.fferences among groups, while the large F ratio on Test 
VII: The Test of Matching Facial Expressions is probably a 
result o.f the varying conditions under which that test was 
administered. 
That ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training scored 
significantly higher than the rest of the sample and signif-
icantly higher than Boston University School o.f Theology 
students, most o.f whom had not had Clinical Pastoral Train-
ing, on Tests III, IV, and VI, and significantly higher 
than all groups except Boston University School of Theology 
students on Test V is in accord with the predictions made 
and is genera1ly supportive of the hypothesis propounded. 
The fact that two of the tests on which ministers in Clini-
cal Pastoral Training scored significantly higher are tests 
of an abstract, aesthetic nature is interpreted as support-
ing the hypothesis that persons who are high in int erperson-
al empathic ability tend also to be high in aesthetic empa-
thic ability. 
However, the fact that ministers in Clinical Pastoral 
Training scored significantly lower than both the rest of 
the sample and Boston University School of Theology students 
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on Test II: The Test of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings in-
dicates that any conclusions drawn here can only be tenta-
tive, :for this result is a direct contradiction o:f' the pre-
diction made above. 
An examination of the distribution of scores of minis-
ters in Clinical Pastoral Training on Test II reveals that 
it is negatively skewed, the median being 63.00 while the 
mean is only 61•54. A few very low scores, which tend to 
lower the mean, belong to this group. The distribution of 
scores made by Boston University School of Theology students 
is not skewed, the median being 66.00 and the mean 65.35. 
The difference between medians is thus less than that be-
tween the means; nevertheless, it is still significant at 
the .05 level. It is the student nurses, however, ~o scored 
highest on Test II. Examination or the distribution o:f their 
scores shaws that it too is negatively skewed, the median 
being 67 .-oo while the mean is 65~~ss.- The difference between 
ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training and student nurses 
thus remains at about :four points whether means or medians 
are compared. This difference is significant at better than 
the .o 5 level. 
Dymond upon f"irst administering her test found no sig-
nificant sex di.f"ferences. However, upon retesting the same 
sample six weeks later she found that female subjects scored 
significantly higher than male subjects and showed signifi-
cant improvement in their scores while male subjects did 
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not.l In a later study Dymond found that female subjects 
scored significantly higher than male subjects on the ini-
tial test (N=53, P•.03);2 
The student nurses used in this sample were all female. 
The ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training were all male 
except three. On the other hand, the Boston Uni varsity 
School of Theology students were also mostly male. Further-
more, an examination of the total sample indicates no sig-
nificant sex difference on Test II, the female mean and 
median being 64.61 and 65.00 and the male being 63.72 and 
64.00 respectively. 
In short, the significantly lower scores of ministers 
in Clinical Pastoral Training on Test II: The Test of Pre-
dicting others' Trait Ratings constitute an anomaly in view 
of the fact that this group was receiving special training 
in the kind of empathic ability and insight into motivation 
that this test is supposed to measure. 
3. The Tests Considered Individually 
i. Test I: The Stick Figure Test 
Eleven items have been omitted here from Sarbin's test 
so that a comparison of Sarbin's mean and standard deviation 
with those obtained here is not instructive. Sarbin does re-
1. Dymond, "A Scale for the Measurement of Enlpathic Ability." 
2. Dymond, "Personality and Empathy." 
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port a split-half' reliability coefficient of '•'50.·1 This is 
higher than the reliability coef.ficient o.f .'27 obtained 
here with thirty-two items, and also higher than that which 
would have been obtained here even had all .forty-three of 
Sarbin's items been used. The scores obtained in this study 
would yield a reliability coefficient o.f .33 (Kuder-Richard-
son 20) i.f eleven items similar to the thirty-two used were 
added.2 
The scoring key provided by Sarbin is obtained i'rom 
college student no:r:ms. These are the modal responses obtain-
ed from a college student sample. Some of' the modal re-
sponses obtained :from the sample used here differ from Sar-
bin's key. This raises some problems concerning the method 
of using the modal response as the correct response. 
Sarbin has found that scores on the Stick Figure Test 
are positively correlated with social adjustment as measured 
by the Cali.fornia Psychological Inventoz:y: ( r-.81) and ad-
justment as measured by the ~ (r-.51) .3 Fields .found 
that scores on the Test o.f Matching Facial Expressions were 
1. Sarbin and Hardyck, op. cit. 
2
• r _ A rtt 
AA- 1 + (A-I) rtt 
f'ound in: Joy Paul Guilford, Funda-
mental Statistics in Psychology and 
Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1950)' p. 282. 
3. Sarbin and Hardyck, op. cit. 
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positively correlated with social adjustment as measured by 
the Bell Adjustment Inventory ( zw•·24)•J. All three of these 
correlations are significant at the ~01 level. 
There is no doubt that theoretically empathic ability 
and social adjustment should be positively correlated. The 
question being raised here is whether or not scoring by the 
method of taking the modal response as the correct response 
is not simply an indirect way of measuring social adjust-
ment. What is measured, after all., is to what extent a sub-
ject's perceptions of a given series of stimuli conform to 
the perceptions of most other people. Sarbin refers to 
scores on the StiCk Figure Test as "conformance scores." 
Obviously it is impossible to determine whether or not 
these modal responses are in any ultimate sense correct. By 
adequate sampling methods the modal responses of the general 
population to a given set of items could be determined; yet 
these responses might still differ from what the model who 
posed for the photograph or the artist who painted the pic-
ture intended. Nevertheless, in defense of the validity of 
this method of scoring it. should be pointed out that the 
meaning of any word in a living language is established in 
precisely this way. A word means what most people think it 
means. Non-verbal expressive behavior, though less organ-
ized, is none the less a language. 
1. Fields, op. cit. 
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Operationally, then, the correct response is the modal 
response. And, the individual whose perceptions of feelings 
in other people differ markedly from those of the general 
population will experience maladjustment in interpersonal 
relationships because he neither "speaks" nor "hears" the 
language correctly. Since the meaning of the language is 
socially determined, an individual who is socially malad-
justed will exhibit as one of his symptoms a poor compre-
hension of the language. The modal response, then, is in 
this sense the "correct" response, and bears because of its 
manner of determination this inevitable relationship to so-
cial adjustment. 
ii. Test II: The Test of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings 
Dymond's test, on which this test is based, differs 
from that used here in two ways. In the first place, sub-
jects actually meet and tal.k with the persons whose trait 
ratings they predict in Dymond's test. In the second place, 
Dymond's test is three times as long as the one used here. 
Dymond's test, which is 108 items in length, yielded a 
split-half reliability coefficient of '"•'82.1 The Test of 
Predicting Others' Trait Ratings yields a split-half relia-
bility coefficient of .;·55. If this test were tripled in 
length it wciuld give a rel.iability coefficient of .-79.2 An-
1. Dymond, "Persona1ity and &apathy." 
2. See footnote supra, p. 136 for :f'ormul.a used. 
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other formula indicates that this test would have to be 3. 7 
times its present length to yield the reliability coeffi-
cient of '.82 obtained by Dymond.! These differences are 
small and probably not significant. The conclusion thus may 
be drawn that subjects are able to predict others' trait 
ratings as reliably from seeing them briefly in a motion 
picture as .from interacting with them .face to .face in a 
small group for ten minutes. In short, the higher reliabil-
ity of Dymond's test is probably a function solely of its 
greater length and not of the type of stimulus used. Note 
that it is not hereby implied that one test is potentially 
as valid as the other. 
iii. Test III: The &tpathy Test 
The data .from the :Empathy Test as used in this battery 
yielded a median score of approximately 73. Kerr obtained 
the following median scores .from various populations: col-
lege men 74; .female college .fine arts students 71; union 
business agents 112; union members 74; industrial supervi-
sors 82; retail clerks 65; and Chicago firemen 73.2 The 
highest scoring subgroup used in this study was ministers 
in Clinical Pastoral Training with a median score of 82.5--
almost identical with industrial supervisors. 
1. A• rAA~l-rlli I"l.l 1-rAA .found in : Guilford, op. cit., p. 282. 
2. Kerr and Speroff, The Emmthy Test: Manual. 
140 
Despite all of the attempts to validate the Flnpathy 
Test,l its validity is not adequately established within 
the context of the understanding of empathy presented in 
this study. Obviously it does not measure aesthetic empathy. 
If it does measure interpersonal empathy in face to face re-
lationships, it should correlate with Dymond's test, which 
it does not,2 or with Test II in Test Batterv: Form I, 
which it likewise does not. 
On the face oi· it, it appears that the Empathy Test 
measures, as the instructions state, how well one knows 
"the likes and dislikes of average people. n3 Such knowledge 
may well constitute a part o1· empathic ability, but certain-
ly not its core. Furthermore, it is not clear that the ~­
thy Test samples even this knowledge adequately. 
iv. Test IV: The Expressive Line Test 
The responses given by subjects to Test IV are not much 
different from those found in Poffenberger and Barrows' ex-
periment of which this test is a replication. Table 4 shows 
that the modal response is the same in Poffenberger and Bar-
rows' experiment and in Test IV on nine o:f the thirteen 
items. On those four items where the modal. response differs 
(items 3, 6, 12, and 13), what is the modal response in one 
1. Ibid.-
2. Bell and Hall,' op. cit. 
3. Kerr, The Empathy Test: Fom A. 
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TABLE 4 
RESPONSES AND PERCENT OF SAMPLE GIVING EACH RESPONSE ON 
TWO TRIALS OF THE EXPRESSIVE LINE TEST 
Item Trial Responses and percent o~ sample giving each 
First Second Third Fourth Fi:rth 
1 IV C( 57%) L(11~) 
P&B C(65%) L(O$%) 
2 IV A~81%~ P&B A 75% 
3 IV A~23%~ C~21%.J L(l2%J J~11%~ p & B C2'f% Al?% L(13% JO$% 
4 IV E( 50~&) H(22%) 
P&B E(3$%) H(20%) 
5 IV Q(35~) N(l9%) P(14%) H(12%) P&B Q(30 ) N(23%) P(ll%) H(09%) 
6 IV Q!23%~ N(2~~ Rt15%~ O(lO%.J P&B N29% Q(24% R ll% 0(06% 
7 IV L( 25%.) J(17%) A(15%) C(12%) G(11%} 
P&B L(21%) C(20%) A(l4%} J(14%) G(l1%) 
8 IV E(30%) H(23%) D(08%) 
P&B E(29%) H(l$%) D{ll%) 
9 IV C{26%) !(21%~ A(13%) G(l3%.) L( 0'7%~ P&B C(1$%) L(l5% !(14%) G(l2%) A(Oi% 
10 IV A( 43%~ B{1'7%) D~ll%) C(ll%~ G(09%~ P&B A(29% G( 21%) D 16%) B(10% C(05% 
11 IV M(25%) 0(18%) N(l5%} R(11%) P{lO%) 
P&B M{24%) N{l9%) 0(16%) R(O~fo) P(09%) 
12 IV M(23%) J(17%) P(ll%) 
P&B J(19%) M(16%) P(08%) 
13 IV N(35~) M(31%~ K(l3~~ P&B M{25 ) N(21% K(16% 
Notes: Only responses which reached a frequency of 10% in 
one o~ the two trials are shown. 
P & B data from: Poffenberger and Barrows, op. cit. 
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study is the second most frequent response in the other, and 
vice versa. A similar crossing of second and third most fre-
quent responses occurs in items 7 and ll. Finally, where the 
largest absolute difference in percentages occurs (items 4 
and 10) the modal response is still the same in both studies. 
Poffenberger and Barrows' conclusions are supported by 
this study; and at the same time, the basis of the scoring 
key used on Test IV is shown to be justified. 
v. Test V: The Portrait Judging Test 
Splitting the Portrait Judging Test scores gives a cor-
relation coefficient of -.06 between scores on odd numbered 
items against even numbered items. Item difficulty does vary 
greatly and also varies randomly. Both of these factors tend 
to lower the coefficient of reliability when calculated by 
either the split-half or the Kuder-Richardson method. In the 
case of this test particularly it is apparent that a test-
retest coefficient of reliability would give a more adequate 
measure of reliability. 
Correspondence with Schlosberg reveals that he does not 
know how reliably subjects are able to sort pictures of fa-
cial expression into the six Woodworth scale categories.! 
Presumably they can do much better than the -.06 obtained 
here would seem to indicate. Schlosberg has indicated that 
subjects are able to rate the Lightfoot pictures on three 
1. Letter from Harold Schlosberg, March 15, 1962. 
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nine point scales with high consistency. The reliability o:r 
subjects' ratings on the dimension o:r Pleasantness-Unpleas-
antness was .-94; on Attention-Rejection it was .87; and on 
Sleep-Tension it was •92.1 
It may be that the pictures used in Test V cannot be 
sorted as reliably as can the photographs used by Schlos-
berg. The Lightfoot pictures are all o:r the same individual 
taken against a blank baCkground with little variation in 
image size from picture to picture and with the same unob-
trusive clothing worn by the model in each picture. The pic-
tures used in the Portrait Judging Test are almost all of' 
dif':ferent persons. They are painted in various styles and 
techniques against various backgrounds all of which were 
probably chosen by the artist for some expressive end. 
Though image size does not vary greatly, it does vary more 
than in the Lightfoot set. More important is the :ract that 
the portraits show individual..s garbed in a wide variety of 
clothing from a wide range of historical periods. 
Furthermore, the choice o:r clothing no doubt serves 
some expressive purpose :for the artist while also arousing 
in the viewer associations which are extraneous to the task 
o:r judging :racial expression. The Lightfoot pictures vary 
only in facial expression. The shoul.ders and head only are 
shown, and the position of the shoulders does not vary. The 
1. Engen, Levy, and Schlosberg, "The Dimensional Analysis 
of" a New Series o:r Facial Expressions." 
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portraits usually show the figure from the waist up and al-
most always include the hands. The use of the position of 
the hands, arms, and upper torso for expressive purposes in 
portrait painting is well kno1m. In short, this is not sim-
ply a test of judging facial expression. (It was, of course, 
never intended as such.) Moreover, the artist has already 
made an interpretation of the facial expression of his 
model-rightly or wrongly--and has sought to .further ex-
press his interpretation in ways other than a literal, pho-
tographic rendering of the face. 
Another .factor is that some of the subjects recognized 
some of the portraits. Art students, of course, knew many 
of them and had studied them. A rough estimate is that half 
of the subjects did not recognize any of the portraits, and 
no more than twenty subjects recognized more than five pic-
tures. 
Schlosberg also allowed a wastebasket category for 
those pictures which did not seem to fit well into any of 
the six categories. Subjects taking the Portrait Judging 
Test were forced to place all of the portraits into one of 
the six categories. Some subjects voiced frustration in re-
gard to this. 
The phenomenon of bimodal distributions in the case of 
eight portraits and also the phenomenon of five portraits 
whose modes and means fell into different categories from 
each other raises some doubts about the adequacy of the 
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Woodworth scale o£ the emot:tons.l If the Woodworth scaJ.e 
is truly a scale of equidistant points similar to a color 
wheel, a portrait such as number 20, which 55 subjects 
placed in category I (love, mirth, happiness) and 67 sub-
jects placed in category III (fear, suffering) while only 5 
subjects placed it in category II (surprise), is an anomaly. 
Schlosberg observes this same phenomenon in his data, 
even while allowing the wastebasket category; yet he evi-
dently does not consider it overly disturbing. To simply ob-
serve, however, that some pictures are ambiguous is to beg 
the question. If the scale is a scale, ambiguity between two 
adjoining categories on the scale might well arise; but, it 
is difficult to see how a picture could belong in either of 
two categories which are separated by an intervening catego-
ry to which the picture obviously does not belong. That this 
does occur is a limitation of the scale and not of the pic-
tures used. Perhaps this is one reason why Schlosberg has 
sought in recent years to discard the Woodworth scale in fa-
vor of a new set of dimensions. 
Schlosberg has never used this method as a test. Its 
use here as a test necessitates .for purposes of scoring the 
assumption that the modal response is the correct response. 
This method of scoring is suggested by Sarbin in connection 
with the Stick Figure Test. However, the modes used in scor-
ing the Stick Figure Test were those .from a large sample, 
1. See Appendix for distribution o.f responses. 
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none of whom were subjects for Test Battery: Form I. In the 
case of the Portrait Judging Test, on the other hand, the 
modal responses used in scoring the test were those of the 
test sample only. The effect of this procedure is not clear. 
In addition to the fact that a sample of 150 is probably not 
large enough to stabilize all of the modes, the more basic 
question of' validity raised previously is raised again here. 
Finally, the standard deviation of 2.28 obtained for 
this test is too small for good discrimination. 
vi. Test VI: The Expressive Design Test 
The modal responses of the test sample were also used 
as the correct responses in scoring the Expressive Design 
Test. Thus, the issues raised above apply to this test also. 
One item yielded two equal modes requiring both answers to 
be accepted as correct. The titles of the pictures used and 
the modal response for each are listed in the Appendix. 
A factor of little importance in regard to the other 
tests in the battery may well be of some significance in in-
terpreting scores on the Expressive Design Test--resistance 
to the test. At least half of the subjects tested expressed 
this verbally. Much of' the resistance was expressed simply 
as a bias against modern, abstract painting. Many subjects 
complained that without color the paintings lost any expres-
siveness they might otherwise have had. A few subjects found 
the suggested responses inadequate, although the number who 
wrote in other responses was no more than 17 for any item, 
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and averaged 7.15 subjects (writing in other responses) per 
i'tem. 
The very high degree of agreement among subjects on 
certain of the pictures indicates that, abstract though 
they be, some objective expression of emotion exists in 
these formal designs. 
The standard deviation of 2.47 obtained for this test 
is also rather small for good discrimination. 
vii. Test VII: The Test of Matching Facial Expressions 
The reliability coefficient of the Test of Matching Fa-
cial Expressions appears to be stable at at least .70. 
Fields's data (N•200) yields a reliability coefficient of 
.63 by Kuder-Richardson formula 21. Data from the same test 
used here as part of Test Batten: Form I yields .67 by 
Kuder-Richardson formula 21, and •'70 by the more accurate 
Kuder-Richardson formula 20. 
Fields obtained a mean of 14.74 and a standard devia-
tion of 3.10.1 The mean obtained here for the Test of 
Matching Facial Expressions is 13.92 with a standard devia-
tion of 3.40. The difference between these two means is 
significant at the .05 level. This may be a result of the 
fact that Fields's subjects did a practice test, his Form M, 
before they did Form P, the test used here. The pictures to 
be matched in Fields's Form M were simply mirror images of 
1. Fields, op. cit. 
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each other. The purposes of this pre-test were: (1) to min-
imize subject frustration by providing an easy test first; 
and ( 2) to screen out those subjects who fail to understand 
the nature of the test, are poorly motivated, or have poor 
vision.l Form M was not used in Test Battery: Form I be-
cause of considerations of time. Failure to include it to-
gether with the less than optimum conditions under which 
Form P (Test VII) was administered probably account for the 
difference in the means. 
The correct answers in this test are the modal re-
sponses of Fields's 200 subjects. However, there is much 
less doubt in the case of this test that these are indeed 
the correct answers. In the first place, Fields found that 
the modal responses of his subjects were the same responses 
that were predicted from a knowledge of the feelings which 
the models intended to express by any given pose.2 Further-
more, the modal responses obtained by Fields and those ob-
tained here are identical. 
Summary 
Four significant, positive coefficients of correlation 
involving six o:f the tests in Test Battery: Form I support 
the hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability and aes-
thetic ~pathic ability constitute a single factor. The 
1. Ibid. 
-
2. Ibid. 
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test :from 't"l'hich this common facto.r appears to be missing is 
Test III: The Empathy Test. The four significant correla-
tions include three tests of an interpersonal nature, two 
tests o:r an aesthetic nature, and one test of: a mixed inter-
personal and aesthetic nature. 
That all twenty-one of: the predicted correlations did 
not reach significance may be the result of the low relia-
bility coef:ficients o:r many of the tests used and of: the ad-
verse conditions under which the tests were administered. In 
any event, the failure of the results to occur entirely as 
predicted indicates that the hypothesis of the dissertation 
is supported only tentatively. 
The fact that ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training, 
who had not had special training in art, scored significant-
ly higher than the rest of the test sample on two tests of a 
purely aesthetic nature also supports the hypothesis of the 
identity of interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic em-
pathic ability. This is supportive insofar as it may be as-
sumed that this group is above average in interpersonal em-
pathic ability. This assumption is based on the fact that 
they were receiving training designed to increase their em-
pathic ability. It also rests on the £act that they scored 
significantly higher than the rest of the test sample on 
three tests in Test Batterr: For.m I and significantly higher 
than all other groups except Boston University School of 
Theology students on a fourth test. 
150 
However, this exper:i.Dtental support is also made tenta-
tive by an anomalous result. Ministers in Clinical Pastoral 
Training also scored significantly lower than the rest of 
the test sample on one test of an interpersonal nature. 
The import of the experimental results as a whole is 
to give tentative but not conclusive support to the hypothe-
sis that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empa-
thic ability constitute a single factor. 
The results of the individual. tests have provided a 
basis upon which various approaches to the measurement of 
empathic ability may be evaluated. These evaluations are 
too many to be summarized here but will be treated in the 
following chapter., 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The chapter will review and summarize how each of the 
theories presented in Chapter ll supports the hypothesis 
that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic 
ability constitute one factor. Following this will be a 
brief evaluation of each of these theories of empathy. Some 
attempt will also be made to indicate how these various 
theories may be combined into one theory of how empathic 
perception operates. A short digression on the operation of 
empathy in counseling will be presented to illustrate the 
application of this theory. 
Next the experimental. results presented in Chapter V 
will be summarized. The meaning of these results in the 
light of the theory developed will be shown. Conclusions 
regarding the hypothesis of the dissertation will be drawn 
on the basis of theory and experimental results combined. 
Finally, the various approaches to the measurement of 
empathic ability will be evaluated and recommendations fbr 
:future efforts to measure empathic ability will be made. 
1. Conclusions 
i. Theoretical Support 
Theory-in .fact any of' the basic types of empathy the-
ory--supports the hypothesis that interpersonal empathy and 
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aesthetic empathy constitute one and the same ability. 
The early theories of empathy can be classified on 
the basis of three dichotomous classifications: (1) active 
self postulated, or no active selr postulated; ( 2) opera-
tion by association, or operation directly; (3) motor ac-
tivity involved, or no motor activity involved. Figure 2, a 
cube divided into eight smaller cubes, illustrates the 
eight possible combinations of these three dichotomous 
classifications. 
'!hough there are these eight possible combinations and 
though a theorist can be round to represent each of these 
positions, there are basically three issues, involving rour 
positions, which have been enthusiastically championed: ( 1) 
the active self; (2) operation by association; (3) operation 
directly; ( 4) motor activity. 
Fach of these four theoretical positions supports the 
hypothesis of the identity or interpersonal and aesthetic 
empathy, and theorists representing each of these positions 
have supported it expl.icitly. 
( l) How Fach Theory Supports the Hypothesis 
That empathy theory which postulates an active self. or 
ego sees empathy as an act on the part of a conscious agent. 
It is a complex act involving perception and projection.- The 
manner of' initial perception is not or such great interest 
to this school of' theorists as is the matter of' projection. 
These theorists do not even agree a:s to whether the perceP-
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tion is direct or mediated by association or both, or wheth-
er it involves motor activity or not. 
Fig. 2.--Figure showing three issues in empathy theory 
and eight possible theoretical positions created thereby, 
"t-Tith representative theorists indicated. 
~ Association 
~ Direct 
·~ 
Self 
/ 
No 
Motor/ 
The important point is that the object of perception 
does stir affect in the observer. However, the observer does 
not take this to be his own feeling--himself feeling himself 
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--but rather projects his feeling upon the object. He pro-
jects the feeling stirred in himself by the perception of 
the object back upon the object and perceives it as an at-
tribute of the object. Included in this affective complex 
are conative as well as more specifically affective quali-
ties. 
In intense empathy not only affective-conative quali-
ties but the total ego is projected into the object. This 
statement must be understood as phenomenological and not 
metaphysical. The observer so identifies himself with the 
object as to merge his own identity with it. He feels him-
self into the object. He imagines how he would feel if he 
were the object or were undergoing what the object is under-
going. 
This ecstatic element in empathy, variously described 
as going out of oneself or projecting oneself into the ob-
ject, is disturbing to "tough-minded" psychologists. Some of 
their objections may be removed if this ecstatic experience 
is understood as highly focused, intense attention. Intro-
spection reveals that when attention is highly focused con-
sciousness of self' disappears. Not only does it disappear, 
but in intense cases one does come to feel that he !§. the 
object. Attention--the "hot spot" of consciousness--may be 
directed away from the self toward some other object and so 
narrowed and focused that the self no longer lies within the 
boundaries of consciousness. 
Since it is the feelings of and even the self of a hu-
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man observer that are projected into the object in empathy, 
it makes no difference whether the object is animate or in-
animate. The process is the same in interpersonal empathy 
and in aesthetic empathy. Empathy is imaginative--an "as if" 
ability. The inanimate state of an object presents little 
barrier to one's imaginatively animating it and endowing it 
with affective-conative qualities. The clinical understand-
ing of projection as a defense mechanism does not preclude 
projection upon inanimate objects. One readily endows the 
rock upon which he stubs his toe with malicious intent. 
According to this theory, it is only through this kind 
of process of projection that the feeling content of other 
persons or of art objects is perceived, because the only 
feelings which are available to the observer are his own 
feelings--himself feeling himself. Nevertheless, these theo-
rists maintain that this is an objective, accurate mode of 
perception, in fact, the most accurate mode of perception. 
Why it is that this is the accurate mode of perception 
of feelings par excellence is not very clear. However, two 
reasons may be suggested. The first is that feeling can be 
most accurately perceived through a process of feeling. That 
is to say that feeling cannot be fUlly understood in the ab-
stract but must be experienced for its meaning to become 
manifest. This is the position, for example, of Rollo May.l 
1. Supra, pp. 23-24·.· 
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The second reason may be that when one gets out o£ himself 
or removes himself entirely from his phenomenal field his 
own needs cease to distort his perception. Maslow makes 
much of this point .1 
The fear that the observer when he gets out of himself 
and feels himself into the object will then be "carried 
away" is unfounded, since the observer will not remain in 
this state forever but will return to an analytical dispo-
sition in which he will consider the knowledge gained in 
the ecstatic state. The point in the theory under consider-
ation is not that this latter analysis is unnecessary or 
that it does not occur, but simply that it does not consti-
tute empathy. Empathy refers only to that aspect of the ex-
perience wherein the self is projected. 
Among those who espouse this theory of empathy two--
Lipps2 and May3 -are prominent supporters of the hypothe-
sis that interpersonal and aesthetic empathy constitute the 
same ability. 
The associationist theory of empathy is simpler than 
the self-theory in that it uses fewer constructs, and it 
also attempts to be more objective. Usually either for the 
sake of simplicity or because of objective bias the concept 
1. Infra, pp. 163-6zt.;· 
2. Lipps, nAesthetische Einrohlung.n 
J. May, op. cit., pp. 75-79. 
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of the self' is .eschewed. Motor activity, on the other hand, 
is more often included than not. 
The individual learns the af'f'ective meaning of expres-
sive behavior and of' expressive design from other persons 
and from his own experiences. In this way countless stimu-
lus-response bonds are built up over the years. Whether the 
stimulus then comes to evoke the f'eeling itself' or only the 
idea of it or the word designating it is a question the an-
swer to which varies f'rom theorist to theorist. 
Generally the opinion seems to be that the idea of the 
f'eeling comes first, the experienced intensity of the feel-
ing itself being amenable to conscious control. In associa-
tionist theories based upon motor mimicry, on the other 
hand, the feeling does in a sense precede the idea of it. 
Here the association is not with the objective pattern of 
the perceptual field but rather with the observer's own 
kinesthetic sensations. He perceives the bodily state which 
he has assumed more or less unconsciously in mimicking the 
object, and associates with that bodily state a certain 
feeling state. That is, he feels in his own body before he 
recognizes intellectually the feeling expressed. 
These two types or associationist theories of empathy 
are most often held in combination rather than exclusively. 
The main issue is that empathy is learned by a process of 
conditioning. Whether it is a pattern in the exterior per-
ceptual field or in the body of the observer, he has learn-
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ed to associate that given pattern with a specific feeling 
through their repeated contiguous occurence. 
It is not asserted that the abstract patterns of art 
are necessarily like or even similar to the patterns of hu-
man expressive behavior. However, the process whereby the 
affective meaning of these patterns is perceived is held to 
be identical--association. This is not necessarily to say 
that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic 
ability are identical. In the first place, one may have 
learned to perceive interpersonal expression but never have 
.formed many strong stimulus-response bonds vis-a-vis aes-
thetic stimuli. In the second place, it may be that the task 
of forming stimulus-response bonds vis-a-vis persons may be 
more or less difficult for a given individual than fanning 
similar bonds vis-a-vis art objects. 
The associationist theory of empathy does not then un-
equivocally support the hypothesis that persons who are high 
in interpersonal empathic ability will also be high in aes-
thetic empathic ability. Whether or not an associationist 
theory of empathy supports this hypothesis depends on the 
extent to which a given theorist allows associations to be 
generalized, on the one hand, or to which stimulus-response 
bonds are held to be specific, on the other. I£ an associa-
tionist theory allows association to be abstract and general-
ized, then that theory can subscribe to the hypothesis that 
interpers·onal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic abil-
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ity are one. It may be fair to place Lotze in this latter 
category. 
The Gestalt theory unequivocally supports the hypothe-
sis that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empa-
thic ability are the same. What is perceived as expressive 
is Gestalt--form. It is the fonnal aspect--the pattern and 
its organization--which gives to any object (animate or in-
animate) its expressive qualities. The same Gestalt means 
the same thing affecti vely whether it be on a human face or 
a non-representational painting. What are referred to here 
as interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic 
ability then are one and the same ability-the ability to 
perceive the af£ecti ve meaning o£ £onn. 
The a££ective meaning of form is given directly in the 
act of perception, because the perceptual field and brain 
field of the observer are isomorphic. The pattern and organ-
ization of the object of perception and the pattern and or-
ganization of the whole perceiving organism come in the act 
of perception to correspond to each other in their gestalt 
structure. But form is dynamic. The organism, by virtue of 
the manner in ~zhich because of its innate structure it or-
ganizes its percepts, cannot perceive fonn as static. 
Forms ~rhich are objectively static are perceived by 
the organism of the human being as endowed with directed 
tension or even motion. A nearly completed circle appears 
to press for closure. Four dots drawn at what would be the 
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four corners of a square, but not connected by any lines, 
are nevertheless perceived as a square, because the organism 
presses toward simple structure. An ambiguous drawing for 
illustrating figure-ground reversal appears to jump quickly 
back and forth from one meaning to another. Such experiments 
by Gestalt psychologists in visual dynamics are commonplace 
today. The point o:f importance here is that it is this di-
rected tension or movement, which is not imposed upon the 
percept by the higher mental faculties but which lies in the 
very nature in which the perceptual apparatus organizes the 
perceptual field, which gives rise directly to consciousness 
of affective meaning. 
The formal organization characteristic of a given affec-
tive state is not merely associated with that state nor Cbes 
it simply accompany it; when assumed by the organism it is 
that affective state. 
This theory of the Gestalt psychologists is not far re-
moved from some motor theories of empathy. The basic premise 
of all motor theories of empathy is that the observer imi-
tates or mimics w.ith his body the .fonn, movement, and ten-
sion in the object. The extent and nature o:f this imitation 
is a matter of some controversy. Opinions are generally of 
three kinds: (1} the imitation is literal; (2) the imitation 
may be only incipient , a motor set preceding any overt move-
ment; (3} the imitation may be only symbolic, i.e., the ob-
server's fonn or act may not correspond literally to that of' 
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the object but only represent it or stand for it symbolical-
ly. It is this latter kind o£ motor theo~ which bears the 
greatest similarity to the Gestalt theory. Both Gestalt the-
orists and motor theorists can speak of a kind of resonance 
between the object and the observer. 
The motor theorist then combines one or several of 
these theories of the nature and extent of motor imitation 
with one of two theories of how imitation gives ri.se to con-
scious perception of feeling in the object. The first theo-
retical option is that of the associationists. This theory 
holds that the kinesthetic sensations aroused by imitating a 
given expression of feeling have through conditioning become 
associated with that particular feeling. The assumption of 
the physical expression by one's own body serves as a stimu-
lus which then elicits the appropriate feeling response. 
The second theoretical option is based on the James-
Lange theory of the emotions. This theory holds that motor 
imitation gives ris·e directly to conscious feeling tone. The 
kinesthetic impulses sent back to the brain when one assumes 
a given posture or imitates a given movement give rise di-
rectly and automatically to conscious feeling. All of the 
various systems controlled by the autonomic nervous system 
are triggered, so that pulse, endocrine balance, muscular 
tonus, etc. all change. It is this bodily change which is 
perceived directly, not by association, as feeling tone. 
Whatever the extent and nature of the motor imitation, 
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and whatever the manner in whiCh it gives rise to conscious 
perception of feeling, the observer is not consciously aware 
of his motor imitation and the feeling tone of which he be-
comes consciously aware he perceives not as his own but as 
belonging to the object. He projects his own feeling into 
the object and perceives it as an attribute of the object. 
In the moment that the observer becomes aware of his own im-
itation or of the feeling as his own projected feeling, the 
empathic process ceases. That is to say, the process ceases, 
by definition, to be empathic. 
Insofar as one may imitate an inanimate object as easi-
ly as an animate one, interpersonal empathic ability and 
aesthetic empathic ability are one and the same ability, ac-
cording to the motor theory of empathy. Support of this hy-
pothesis is evident in the writings of both Groosl and 
Lee.2 
( 2) Theoretical Synthesis and Summary 
The self-theories of empathy are more descriptive than 
explanatory. They describe elaborately the experience of the 
observer in projecting himself into the object, but they of-
ten fail to explain how he perceives initially the feeling 
complex which he then projects. This is especially true of 
1. Groos, Einleitung in die lsthetik, pp. 96-97. 
2. Lee, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 22. 
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Lipps who on the one hand holds that this perception is di-
rect (anticipating Gestalt insights) and on the other hand 
sometimes allows the operation of association. 
The insights of the self-theory of empathy are, never-
theless, not to be ignored. The experience of sich ein:ffthlen 
is commonly enough reported that it deserves to be taken 
seriously. This is especially o.ften reported and held by 
many theorists to be essential. in aesthetic empathy and in 
the interpersonal empathy between counselor and client. 
The contention that one perceives accurately and under-
stands tully another person or object only when he in this 
sense identifies himself with it needs more serious consid-
eration by psychology. Many philosophers have held that one 
must enter into some kind of union with an object in order 
to understand it fully. Psychologists have been prone to 
dismiss this as metaphysical speculation. 
Among academic psychologists, Maslow is one of the few 
who has shown some serious interest in this matter. His con-
cept of cognition ot· being, or B-cognition, bears many simi-
larities to empathic perception as described by self-theo-
ries of empathy.l He speaks of the object coming to occupy 
the entire phenomenal field and of the consciousness of self 
disappearing as self and object merge. This kind of cogni-
1. Abraham Maslow, "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experi-
ences," (mimeographed, preprinted from J. Gen. Psycho!., 
1959). 
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tion lV'aslow :finds characteristic o:f both therapeutic insight 
and aesthetic appreciation. ~~slow observes that sel:f-actu-
alizing people typically perceive in this manner, and that 
this is the accurate mode o:f perception par excellence. 
To deny the operation o:f association in empathy would 
be to ignore the obvious. There are :few stimuli no matter 
how abstract which do not stir some associations, and there 
is no doubt that association often occurs below the thres-
hold o:f conscious awareness. That association can occur :for 
all practical purposes instantaneously is, of course, not to 
be denied. 
Two major objections, however, make it impossible to 
accept association alone as an adequate explanation o:f the 
operation o:f empathy. In the :first place, it does not ex-
plain how the unconditioned in:fant understands the a:f:fecti ve 
connotation o:f expressive behavior. Likewise, it do,es not 
explain how the adult perceives correctly the a:f:fective 
meaning o:f human or artistic expression to which he has nev-
er been conditioned--that is, unless he understands it by 
analogy or in:ference. Yet, though analogy and in:ference are 
mental processes which every individual knows empirically, 
to introduce them into the conceptual framework o:f stimulus-
response psychology is to beg the question. To say that em-
pathy operates by analogy or in:ference does not explain, it 
merely names. 
The second objection is that i:f stimulus-response bonds 
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are held to be specific, it is difficult to see how a suf-
ficient number of such bonds can be formed and remembered to 
cover all of the various and subtly differentiated forms of 
personal and aesthetic expression. The number of such bonds 
would have to be almost infinite. 
The plight of the associationist theory is that it can-
not have its simplicity and experimental demonstrability and 
be true to the full range of human experience at the same 
time. However, if it attempts to be more inclusive, it then 
loses its conceptual simplicity and experimental demonstra-
bility and becomes almost as "metaphysical" as those theo-
ries of which it is often so critical. 
The Gestalt. theory ignores the phenomenal self and its 
projection into the object·. Nevertheless, Gestalt theory 
does postulate a kind of union between observer and object. 
The observer and the object do become one in their gestalt 
organization; there is an isomorphic identification of one 
with the other. The union is not substantial but formal. 
Experimental validation of the theory of isomorphism is 
lacking, as is experimental validation of all the theories 
of empathy. Nevertheless, because there are very few ques-
tions which it does not answer, and because its conceptual 
framework is simple and logical, the Gestalt theory of ex-
pression is the most adequate theory yet put forward. 
While no objections are raised to the Gestalt theory, 
the motor theory of empathy is, on the other hand, vulnera-
166 
ble to several criticisms. The motor theory which utilizes 
the associationist theory is subject to the same objections 
raised above to associationism. That motor theory which 
rests upon the James-Lange theory o:f the emotions su:f:fers 
because that theory of the emotions has fallen into disre-
pute, despite the fact that it has not been disproved. Nei-
ther, of course, has the James-Lange theory been verified 
by any experimental evidence. Hence, like isomorphism it 
remains only a theory. 
In fact, motor imitation itself' has not been proved to 
occur in all cases of empathic perception. There is no doubt 
that it does occur in some cases, and in some individuals 
more commonly than in others. But, that it is necessary :for 
empathic perception is by no means certain. 
I£ motor imitation were sine qua non :for empathic per-
ception, it would follow that the empathic ability of para-
lytics would thereby be impaired. That this is true seems 
unlikely. 
Neurological techniques are available today with which 
many of the hypotheses of the motor theory of empathy could 
be tested; however, there has been little interest in recent 
years in these questions. 
It appears then that there is no single theory o:f empa-
thy which is entirely satisfactory. Consequently, an eclec-
tic theory will be presented briefly here without any .fUr-
ther evidence to support it. 
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Empathy is to be understood as pathic perception--the 
perception of feeling and emotion through a process involv-
ing feeling and emotion. Feeling and emotion are perceived 
primarily through the process referred to by the Gestalt 
psychologists as isomorphism. Feeling and emotion are con-
veyed primarily by gestalt qualities--directed tension, aP-
parent motion, balance, rhythm, etc-and are given directly 
in the percept. In fact, the very act of perceiving is an 
act in which the observer feels-feels the expression of the 
object. The act of perceiving is an act of the whole organ-
ism, and the isomorphism is an isomorphism of the whole or-
ganism. 
If the object is in motion or expresses directed ten-
sion, which it almost invariably does, the observer may ex-
perience motor activity or kinesthetic sensation. Of this 
he may or may not be conscious. Since the isomorphic rela-
tionship is total, the motor element cannot be analyzed out 
of it. The question of whether or not such perception could 
occur without it is irrelevant as is the question of wheth-
er the motor element alone is responsible for the perceP-
tion of feeling. The whole organism corresponds isomorphi-
cally to the object; and hence, the whole organism feels. 
The motor activity does not precede the conscious perceP-
tion of feeling, but it accompanies it. A paralytic or an 
amputee may still experience kinesthetic sensations in a 
paralyzed or amputated part of his body, and thus does not 
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thereby necessarily suffer impairment of his empathic abil-
ity. 
Associations almost invariably accompany any perception. 
Association no doubt plays a part in empathy, and evidence 
does seem to indicate that empathic ability can be increased 
by training. But empathy is not limited by previous condi-
tioning, and does not rest entirely or even primarily upon 
association. Training may increase the number and strength 
of stimulus-response bonds, but the results of training may 
also occur through increasing an individual's sensitivity to 
perceptual processes which are already going on within him, 
and by teaching him to focus his attention thus removing dis-
tracting elements from his perceptual field. 
Empathy is a process of feeling-perception which in-
volves highly focused attention. For this reason the concept 
of the projection of the self into the object should be re-
tained in any theory of empathy. The consciousness of self 
over against the object does disappear when one concentrates 
intensely upon a specific object. Though empathy may occur 
without the projection of the self, projection frequently 
accompanies empathic perception. 
Empathy then is pathic perception wherein the feeling-
expression in the object is given directly to the observer 
by virtue of an isomorphic relationship between object and 
observer. The observer feels immediately what the object ex-
presses. Whether he can name the feeling or consciously has 
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the idea of· it is essentially beside the point in regard to 
empathy. He will very likely experience motor activity 
though he may not be consciously aware of it. He will prob-
ably exhibit certain conditioned responses also. However, 
neither these associations nor the motor imitation gives 
rise initially to the conscious perception of ~eeling, 
since this is given directly in the act of perception. The 
experience of the projection of' the self into the object 
may also occur if attention is highly :focused; and the ac-
curacy of the perception will increase as attention is in-
creasingly focalized. 
(3) Digression on Empathy in Counseling 
In addition to the identity of' interpersonal empathic 
ability and aesthetic empathic ability there are further 
similarities between aesthetic contemplation and counseling. 
Two distinctions were suggested earlier between inte~ 
personal empathy and aesthetic empathy (not distinctions be-
tween the abilities or the basic processes). The first was 
that in aesthetic contemplation the object is regarded as 
an end in itself, whereas in interpersonal empathic perceP-
tion the perception is more typicaLLy a means to some util-
itarian end. 
The second distinction had to do with the matter o£ 
detachment or psychical distance. This is partly another 
way of saying that the experience is entered into as an end 
in itself and is thus detached from practical considerations, 
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but it also implies what has been ret·erred to as a willing 
suspension or disbelief. The observer accepts a fictive--an 
"as i£" attitude--so that he does not react in a practical 
manner to the object. He is not, £or example, threatened 
even though the feeling expressed by the object might be 
threatening to him in a practical situation. Neither does 
he act out his s·entiments as, for example, by jumping onto 
the stage to deliver the heroine of a melodrama £rom the 
hands of the villain. He £eels into the object rather than 
reacting to it or over against it. 
The point here is that aesthetic contemplation and 
counseling exhibit similarities which go beyond the opera-
tion of the same .factor o£ empathy in both. The therapeutic 
counselor regards his relationship to his client as an end 
in itself in the same way that, upon assuming an aesthetic 
attitude, the observer o£ an art object regards his rela-
tionship to the art object as an end in itsel£. And, it is 
primarily because he regards his relationship with his 
client as an end in itself' that the counselor is able to 
heal his client. 
The therapeutic counselor regards his client as an end 
in himself, and he enters into the counseling relationship 
as an end in itself'--purely f'or the enjoyment he derives 
f'rom feeling into the other person. It is this regard o£ 
the client as an end in himself' and of the relationship 
with him as an experience o:f worth in and of itsel£ that 
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imputes to the client a :feeling of his own self-worth. 
The therapeutic counselor goes further than this.· In 
empathy he goes out of himself; he gives himself, as Jung 
says, to the patient.! In so doing he not only a:f:firms the 
value of the client as a person, but he also expresses dra-
matically his trust of the client. He dares to go out of 
himsel£ on behalf o:f his client, and he trusts the client 
with his (i.e., the counselor's) own self. He makes himself 
vulnerable to the client. 
Yet, the counselor maintains a sort o:f detachment. He 
does not react to the client's expression of hostility by 
striking him. He does not flee from the client's expression 
o:f :fear. Neither does he try to manipulate the client :for 
any practical. end. It might even in a sense be appropriate 
to say that he does not try to heal the client. He does not 
try to do anything 12 the client; he simply attends to him 
and receives him as an object o:f value. 
This experience is a healing experience for the client 
because his val.ue--his intrinsic value apart :from practical 
considerations--is affirmed. His ego strength is increased, 
to use a psychoanalytic te:nn, and his ability to make deci-
sions is thereby strengthened. He is better able then to 
bind time and tension and to face reality. 
However, as May points out, the counselor is also heal-
1. Jung, opt' cit., p.· 368. 
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ed by this experience~! It is the objectification of the 
self and its feelings that accounts for the healing of the 
counselor and the viewer of a work of art alike. Both art 
and counseling heal because in both the self, or certain el-
ements of it, are projected upon the screen of the other. 
The self and its feelings are objectified, held out as it 
were at arm's length, where they can be dealt with in a some-
what detached manner, where the pattem can be reorganized 
imaginatively and the results of such reorganization consid-
ered without threat of practical consequences. In counseling 
these benefits accrue not only to the counselor but to the 
client also, in addition to the effects described in previ-
ous paragraphs. 
The healing effect of emotional catharsis in counseling 
and in art appreciation should also be mentioned• Both situ-
ations allow one to experience intense feelings without suf-
fering practical consequences. The healing effect of emotion-
al catharsis is generally agreed upon by both aestheticians 
and psychotherapists. 
ii. Experimental Evidence 
The very great 1man:i•ity of subjects' responses to cer-
tain very abstract stimuli in the Expressive Line Test and 
the Expressive Design Test suggests that there is some objec-
tive expression o:f feeling in certain o:f these stimuli. The 
1. May, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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designs do express something; responses are not merely by 
chance. This result could be interpreted as supporting any 
of the various theories of empathy; however, the absolute 
abstractness of the designs would seem to cast some doubt 
upon the associationist theory. In any event, what this 
does indicate is that form alone is capable of expressing 
feeling quite specificall.y. This does not prove that form 
alone, or even form primarily, is the mode of feeling-ex-
pression, but it does indicate that it could be. 
'l'he hypothesis that interpersonal. empathic ability and 
aesthetic empathic ability constitute one ability is as 
strongly supported by the result that ministers in Clinical 
Pastoral Training scored significantly higher than the rest 
of the sample on tests of aesthetic empathic ability as by 
the result that certain significant, positive correlations 
were found among some of the tests in Test Battery: Form I. 
Ministers in Clinical Pastoral. Training, whom there is 
good reason to believe might well be the highest in inter-
personal empathic ability of all the groups tested, and who 
were in the process of receiving training specifically in 
interpersonal empathic perception, scored significantly 
higher than the rest of the test sample on the Expressive 
Line Test and the Expressive Design Test. The fact that 
this group of ministers also scored significantly higher 
than the rest of the test sample on the Empathy Test may 
also give some support to the assumption that this group is 
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high in interpersonal empathic ability. The most logical 
explanation of why it is that this group, which is high in 
interpersonal empathic ability, also scores high on two 
tests the stimuli for which are abstract and artistic is 
that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic 
ability constitute one and the same ability. 
Ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training also scored 
significantly higher than all other groups except Boston 
University School of Theology students on the Portrait 
Judging Test, a test which presents a stimulus of a mixed 
aesthetic-personal nature. These ministers indicated no 
special interest in art, nor had they, with the exception 
of one of the twenty-six members of the group, had any spe-
cialized training in art. Their ability to judge the ex-
pressiveness of aesthetic stimuli does not seem to be the 
result of training in the empathic perception of objects of 
art, but rather of training in interpersonal empathic per-
ception. 
That ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training scored 
significantly lower than the rest of the test sample on the 
Test of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings is an anomalous 
resu1t. Such a test requires not only pathic perception but 
also an additional inference concerning how the individual 
perceived feels about himself, or will report that he feels 
about himsel.f. This inference requires an intellectual abil-
ity which might more properly be termed insight rather than 
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empathy. In fact, Steinmetz, when he first suggested the 
method of predicting others' responses, referred to it as a 
method of measuring "psychological perception or empathetic 
insight. nl Hence, the use of this method does not result 
in a factorially pure test of eapathic ability. 
On the other hand, the method of predicting others' re-
sponses does have the virtue of giving some measure of the 
extent to which a subject has projected himself into or iden-
tified himself with the other person. And though it measures 
this indirectly, there appears to be no other equally prac-
tical method of assessing this aspect of empathy. One's eval-
uation of this method depends basically upon the degree to 
which one understands behavior to be motivated by feeling as 
contrasted to reason. If people are motivated primarily by 
feeling, then if one perceives the feeling of another he 
should be able to predict his behavior. Still, this kind of 
feeling into the other person is not the same thing referred 
to by the early empathy theorists as Einffthlung, and this 
ability to predict is not strictly speaking empathic ability. 
lmlpathy is a factor, and a large factor, in a test of 
ability to predict others' responses. However, in attempting 
to measure empathic ability this sort of test should be used 
only in a battery with other tests that measure pathic per-
ception in a more limited sense. 
1. Steinmetz, op. cit. 
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Despite the fact that the Test of Predicting Others' 
Trait Ratings is not a factorially pure test of eapathic 
ability, it does appear to measure a kind of empathic in-
sight in which ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training 
should be especiall.y well. trained. Furthermore, nurses who 
were also receiving similar training did score significant-
ly higher than ministers in Clinical Pastoral Training on 
this test. This difference is significant at the ~05 level. 
No explanation can be f'olDld to account for this result. 
With the exception of the Test of Predicting Others' 
Trait Ratings, ministers in Clinical. Pastoral Training 
scored significantly higher than the rest o:f the test sam-
ple on most of' the tests in Test Batteu: Form I. This re-
sult was predicted. 
Four significant correlations among the tests in Test 
Batten: Fora I (correlations involving six o:f the seven 
tests in the battery} also l.end support to the hypothesis 
that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic 
ability are one and the same ability. It was predicted that 
all. of' the tests would be correlated with each other, i• e., 
tbat there would be twenty-one significant, positive corre-
lations. As it is, there are only four, and they are o:f the 
order o:f •"20. However, there is only one test, the &lpath;r 
~' the only non-visual test in the battery, that is not 
correlated with at least one other test in the battery." 
Apparently then, there is a common :factor among the other 
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six tests even though it accounts for only a small portion 
o:f the variance. This :factor may well be the unitary :factor 
o:f empathic ability postulated here. 
The lack o:f more and higher correlations among the 
tests is probably due to the unreliability o:f the tests and 
their administration in many instances under adverse condi-
tions. 
A test of judging the expressiveness of lines was 
:found to be correlated with two tests o:f judging facial ex-
pression. A test of judging the expressiveness of abstract 
designs was found to be correlated with a test of' judging 
the expressiveness of posture and gesture. That is, two 
tests of an abstract, aesthetic nature were found to be cor-
related with three tests of an interpersonal nature. This 
is experimental evidence in support of the hypothesis of 
the identity of interpersonal empathic ability and aesthet-
ic empathic ability. 
These correlations between tests having aesthetic stim-
uli and tests having personal stimuli, plus the significant 
differences between the scores o:f ministers in Clinical Pas-
toral Training and the rest of the test sample, constitute 
limited experimental verification of· the hypothesis of this 
dissertation. The experimental. results are not clear-cut 
enough to support any unequivocal conclusions, but they do 
tend to support the hypothesis. They show trends in the di-
rection predicted, and encourage :further research using sim-
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ilar but more refined techniques. 
This is especially true, since the combined effect of 
theory and experiment is definitely to support the hypothe-
sis that interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empa-
thic ability constitute one and the same factor or ability. 
To summarize, proponents of the self-theory, the Ge-
stalt theory, the associationist theory, and the motor the-
ory of empathy agree almost without exception that feeling 
is perceived in other persons and in art objects in the 
same manner. It follows then that persons who are high in 
interpersonal empathic ability will also be high in aesthet-
ic empathic ability. The two abilities, in short, are per-
fectly correlated. They are one ability or factor. 
Experiment has failed to prove conclusively this iden-
tity of interpersonal empathic ability and aesthetic empa-
thic ability. However, the results of Test Battecy: Form I 
do tend to support this hypothesis. The experimental re-
sults presented here are more adequately explained by this 
hypothesis than by any alternative explanation. 
Two tests of an abstract, aesthetic nature were found 
to be correlated with three tests of an interpersonal na-
ture. This is experimental evidence that interpersonal em-
pathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability tend to go 
together--to be correlated. 
A group of subjects, whom there is good reason to be-
lieve were above average in interpersonal empathic ability, 
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scored significantly higher than the rest of the test sam-
ple on those two tests in Test Batterv: Form I which are of 
an abstract, aesthetic nature. Since this group of subjects 
had had no special training in art, this result is inter-
preted as supporting the hypothesis that interpersonal em-
pathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability constitute a 
single factor. 
2. Recommendations for Future Efforts to Measure :&npathy 
The potential value of the methods for measuring empa-
thic ability used in Test Battery: Form I has not been ful-
ly explored by this dissertation. Neither has the useful-
ness of these methods been exhausted here. Consequently, it 
is seriously urged that any future efforts to measure empa-
thic ability carry on the work begun here. The methods used 
in Test Batterr: Form I constitute the most promising solu-
tion to the problem of developing a short pencil and paper 
test of empathic ability. 
Several potentially valuable methods of measuring empa-
thic ability were not used in this dissertation because 
they are too time consuming. These too are worthy of furth-
er exploration. Some of them show promise of high validity. 
i. Continuation of the Methods Used Here 
If one were to continue with the methods used here, he 
might select one or several of the tests in Test Battery: 
Form I for further refinement. It would be especially de-
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sirable to obtain a test-retest reliability coefficient for 
each of the tests except the Empathy Test. A test-retest 
reliability coefficient might be much higher than the split-
hal£ reliability coefficient which is so adversely effected 
by varying item di:fficulty. With this in:fonnation in hand 
it would be much easier to determine which o:f the tests 
shows the greatest promise. Item analysis would no doubt be 
worth applying to certain o:f the tests--the Stick Figure 
Test, the Expressive Line Test, the Portrait Judging Test, 
and the Expressive Design Test. Adding more reliable items 
would, of' course, increase the over-all reliability of a 
given test. 
On the basis of' the inf'ormation already in hand, it 
appears that Test IV: The Expressive Line Test would re-
quire the least work in order to gain a considerable in-
crease in reliability. Its reliability coefficient o.f •'55 
could be increased to .70 simply by adding enough similar 
items to double its present length.l This would still 
leave a test of only twenty-six items which could easily be 
done in from .five to .fifteen minutes. The number of' items 
could be doubled simply by taking hal£ of the adj actives 
from each of the present items· and presenting them as addi-
tional items. The same chart of' lines could still be used 
and the same instructions would still apply. As for the 
1. See supra, p. 136 f'or formula. 
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validity o£ the Expressive Line Test, it should be noted 
that it has the highest total correlation with the other 
tests in the battery--i.e., the highest common factor load-
ing. 
The reliabil.ity and the standard deviations o£ Test V: 
The Portrait Judging Test and Test VI: The Expressive Design 
Test could be increas.ed by adding more items. This would be 
particularly easy to do in the case of Test v. 
Regardless of what tests are used, the test situation 
should be more rigidly controlled than was possible in the 
present study. If possible, the entire sample should be 
tested simultaneously under identical conditions. The pic-
tures in Test V: The Portrait Judging Test and Test VI: The 
Expressive Design Test could be projected on a screen from 
slides which are available from the same companies who SUP-
plied the prints used here. Test VII: The Test of Matching 
Facial Expressions, unfortunately, can only be administered 
individually. 
If several oi' the tests i'rom Test Battery: Form I were 
refined, they shorud then be administered again as a bat-
tery. Their intercorrelations should be computed and the re-
sulting matrix :factor analyzed. The Empathy Test should be 
included in any such battery. 
If only one test is chosen i'rom Test Battery: Form I 
for refinement, it would have immediately to be validated 
against some criterion. The Empathy Test is not recommended 
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for this purpose.' It :is the best short test for use in a 
long battery; but Kerr has recently published another test, 
Primary Empathic Abilities, which he considers a better 
test of empathic ability• It is, nevertheless, constructed 
on the basis of the same assumptions that underlie the .£!!-
pathy Test. 
Dymond's method of testing empathy has greater face 
validity than Kerr's tests; however, it is more cumbersome 
to apply. It suffers too from the additional restriction 
that the subjects involved should not have been well ac-
quainted with each other previously. The objections of 
Hastorf and Bender to Dymond's method have already been 
noted.l. 
Clinical ratings would be a relatively easy criterion 
to apply and might after all be the most adequate. These 
could be obtained from interviews or by observation of sub-
jects in some structured situation. This structured situa-
tion might well be a role playing situation. 
Finally, such a test might be validated on the basis 
of its predictive ability. Kerr has achieved amazing re-
sults in predicting with the &lpathy Test. His predictions, 
however, lack specificity and are generally of a rather 
gross sort. Perhaps this is the best that can be done in an 
extremely difficult field. One might predict, for exampl.e, 
1. Supra, pp. 69-70; 
that success or effectiveness as a psychotherapist would be 
highly correlated with empathic ability. But, how is one to 
measure the success or effectiveness of a psychotherapist? 
Furthermore, empathic ability is only one of many factors 
contributing to the effectiveness of a psychotherapist. 
Consequently, his effectiveness woul.d not necessarily be 
directly proportional to his empathic ability. 
ii. Methods Not Used in this Study 
All of the known methods of measuring empathic ability 
were used in Test Battery: Form I except those which for 
practical reasons could not be fitted into the battery. 
These practical reasons were for the most part considera-
tions of the length of time required of any subject to take 
the entire test battery. Consequently, some very promising 
methods of measuring empathic ability were not used in this 
study but should be recommended to .future researchers. 
Test II: The Test of Predicting Others' Trait Ratings 
was conceived as a variation of Dymond's method of testing 
empathy.! Dymond's method is no doubt superior to Test II 
in that the subjects actually talk with and relate to the 
persons whose trait ratings they try to predict, rather 
than only seeing them in a silent motion picture. As a test 
situation, Dymond's is much closer to the real life situa-
tion. The difficulties of administering Dymond's test have 
1. See supra, pp. 106-10 for detailed description. 
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already been discussed. I£ the necessary conditions can be 
met, Dymond's test should be used in any attempt to measure 
empathic ability. Though empirical validation is lacking, 
it seems certain that empathic ability is a .factor in 
Dymond's test. It would be o£ interest to .find the correla-
tion between Dymond's test and Test II to see i.f substitu-
tion o.f one .for the other were possible. 
Kerr's Primary Empathic Abilities was not used in Test 
Batterr: Form I because it requires thirty to .forty minutes 
to do. Much has already been said about Kerr's work. His re-
liability and validity coefficients are impressive. His the-
ory is less impressive. What Kerr's tests seem to measure at 
best is some kind o.f understanding or knowledge of' general 
cultural or subcultural values. The use of' the hypothetical 
average person lacks the specificity of' .face to .face inter-
personal relationships. One should be well aware of these 
objections before presuming to measure empathy with one of 
Kerr's tests alone. 
The use o.f role playing techniques in the measurement 
o.f empathy offers promise of very high validity. High reli-
ability, on the other hand, would probably be difficult to 
achieve. Such a test would require subjects to role play 
certain specified roles in a number of structured situations. 
Some provision should also be made .for use of the technique 
of reversing roles. Subjects' performances would be rated 
.for ability to take the role o£ another by a jury of compe-
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tent judges. Judges would be especial.l.y attentive to sub-
jects' taking of: the affective aspects of any given role. 
Though undoubtedly the most cumbersome method of' measuring 
empathy, this promises to be one of the most valid. 
Concluding Summary 
To reiterate, it is strongly recommended that the work 
begun in the construction of: Test Battery: Form I be carried 
further, since its potential value has by no means been ex-
hausted in this dissertation. Other methods, such as 
Dymond's test or the use of rol.e playing techniques, also 
show promise. However, Test Battery: Form I is the closest 
thing to a good, short pencil and paper test of empathic 
ability yet available. In its present f:or.m, lacking relia-
bility as it does, it is not a good test at all. But, as has 
been shown above, the reliability of several of the tests 
could be increased rather easily. 
Test Battery: Form I is more than a potentially good 
instrument for the measurement of empathic ability. When 
coupled with the technique of factor analysis it is also a 
potentially powerfUl research tool. If the reliability coef-
ficients o.f the tests in Test Battery: Form I were raised, 
it is predicted that higher correlations among the tests 
would result-i.e., higher than those obtained in this dis-
sertation. Given these higher correlations, a factor analy-
sis might well reveal valuable information about empathic 
ability. 
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The results obtained from Test Battery: Form I as used 
here support the prediction that higher correlations among 
the tests would result if teBt reliability were increased. 
That is to say, the experimental results reported in this 
dissertation support the hypothesis that interpersonal em-
pathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability constitute a 
single factor. 
This experimental support is only tentative because of 
the lack of high test reliability. However, two tests using 
abstract designs as stimuli were found to be correlated 
with three tests using pictures of people as stimuli. This 
result was predicted on the basis of the hypothesis of this 
dissertation and is interpreted as supporting it. 
The result that ministers in Clinical Pastoral Train-
ing, who were receiving training in empathic perception, 
scored significantly higher than the rest of the test sam-
ple on those two tests in the battery which use abstract 
designs as stimuli is interpreted as supporting the hypoth-
esis of this dissertation. 
Theoretical writings by a great many psychologists, 
aestheticians, and psychotherapists representing several 
different schools of thought almost without exception SUP-
port the hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability and 
aesthetic empathic ability constitute one factor. 
Given the overwhelming weight of theoretical evidence, 
plus the tentative experimental evidence obtained from Test 
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Battery: Form I, it is the conclusion of this dissertation 
that the hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability and 
aesthetic empathic ability constitute a unitary factor or 
ability is supported. 
APPENDIX 
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Subject number ____ __ 
NAME~----------------------------~AGE _____ SEX. ______ _ 
OCCUPATION or ACADPm:C MA.JOR':...-------------
ADDRESS (if' you desire report of' scores)----------
TEST BATTERY: FORM I 
This battery of tests is designed to measure your sensi-
tivity to other persons and to certain visual configurations 
or designs. This ability is not directly related to intelli-
gence and is common to many different kinds of people. 
There are seven tests in the battery each of which is ac-
companied by a separate set of instructions. Read the instruc-
tions thoroughly and follow them as carefully as possible. It 
is very likely that you will find most of these tests both 
challenging and very enjoyable. 
I. The Stick Figure Test 
A number of stick figures, representing people in various 
postures, will be shown to you. Each figure will be numbered, 
corresponding to a number on this paper. For the correspqnding 
number on this paper there is a list of' 5 words, plus a 6th 
space which is left blank. As the figures are shown to you, 
you are to check the word which you think best describes your 
impression of that figure. 
If you feel that none of the words on the list adequately 
describes your impression of the figure, write what you con-
sider to be the best description in the space marked "other". 
Work quickly as the figures will be shown only for very brief 
periods of time. 
Figure 11 
(Do you see this figure as:) 
__ thoughtful 
___ worried 
tired 
----disgusted 
___ .relaxed 
Figure 12 
curious athleti_c ________ __ 
window peeker ____ __ 
alert 
awkwa-r~d-----------
Figure 13 
__ _.asleep 
sad 
---afraid 
lazy 
---active 
Figure 14 
worried 
---impatient 
tired 
---thinking 
---s:patient 
Figure 15 
__ drunk 
___ depressed 
__ ... sleeping 
anxious 
---exhausted 
Figure 16 
thoughtfu1 
---curious 
puzzled 
---s:self-conscious 
_ ___.happy 
Figure 19 
__ doubtful 
__ tempted 
___ rejecting 
___ .resisting 
___ describing 
Figure 20 
---~self-satisfied 
__ ... impatient 
___ describing 
casual 
---___ a.ngry 
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Figure 22 
awkward __________ _ 
admirin~Q---------­
shy 
non---co-,-1,,-~~i~t~a~l~-----
watchin=g----------
Figure 24 
begging~---------­welcoming~--------kind ____________ __ 
givin~g~---------­
accepting=---------
Figure 25 
affected ________ __ 
drunk ca ti_o_us __________ _ 
modeling walking0a--l~i~n-e-----
Figure 28 
bored~----------­
relaxing thinkingQ-________ _ 
extremely tired _ casual __________ __ 
Figure 29 
p~aying with child~-
exercisingo-______ _ 
crawlin=g ________ __ 
searchin0g ________ _ 
submissive. ________ _ 
Figure 30 
readin~o-----------watchin0g _______ __ 
relaxin=g~--------enjoyment ________ _ 
thinkinQg ________ __ 
Figure 31 
sexy 
---·curious 
__ .-relaxed 
expectant 
----undecided 
Figure 32 
tense 
---relaxed 
prudish 
--...:self-satisfied 
attentive 
-----
Figure 33 
balanced 
---dancing 
--...:playing 
___ _.overjoyed 
___ drunk 
Figure 34 
--J?gi ving an order 
___ threatening 
scared 
__ a.thletic 
_____ violent anger 
Figure 35 
a:fraid -~happy 
:f'urious 
----·excited 
___ commanding 
Figure 36 
directing 
--preaching 
enraged 
--excited 
___ dancer 
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Figure 38 
suspicious ________ __ 
stealing=------------
sneaking=------------athlete. ____________ _ 
:fear 
----------------
Figure 39 
shy 
sel~f-~co_n_s_c~i~o-u_s ______ _ 
ashamed~-----------modest ________ _ 
sad ________________ _ 
Figure 42 
exercising~---------­laughing 
:fallin =------------
very happy ________ __ 
tantrum ____________ _ 
Figure 43 
disdainf'u.l 
surprised ·-----
contented __________ _ 
skeptical __________ _ 
observinga_ ________ __ 
Figure 44 
sexy pose __________ _ 
sleepy 
thought~fUl~~--------
stretching=----------
relaxing __________ __ 
Figure 46 
determined 
conceited ----------
angry ____________ _ 
sexy: 
skept~1~·-ca~l~----------
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Figure 47 Figure 50 
depressed tired 
a:fraid sad 
stealthy curious 
tired dejected 
suggestive thinking 
Figure 48 Figure 51 
a:f:fected depressed 
idiotic doubting 
:facetious puzzled 
homosexual tired 
saying goodbye exhausted 
Figure 49 Figure 52 
drunk happy 
falling idle 
directing intent 
balancing tired 
fearful pg.tient 
II. Predicting Others' Trait Ratings 
You will be shown a motion picture in which six pers·ons 
will appear successively for approximately two minutes per 
person. Each person in the motion picture will perfonn the 
same five specified tasks. 
After each of these persons was photographed he filled 
out a trait rating scale, such as you see on the next page, 
in terms of himself. Your task will be to watch each person 
in the motion picture as he appears, try to put yourself in 
his place, and then fill out. the trait rating scale as you 
think he has filled it out in rating himself. Time will be 
allowed after the appearance of each person in the motion 
picture f'or you to fill out the appropriate scale. Remember, 
you are to rate each person as you think he rated himself, 
not as you think him actually to be. 
Six traits are to be considered for each person in the 
motion picture. The relative strength of each trait is indi-
cated by numbers from 1 to 5 running along the line. To make 
your response draw a circle around the number (from 1 to 5) 
on each line which best describes how much or how little of 
that particular trait you think the person you have just 
seen in the motion picture judged to be present in himself. 
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Now watch the first person in the motion picture and 
try to put yourself" in his place. Then :fill out the .first 
trait rating scale {six traits on six lines) as you think 
he filled it out in terms of his own personality. 
Trait Rating Scale 
for Person 1 
1 2 2 !.t 2 
' 
superior ' moderately 
f average 
' 
moderately f iiiferior 
' superior inferior 
1 2 J ~ 2 
' 
friendly f moderately f neither f moderately f unfriendly 
' 
.friendly especially unfriendly 
friendly nor 
unfriendly 
1 2 J 4 a~st r aliiiOst f usually f no more f usuaOlly f 
' always a a leader -leader than a follower always a 
leader follower follower 
1 2 J ~ 2 
' shy ' moderately ' neither ' moderately 'self-assured' 
shy especially ·self-assured · 
shy nor 
self-assured 
1 2 2 ~ 2 
'sympathetic f moderately f neither f moderately 
' 
unsym- f 
·sympathetic especially unsym- pathetic 
sympathetic pathetic 
nor unsym-
pathetic 
1 2 J !± 2 
' 
tense f moderately f neither f moderately f relaxed 
' tense especially relaxed 
tense nor 
relaxed 
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(Note: Five more rating scales identical to the one on the 
previous page appear in Test Battery: Form I, but are not 
reproduced here.) 
III. The Jpnpathy Test 
(Note: Copyright laws :forbid the reproduction o:f the :pa-
t~est here. Copies may be obtained :from: Psychomet c 
A uiates, Box lb25, Chicago 90, Illinois.) 
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IV. The Expressive Line Test 
Below you will find thirteen sets of words, each set in-
dicating a particular feeling state or emotional state. The 
first word in each set will serve as a cue to the others. 
On the next page you will find a series of lines, eight-
een in number, each designated by a letter. You may tear that 
page out of the test booklet for convenience. 
Begin with class 1 of the feelings and find that line on 
the chart that best expresses to you the .feelings that class 
1 represents. Mark the letter attached to this line in front 
of class 1 (under "letter"). Do the same with class 2 of the 
feelings, and so on until each of the thirteen classes of 
feelings has been given a letter. You may use the same line 
as often as you wish. 
Letter Class 
1. Sad, melancholy, mournf'ul, doleful, sorrowful 
2. Quiet, calm, tranquil, serene 
3. Lazy, indolent, idle 
4. Merry, cheerful, gay, jolly, joyous 
5. Agitating, exciting, fiery, brisk, vivacious, 
6. Furious, angry, cross; vexed, enraged 
lively 
7. ~' dull 
8. Playful 
9. Weak, .feeble, faint, delicate 
10. Gentle, mild 
11. Harsh, hard, cruel 
12. Serious, solenm, grave, earnest 
13. PowerfUl., forceful, strong 
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A 
c 
D 
K 
M 
p 
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v. The Portrait Judging Test 
The materials for this test are a pile of 25 reproduc-
tions of portraits painted by artists from various periods 
and six category cards arranged in order from 1 e.ft to right 
on the table before you. Each category card describes a 
feeling or group of feelings or emotions. 
To begin the test, look at the portrait at the top of 
the pile and try to determine what feeling or emotion you 
think it expresses. Then try to decide which of the six cat-
egories of feelings and emotions this particular .feeling or 
emotion most nearly fits into. Some portraits will seem to 
belong quite definitely to one category, while others will 
not seem to fit well anywhere. Do your best to place each 
portrait in the category which is the most nearly appropri-
ate. 
When you have decided to which category the first por-
trait belongs, place that portrait on the table below the 
appropriate category card. Go on then to the next portrait 
and so forth one by one through the entire pile. Tum up 
only one portrait at a time. 
The experimenter will record your responses when you 
have finished. 
VI. The Expressive Design Test 
The materials for this test are a pile of 20 reproduc-
tions of abstract paintings and a list of feelings or emo-
tions for each painting. Each painting is numbered, corre-
sponding to a number on this paper. For the corresponding 
number on this paper there is a list of 5 words, plus a 6th 
space which is le.ft blank. Look at the paintings one by one, 
turning up only the top one each time, and check the word 
which best describes the feeling or emotion expressed by 
that picture. If you feel that none of the words on the list 
adequately describes what feeling or emotion the picture ex-
presses, write what you consider to be the best description 
in the space marked "other." 
Figure 1 (This painting expresses:) 
___ comicality 
--~peace 
hate 
---despair 
___ terror 
Figure 2 
obscenity ________ __ 
su:ffering~----------
melancholy ________ _ 
fear~~-----------vivacity __________ _ 
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Figure 3 Figure 9 
meekness mirth 
cruelty sadness 
anguish hmnor 
peace conf'us~on 
anxiety unity 
Figure 4 Figure 10 
anxiety mirth 
humc>'r anger 
haughtiness rashness 
slyness restlessness 
hate .fear 
Figure 5 Figure 11 
joy optimism 
rage humor 
melancholy apprehension 
shame pleasure 
terror liveliness 
Figure 6 Figure 12 
cruelty violence 
contentment horror 
anxiety despair 
laziness hope 
grief strength 
Figure 7 Figure 13 
irritation torment 
conflict hopelessness 
comicality tranquility 
confidence mildness 
serenity dullness 
Figure 8 Figure 14 
love serenity 
timidity boldness 
gaiety sensuality 
hope boredom 
.frustration delight 
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Figure 15 Figure 18 
mirth turmoil 
tranquility humor 
fear fear jocularity laziness 
laziness resentment 
Figure 16 Figure 19 
affection :f'Ur1, 
gentleness fear 
gaiety gloom 
gloom boredom 
boldness courage 
Figure 17 Figure 20 
horror optimism 
frustration loathing 
frenzy gloom 
affection £ear 
anger prowess 
VII: The Test o£ 14a.tching Facial Expressions 
The Test of Matching Facial Expressions will be admin-
istered to you individually by the experimenter who will 
supply you with materials and instructions. 
Turn in this Test Booklet now to the experimenter, 
checking first to see that you have answered all of the 
questions and filled in the personal information at the 
top of page one. 
Ib not leave the room 'Without taking Test VII: The 
Test of ~Atching Facial Expressions. 
200 
Supplementary Instructions f'or Test II: Predicting Others' 
Trait Ratings (to be given orally) · 
Watch the movie very caref'ully sinc-e you will see it 
only once~ a~d each person will appear f'or less than two 
minutes. ilUrtng the two minutes each person will perf'orm 
five specified tasks f'or approximately twenty seconds each. 
The f'i ve tasks, as the persons you will see in the movie 
were instructed to perf'orm them, are as .follows: (1) Remove 
your outer coat and then your suit coat or sweater, laying 
each on the table (one person who appeared with two outer 
coats will be seen taking them of'f' in separate sequences) ; 
(2) Draw a person, a tree, and a house in that order on the 
blackboard; ( 3) Build as elaborate a house of' playing cards 
as you can on the table; (4) Remove a match from the book, 
light it, hold it downward at first so that it starts to 
burn rapidly1 and then hold it keeping it burning as long 
as you· can; t5) Play a game of slap hands with the experi-
menter. The persons in the movie were also told in most in-
stances that they would have only twenty seconds to perform 
each task, and this may account in part for some appearance 
of hurrying. 
Watch carefully, now, and remember that you are to rate 
each person as you think he rated himsel.f, not as you think 
him actually to be. 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
TABLE SHOWING SCORING KEY AND WEIGHTS FOR 
TEST IV: THE EXPRESSIVE LINE TEST 
Responses 
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Weight 3 points Weight 2 points Weight 1 point 
c 
A 
c A L 
E H 
Q N p 
N Q R 
L c A,J,G 
E H D 
c L,I G 
A G D 
M N 0 
J M 
M N K 
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UNIVERSITY PRINTS USED IN TEST V: THE PORTRAIT JUDGING TEST 
Item Catalogue 
number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
B353 
C349 
D68 
D78 
Dl53 
D191 
Dl96 
D201 
D262 
D265 
D282 
D390 
D4ll 
D444 
E3 
El3 
E45 
E245 
E264 
F84 
H219 
H270 
Title and artist 
Il Condottiere, Antonello Da Messina 
Padre Servito Grano (detail), Paul Veronese 
Portrait of a Man with Rosary, Gossaert 
Portrait o:r the Artist 1 s Father, Martin 
Heemskerk . 
Portrait of GalUeo, Justus Susterma.ns 
Portrait of a Lady, Van 11dereveld 
Portrait of a Man, Hals 
La BohSmienne, Hals 
Portrait of Titus, Rembrandt Van Rijn 
Portrait of the Artist, Rembrandt Van Rijn 
Peter Potter, Van Der Helst 
Portrait of Darer's Father, DUrer 
Hans Imhofr ( ? ) , OOrer 
Portrait of a Man, Christoph Amberger 
Francis I, Jean Clouet 
The Viscount o:f Turerme, Champaigne 
Head of a Young Girl, Greuze 
Dona Isabel Y Corcel, Goya 
Louis Guillaume, C~zanne 
~irs. Siddons, Lawrence 
Lilya, Speicher 
Portrait of Mrs. Edith Mahon, Eakins 
Item 
23 
24 
25 
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UNIVERSITY PRINTS USED IN TEST V --Continued 
Catalogue Title and artist 
number 
MH14 Ann Pollard, Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Boston, Anon. 
P35 Portrait o:r the Artist, Rembrandt Van 
Rijn 
Pl68 The Girl with a Red Hat, Johannes 
Venneer 
PAINTINGS USED IN TEST VI: THE EXPRESSIVE DESIGN TEST 
AND MODAL RESPONSES ( N=l50) 
Item Catalogue Title and art.ist Modal response 
m.nnber 
l 12465 Painting, 1954, terror 
John Levee 
2 B56~'164 Enamored Tomcat, su.f.fering 
Leonardo Cremonini 
3 B56.116 Pompeii, 
William Baziotes 
anxiety 
4 B56.01 Ancestral Image, 
Adolf Gottlieb 
haughtiness 
5 B56.713 Painting, 1944-45, rage 
Wols 
6 Elegy to the Spanish Re-
public XXXV, Motherwell 
grie.f 
7 B56.311 Proun 19D, 
El Lissitzky 
confidence 
8 B56.217 Forms and Red, 1949, timidity, 
A. E. Gallatin .frustration 
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PAINTINGS USED IN TEST VI--Continued 
Item Catalogue Title and artist Modal response 
number 
9 B57.146 Kitchen, 1948, confusion 
Picasso 
10 B56.538 Number 20, 1949, restlessness 
Bradley Tomlin 
11 B56.442 I See Again in Memory My liveliness 
Dear Udnie, Francis 
Picabia 
12 B56.791 Light Breaking Through, horror 
Fritz Winter 
13 White Target, 1958, 
John Jasper 
hopelessness 
14 Rebound, 1959, sensuality 
Elsworth Kellg 
15 B56.395 Composition, 
Miro 
1933, jocularity 
16 Dark Melody, 1956, gaiety 
Ernst Wilhelm Nay 
17 B56.790 11/56, Theodor Werner frenzy 
18 B56.255 Ambush, Hans Hoffmann turmoil 
19 12466 Red and Black, gloom 
Philippe Hosiasson 
20 B56.518 January 10, 1951, gloom 
Pierre Soulages 
Note: 
All pictures are black and white contact prints re-
ceived from Taurgo Company, 58 Park Avenue, New York 16, 
New York. 
11 
R-5 
FW9 
~3 
R 7 
Notes: 
PICTURES AND KEI FUR TEST VII: THE TEST 
OF MATCHING FACIAL EXPRESSIONS 
12 ll l1t 21 22 ~6 Jii147 F\01 FW22 Rl2 M9 
R 8 R 17 R 13 FW17 R 20 R 6 
JZ. ~8 ~ R!tio ~8 R!jO R 3 
FW46 R 27 R 29 FW7 R 24 F'W32 
.a ~3 ll 211 R 23 R 25 R 31 
FW26 Rll FWll FW72 
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Z! R 1 
FW38 
~2 
R 26 
Taken from: Sidney J. Fields, "Discrimination of Fa-
cial Expression and Its Relation to Personal Adjustment," J. 
Soc. Psychol., 38(1953), 66. -
"R" numbers are Ruckmick pictures; "FW" numbers are 
Frois-Wittmann pictures. 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO TEST V: 
THE PORTRAIT JUDGING TEST ( N=l50) 
1 
4 
20 
49 
0 
26 
15 
81 
134 
2 
Category 
3 4 
5 4 
3 102 
66 26 
1 47 
67 30 
0 23 
9 4 
1 0 
18 
8 
19 
11 
58 
16 
0 
5 
9 
2 
0 
50 
10 
23 
8 
1 
6 
30 
5 
1 
33 
6 
31 
32 
14 
Modal 
Category 
4 
3 
2 
5 
2 
4 
1 
1 
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DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO TEST V--Continued 
Item Category Modal 1 2 3 4 5 6 Category 
9 46 13 29 25 14 23 1 
10 0 1 10 81 42 16 4 
11 25 5 11 13 23 73 6 
12 7 8 55 42 23 15 3 
13 0 1 0 133 5 11 4 
14 19 23 51 /¥) 10 7 3 
15 33 0 1 23 9 84 6 
16 1 1 12 21 43 72 6 
17 61 1 78 8 2 0 3 
18 95 16 9 10 3 17 1 
19 29 7 68 20 14 12 3 
20 55 5 67 4 11 8 3 
21 29 1 19 37 25 51 6 
22 3 0 142 3 2 0 3 
23 14 13 35 28 34 26 3 
24 8 46 17 13 18 48 6 
25 7 89 28 6 4 16 2 
Note: 
Categories are: <1> love mirth, happiness; {2) sur--
prise; (3} fear, suffering; (4J determination, anger; {5} 
disgust; { 6} contempt. 
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ABSTRACT 
It is the hypothesis o~ this dissertation that inter-
personal empathic ability and aesthetic empathic ability 
constitute one factor or ability. A secondary purpose of 
the dissertation is to explore and evaluate all possible 
methods of measuring empathic ability, and to develop a 
good pencil and paper test of empathic ability. 
"Empathy" is understood here as "pathic perception" 
--the perception or cognition of feeling and emotion. 
The methodology of the dissertation involves a theo-
retical review and synthesis, and an experiment. 
A review of the literature reveals four basic types of 
empathy theories: (1) self-theories; (2) associationist 
theories; (J) Gestalt theories; (4} motor theories. Though 
the theorists representing these four positions argue among 
themselves as to how the process of empathy operates, al-
most without exception they agree that it operates in the 
same manner in the perception of persons. as it does in the 
perception of objects of art. The weight of theoretical 
opinion is overwhelming on this point. Interpersonal empa-
thy and aesthetic empathy are held by all of the major em-
pathy theorists to be one and the same process. 
Five major types of tests have been used to measure 
empathic ability or are said to contain empathic ability as 
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a .factor. To verify the hypothesis o.f the dissertation, 
Test Battery: Form I was constructed including each o.f 
these types o.f tests. Seven tests were included: (1) a test 
o.f judging the emotions expressed by drawings o.f stick .fig-
ures; ( 2) a test o.f predicting the trait ratings o.f persons 
who appeared in a motion picture; (3} the Empathy Test 
(Chicago: Psychometric A.f.filiates); (4) a test of judging 
the emotions expressed by variously shaped lines; (5) a 
test o.f judging the emotions expressed by portrait paint-
ings; (6) a test of judging the emotions expressed by mod-
em, abstract paintings; ( 7) a test o.f matching a male se-
ries and a .female series o.f pictures of .facial expressions; 
i.e., on the basis of identity of emotion expressed. 
It was predicted on the basis o.f the hypothesis that 
subjects' scores would be highly correlated on all seven 
tests. For example, a subject who scores high on one test 
should score equally high on all o.f the other tests. 
Four significant correlations resulted: r:t.,2=.22; 
IJ.,6•.18; r4,5•.24; r4,,..20 (N•l50}·. These correlations 
involve all o.f the tests except Test III: The Empathy Test, 
which is the only non-visual test in the battery. There ap-
parently is a common factor in the other six tests. This 
may well be the unitary factor o.f empathic ability. 
Two tests o.f an abstract, aesthetic nature are corre-
lated with three tests of an interpersonal nature. This is 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis. 
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Equally supportive is the result that a group of 26 
subjects, who were receiving clinical training in interper-
sonal empathy, scored significantly higher than the rest o!' 
the sample on those two tests which are abstract and aes-
thetic. These subjects had had no special training in art 
or aesthetics. 
The experimental results, however, are tentative since 
the reliability of several of the tests is low. Yet, the 
combined effect of theory and experiment is definitely to 
support the hypothesis that interpersonal empathic ability 
and aesthetic empathic ability constitute one factor or 
ability. 
It is recommended that in future efforts to measure 
empathic ability Test Battery: Form I be refined and used. 
With increased reliability it would be the best pencil and 
paper test of empathic ability yet developed, and would al-
so be, when used with factor analysis, a powerful research 
tool. 
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